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The Universal Declaration of Human Rights states that ‘everyone has the right to take 
part in the government of his country, directly or through freely chosen representatives’. 
The United Nations has thus been involved in the field of electoral assistance since its 
founding in 1945, working to establish and advance the principles of democracy and 
political rights. 
The work of the UN in elections is most often most associated with comprehensive 
modern peacekeeping and peace-building operations, for example, in Cambodia, El 
Salvador and Mozambique, and more recently in Afghanistan and Iraq. These efforts 
are, however, only the most visible part of UN electoral assistance activities that 
currently support democratic election processes in over 50 countries. 
The design of electoral systems is a vital component of these processes. It cannot be 
considered in isolation from the wider context of constitutional and institutional design, 
and it can be critical for areas as diverse as conflict management, gender representation 
and the development of political party systems. Done well, electoral system design can 
add to the momentum of political change, encourage popular participation, and enable 
the emergence of legitimate representatives who are capable of handling a wide range 
of needs and expectations, immediately and in the future. Done badly, it can derail 
progress towards democracy or even political stability. 
To be successful, electoral system design processes must build understanding and 
trust–not just among politicians and election administrators, but among civil society 
organizations, among commentators, and above all among the citizens of a country 
undergoing democratic reform. Electoral systems must be designed not only to work 
under current situations but also to accommodate future changes in attitudes and 
behaviour as electoral incentives change. They can contribute to the development of 
stable democracy or they can be a major stumbling block to it. 
I am delighted therefore to welcome the publication of this new Handbook by 
International IDEA. It lays out essential knowledge about electoral systems and their 
consequences, presenting complex ideas with accessible clarity. It addresses key issues in 
the process of democratic transition and reform in a practical way. It is clear, simple and 
global in its approach, and will be a vital tool for those involved in the development of 
stable democracies. It should be made widely available and be widely read by electoral 
practitioners worldwide. 
Carina Perelli 
Director, United Nations Electoral Assistance Division 
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It is now 50 years since Maurice Duverger’s work initiated the widespread study of 
electoral systems and their effects. For many years, however, the impact of this study on 
the real political world was limited.  The worlds of political scientists and of electoral 
framework designers did not often connect, and the scope for institutional change was 
itself limited in many parts of the world of the Cold War.
The 1990s saw an explosion of innovation and reform in electoral systems, especially 
as the new democracies in Africa, Asia, Eastern Europe, Latin America and the former 
Soviet Union began actively reforming their political and electoral systems and looking 
for options and experiences from elsewhere. Responding to this need for comparative 
information and guidance, IDEA, as a newly established international organization 
specifically mandated to promote democracy and electoral assistance, drew upon these 
many and varied experiences to create its first published Handbook, the International 
IDEA Handbook of Electoral System Design, in 1997. Since then, this resource has been 
widely used and has received much positive feedback. It has been made available on 
IDEA’s web site, distributed by CD ROM, and produced in French, Spanish, Arabic 
and Burmese editions. 
Notwithstanding its continuing success, there have, in the period since the first 
edition was published, been many more innovations and developments in electoral 
system design. Several countries have changed their systems, and lessons have been 
learnt in the process. There is much more understanding about the relationship 
between electoral systems and party systems and the broader democratic institutional 
framework, especially in the newer democracies. There is clearer acknowledgement that 
electoral system change is not simply a technical matter, but a political process requiring 
public debate and careful consensus building. In this context, electoral system design 
can be a crucial tool in conflict management strategies, helping to lay firm foundations 
for sustainable democracy.
IDEA is publishing this new edition —Electoral System Design: The New International 
IDEA Handbook—as part of its tenth anniversary celebrations. While staying faithful to 
the original edition, the new Handbook features an updated core text, fresh material on 
the process of electoral system reform, new case studies, and several additional sections 
on particular issues such as the quality of representation, the challenge of post-conflict 
situations, and the use of direct democracy options. There is also a revised listing of 
the electoral systems of the world through the maps, annexes and tables.  We hope the 
result is an accessible and useful volume which will assist those actively engaged in the 
process of democracy building. We would welcome your comments, suggestions and 
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1. The Choice of Electoral System is one of the most important institutional 
decisions for any democracy. In almost all cases the choice of a particular electoral 
system has a profound effect on the future political life of the country concerned, and 
electoral systems, once chosen, often remain fairly constant as political interests solidify 
around and respond to the incentives presented by them. However, while conscious 
design has become far more prevalent recently, traditionally it has been rare for electoral 
systems to be consciously and deliberately selected. Often the choice was essentially 
accidental, the result of an unusual combination of circumstances, of a passing trend, 
or of a quirk of history, with the impact of colonialism and the effects of influential 
neighbours often being especially strong. 
2. Any new democracy must choose (or inherit) an electoral system to elect its legislature. 
Equally, political crisis within an established democracy may lead to momentum for 
electoral system change, and even without political crisis campaigners for political 
reform may attempt to put electoral system change onto the political agenda. Decisions 
to change, or indeed to keep in place, an electoral system are often affected by one of 
two circumstances: 
• either political actors lack basic knowledge and information so that the choices and 
consequences of different electoral systems are not fully recognized; 
• or, conversely, political actors use their knowledge of electoral systems to promote 
designs which they think will work to their own partisan advantage. 
The choices that are made may have consequences that were unforeseen when they are 
introduced, as well as effects which were predicted. These choices may not always be 
the best ones for the long-term political health of the country concerned, and at times 
they can have disastrous consequences for its democratic prospects.
1. Overview
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3. The background to a choice of electoral system can thus be as important as the 
choice itself. Electoral system choice is a fundamentally political process, rather 
than a question to which independent technical experts can produce a single ‘correct 
answer’. In fact, the consideration of political advantage is almost always a factor in 
the choice of electoral systems—sometimes it is the only consideration—while the 
menu of available electoral system choices is often, in reality, a relatively constrained 
one. Equally, however, calculations of short-term political interest can often obscure 
the longer-term consequences of a particular electoral system and the interests of the 
wider political system. Consequently, while recognizing the practical constraints, this 
Handbook attempts to approach the issue of electoral system choices in as broad and 
comprehensive a manner as possible. 
4. This Handbook is aimed in particular at political negotiators, the designers of 
constitutions and those involved in debate on political institutions in new, fledgling, 
and transitional democracies. However, as the crafting of political institutions is a 
critical task not only for new democracies but also for those established democracies 
that are seeking to adapt their systems to better reflect new political realities, the 
Handbook also seeks to address the likely concerns of those persons in established 
democracies who may be designing or redesigning electoral systems. Given this target 
audience, much of the academic literature on the subject is necessarily simplified, while 
at the same time the Handbook attempts to address some of the more complex issues 
inherent in the area. If the Handbook appears to be sometimes overly simplistic and at 
other times unduly complex, the explanation will usually lie in the attempt to balance 
the two objectives of clarity and comprehensiveness. 
While the contexts in which emerging and established democracies make institutional 
choices can vary enormously, their long-term purposes are usually the same: to adopt 
institutions which are strong enough to promote stable democracy but flexible enough 
to react to changing circumstances. Each type of democracy has much to learn from 
the experiences of the other. 
Institutional design is an evolving process, and this Handbook seeks to distil the lessons 
learnt from the many actual examples of institutional design around the world. 
5. Much constitutional design has taken place relatively recently: the global movement 
towards democratic governance in the 1980s and 1990s stimulated a new urgency in 
the search for enduring models of appropriate representative institutions, and a fresh 
evaluation of electoral systems. This process was encouraged by the realization that 
the choice of political institutions can have a significant impact on the wider political 
system. For example, it is increasingly being recognized that an electoral system 
can be designed both to provide local geographic representation and to promote 
proportionality; can promote the development of strong and viable national political 
parties, and ensure the representation of women and regional minorities; and can help 
to ‘engineer’ cooperation and accommodation in a divided society by the creative use of 




most influential of all political institutions, and of crucial importance to broader issues 
of governance. 
6. While the focus of this Handbook is on electoral systems at national level, the 
options discussed are those available to any community seeking to organize a vote. 
The Handbook may therefore be of value not only to designers of national, local and 
supranational institutions but also, for example, to professional associations, trade 
unions and civil society organizations.
How to Use this Handbook
7. Through providing this detailed analysis of choices and consequences, and showing 
how electoral systems have worked throughout the democratic world, this Handbook 
aims to achieve two things: to expand knowledge and illuminate political and public 
discussions; and to give designers of constitutions, political frameworks and electoral 
legislation the tools to make an informed choice and thereby avoid some of the more 
dysfunctional and destabilizing effects of particular electoral system choices. 
8. The Handbook begins with a discussion of what electoral systems actually are (and 
what they are not), and why they are important to a nation’s political success and 
stability. It then suggests ten criteria to be used when trying to decide which electoral 
system is best for any given society (paragraphs 27–45) and discusses issues relating to 
the process of review and change. Having set up this framework, it describes in chapters 
2 and 3 the different systems and their possible consequences. The advantages and 
disadvantages of each system are drawn from historical experience and the writings of 
scholars in the field. 
9. There are a large number of different electoral systems currently in use and many 
more permutations on each form, but for the sake of simplicity we have categorized 
electoral systems into three broad families: plurality/majority systems, proportional 
systems, and mixed systems. Within these there are nine ‘sub-families’: First Past The 
Post (FPTP), Block Vote (BV), Party Block Vote (PBV), Alternative Vote (AV), and 
the Two-Round System (TRS) are all plurality/majority systems; List Proportional 
Representation (List PR) and the Single Transferable Vote (STV) are both proportional 
systems; and Mixed Member Proportional (MMP) and Parallel systems are both 
examples of the mixed model. In addition, there are other systems such as the Single 
Non-Transferable Vote (SNTV), the Limited Vote (LV), and the Borda Count (BC) 
which do not fit neatly into any particular category (see figure 1) and can be regarded 
as three further sub-families. 
10. This family tree is designed to provide a clear and concise guide to the choice among 
systems. While rooted in long-established conventions, it attempts to take account of 
all the electoral systems used for national-level legislative elections in the world today, 
regardless of wider questions of democracy and legitimacy. The systems are classified by 
the process on which each is based, rather than their outcome: while results in countries 
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that use a proportional system are normally more proportional than results in countries 
using a plurality/majority system, this is not always the case. 
11. After describing the mechanics and consequences of each electoral system, chapter 3 
moves on to address a number of issues which can relate to all electoral systems, such as 
the representation of women and minorities, communal representation, election timing, 
compulsory voting and absentee or out-of-country voting. The focus of this Handbook 
is on electing legislatures such as national assemblies or lower houses of parliaments or 
congresses, but electoral system options for choosing a president, for electing the upper 
house of a legislature in bicameral systems, and for electing local government bodies 
are also discussed in chapter 4, and we examine the particular issues facing elections 
to supranational bodies such as the European Parliament, as well as the electoral 
implications of different forms of federalism, both symmetrical and asymmetrical, and 
autonomous jurisdictions. 
Chapter 5 deals with the important cost and administrative implications of electoral 
system choice, and we conclude in chapter 6 with some advice for electoral system 
designers, culled from the experience of a number of experts who have helped draft 
constitutions and electoral laws around the world. The annexes include a table listing 
the electoral system particulars of 213 independent countries and territories, a glossary 
of terms, a bibliography of further reading, and examples of the effects of electoral 
systems and boundary delimitation. 
12. Interspersed throughout the text are 18 case studies which attempt to root the 
abstract theory of electoral system design in practical reality. The authors of these case 
studies, experts on the politics of their assigned country, were asked to address the 
following questions. What is the electoral system and how did it come into being? How 
does it work in practice? What aspects of the system work well? On what grounds is it 
criticized? And, if there was a change at some stage, why was there a change, and does 
the new system fulfil the requirements expected of it? 
13. This Handbook does not aim to provide all the answers to electoral system design; 
instead, the hope is to provide enough information to allow for an informed choice, and 
to open windows to a much broader discussion of which electoral systems may work best 
in a given country. The Handbook is not prescriptive: no formula exists, or can exist, 
to tell the reader, for example, that a society which is 60 per cent Muslim and 40 per 
cent Christian and has a three-party system and a history of violent secessionism should 
have a particular type of electoral system. What it does do is to suggest parameters of 
the available choices and, in so doing, provide a structure for making an informed 
decision. Through the examples and case studies, the reader from one country should 
be able to identify how similar problems and needs have been addressed in other 
parts of the world. Every country is different, but the uniqueness usually rests on its 
particular concoction of basic socio-political factors, for example, the way in which a 
society and culture defines the concept of representation, the salience of ethnicity or 
the history of internal conflict. For this reason the would-be electoral system designer 
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is recommended to begin with the criteria for choice (see paragraphs 27–45) and try 
to prioritize the issues which are particularly important to his or her country; he or she 
can then move on to the options available and their likely consequences and the process 
of consultation and debate that will precede the adoption of a new electoral system. 
The quest for the most appropriate electoral system thus involves assessing the available 
choices against the chosen criteria (always with history, time and political realities in 
mind) in order to identify one or more options which will suit the needs of the country 
concerned. It also involves following a process through which the final choice will be 
accepted as legitimate. 
What Electoral Systems Are
14. At the most basic level, electoral systems translate the votes cast in a general election 
into seats won by parties and candidates. The key variables are the electoral formula 
used (i.e. whether a plurality/majority, proportional, mixed or other system is used, and 
what mathematical formula is used to calculate the seat allocation), the ballot structure 
(i.e. whether the voter votes for a candidate or a party and whether the voter makes a 
single choice or expresses a series of preferences) and the district magnitude (not how 
many voters live in a district, but how many representatives to the legislature that 
district elects). It must also be stressed that, although this Handbook does not focus on 
the administrative aspects of elections (such as the distribution of polling places, the 
nomination of candidates, the registration of voters, who runs the elections and so on), 
these issues are of critical importance, and the possible advantages of any given electoral 
system choice will be undermined unless due attention is paid to them. Electoral system 
design also affects other areas of electoral laws: the choice of electoral system has an 
influence on the way in which district boundaries are drawn, how voters are registered, 
the design of ballot papers, how votes are counted, and numerous other aspects of the 
electoral process.
The Importance of Electoral Systems
15. Political institutions shape the rules of the game under which democracy is 
practised, and it is often argued that the easiest political institution to manipulate, for 
good or for bad, is the electoral system. In translating the votes cast in a general election 
into seats in the legislature, the choice of electoral system can effectively determine who 
is elected and which party gains power. While many aspects of a country’s political 
framework are often specified in the constitution and can thus be difficult to amend, 
electoral system change often only involves new legislation. 
16. Even with each voter casting exactly the same vote and with exactly the same 
number of votes for each party, one electoral system may lead to a coalition government 
or a minority government while another may allow a single party to assume majority 
control. The examples presented in annex D illustrate how different electoral systems 




Electoral Systems and Party Systems
17. A number of other consequences of electoral systems go beyond this primary effect. 
Some systems encourage, or even enforce, the formation of political parties; others 
recognize only individual candidates. The type of party system which develops, in 
particular the number and the relative sizes of political parties in the legislature, is 
heavily influenced by the electoral system. So is the internal cohesion and discipline of 
parties: some systems may encourage factionalism, where different wings of one party 
are constantly at odds with each other, while another system might encourage parties 
to speak with one voice and suppress dissent. Electoral systems can also influence the 
way parties campaign and the way political elites behave, thus helping to determine 
the broader political climate; they may encourage, or retard, the forging of alliances 
between parties; and they can provide incentives for parties and groups to be broadly-
based and accommodating, or to base themselves on narrow appeals to ethnicity or 
kinship ties. 
Electoral Systems and Conflict Management
18. These different impacts underline the important role that electoral systems often 
have in terms of conflict management. It is clear that different electoral systems can 
aggravate or moderate tension and conflict in a society. At one level, a tension exists 
between systems which put a premium on representation of minority groups and those 
which encourage strong single-party government. At another level, if an electoral 
system is not considered fair and the political framework does not allow the opposition 
to feel that they have the chance to win next time around, losers may feel compelled 
to work outside the system, using non-democratic, confrontationalist and even violent 
tactics. And finally, because the choice of electoral system will determine the ease or 
complexity of the act of voting, it inevitably impacts on minorities and underprivileged 
groups. This is always important, but becomes particularly so in societies where there 
are a substantial number of inexperienced or illiterate voters (see chapter 5 on Cost and 
Administrative Implications). 
Psychological and Mechanical Effects
19. Electoral systems are generally considered to have both ‘mechanical’ and 
‘psychological’ effects. The mechanical impact is most apparent in the way different 
electoral systems tend to encourage different kinds of party system. Plurality/majority 
systems often tend to have a constraining effect on party numbers, while proportional 
systems tend to be more ‘permissive’, resulting in a greater diversity of parties. The 
psychological impact of electoral systems reinforces this mechanical effect: under FPTP 
rules, voters who wish to support a minor party are often faced with a dilemma as to 
how best to avoid ‘wasting’ their vote, as only one candidate can be elected from any 
single-member district. The result of this dilemma is that many voters will not express 
their sincere choice but rather will vote for another candidate (usually from a major 
party) who they believe has a realistic chance of winning the seat. The overall effect of 
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this is to strengthen larger parties at the expense of smaller ones. Proportional systems 
or systems that allow multiple ballot choices, by contrast, are more likely to facilitate 
the election of small parties, and hence the pressure to vote strategically is reduced. 
The Importance of Context
20. It is important to realize that a given electoral system will not necessarily work in 
the same way in different countries. Although there are some common experiences 
in different regions of the world, the effects of a particular type of electoral system 
depend to a great extent on the socio-political context in which it is used. For 
example, while there remains general agreement that plurality/majority systems tend 
to restrict the range of legislative representation and PR systems encourage it, the 
conventional wisdom that plurality/majority rules will produce a two-party system 
and PR a multiparty system is looking increasingly dated. In recent years, FPTP has 
not facilitated the aggregation of the party system in established democracies such as 
Canada and India, nor has it led to the formation of strong and lasting parties in Papua 
New Guinea. PR has seen the election of dominant single-party regimes in Namibia, 
South Africa and elsewhere. More broadly, the consequences of the choice of electoral 
system depend on factors such as how a society is structured in terms of ideological, 
religious, ethnic, racial, regional, linguistic or class divisions; whether the country is 
an established democracy, a transitional democracy or a new democracy; whether there 
is an established party system, or parties are embryonic or unformed, and how many 
‘serious’ parties there are; and whether a particular party’s supporters are geographically 
concentrated or dispersed over a wide area. 
The Broader Democratic Framework
21. It is also important not to see electoral systems in isolation. Their design and effects 
are heavily contingent upon other structures within and outside the constitution. 
Electoral systems are one square of an interrelated patchwork of government systems, 
rules and points of access to power. Successful electoral system design comes from 
looking at the framework of political institutions as a whole: changing one part of this 
framework is likely to cause adjustments in the way other institutions within it work. 
22. For example, how does the chosen electoral system facilitate or encourage conflict 
resolution between party leaders and activists on the ground? How much control do 
party leaders have over the party’s elected representatives? Are there constitutional 
provisions for referendums, citizens’ initiatives or ‘direct democracy’ which may 
complement the institutions of representative democracy? And are the details of the 
electoral system specified in the constitution, as an attached schedule to the constitution 
or in regular legislation? This will determine how entrenched the system is or how open 
it may be to change by elected majorities (see paragraph 49). 
23. There are two issues of this kind that are worth considering in more detail. The 




are the units symmetrical in their power or asymmetrical? The second is the choice 
between parliamentarism and presidentialism. Both systems have their advocates, and 
the traditions of different countries may influence which is chosen or even foreclose 
debate; but the different relationship between legislative and executive institutions has 
important implications for electoral system design for both. The frequent debates over 
the direct election of mayors and heads of the executive at local level combine both 
issues. 
24. In most bicameral legislatures in federal systems of government, the two chambers 
are elected by different (or incongruent) methods. This makes sense for two prime 
reasons which have to do with the theory underpinning federalism. First, the second 
(or upper) house of a federal legislature is there to represent the regions or states of the 
country, and each state often receives equal representation regardless of population or 
territory size (e.g. the US Senate or South Africa’s National Council of Provinces). 
Second, there is little point in creating a two-chamber legislature unless there is a degree 
of difference between the roles and possibly also of the powers of the two chambers, 
and using the same electoral system for both is more likely to repeat and reinforce the 
majority power that controls the lower chamber—particularly if the elections to both 
chambers are simultaneous. As noted below (see paragraphs 189–192), upper chambers 
provide the opportunity for some degree of electoral innovation to include communities 
of interest which may not be fully represented in national elections to a lower chamber. 
But when elections take place at three or more levels, to the upper chamber of the 
legislature, the lower chamber of the legislature, and the institutions of government 
at regional level, it is crucial that the systems used are considered together. It may for 
example be possible to promote representation of minorities at regional level while 
discouraging or even prohibiting it at national level. Whether this is or is not desirable 
is a matter of political debate and choice. 
25. Until recent years there were few examples of enduring democracies using 
presidential systems. However, the commitment to presidentialism in for example Latin 
America and parts of South-East Asia means that the question now asked is: What 
aspects of institutional design help make presidentialism work? There is some evidence 
from the Latin American experience that stability can be problematic in countries 
with presidential constitutions and highly fragmented party systems, and that there 
are tensions between divided executive and legislative branches when the presidential 
electoral system is over two rounds, the legislative system is List PR and the elections 
are not held concurrently. However, it appears helpful to adopt an electoral system 
which makes it likely that the party or coalition supporting an elected president has a 
significant block, although not necessarily an absolute majority, of elected members of 
the legislature. 
26. Plurality elections for the presidency and simultaneous presidential and legislative 
elections are often seen as helping to focus the party system into fewer and more 
viable challengers for power. However, there can be serious dangers in combining 
the great power that is vested in the hands of a directly elected president who is head 
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of the executive with the use of a plurality method in a diverse or ethnically divided 
country where no single group has an absolute majority. The result can be devastating 
for legitimacy or indeed for the success of a peace process. A presidential electoral 
system may complement a federal system by requiring a successful candidate to 
achieve a winning vote not only nationwide but also a significant fraction of the vote 
in a minimum number of the states of the federation (as in Indonesia or Nigeria: see 
paragraphs 187–188). 
Criteria for Design
27. When designing an electoral system, it is best to start with a list of criteria which 
sum up what you want to achieve, what you want to avoid and, in a broad sense, what 
you want your legislature and executive government to look like. The criteria which 
follow cover many areas, but the list is not exhaustive and the reader may add a host 
of equally valid items. It is also true that some of the criteria outlined overlap and may 
appear contradictory. This is because they often are contradictory: it is the nature of 
institutional design that trade-offs have to be made between a number of competing 
desires and objectives. 
For example, one may want to provide the opportunity for independent candidates to be 
elected, and at the same time to encourage the growth of strong political parties. Or the 
electoral system designer may think it wise to craft a system which gives voters a wide 
degree of choice between candidates and parties, but this may make for a complicated 
ballot paper which causes difficulties for less-educated voters. The trick in choosing 
(or reforming) an electoral system is to prioritize the criteria that are most important 
and then assess which electoral system, or combination of systems, best maximizes the 
attainment of these objectives. 
Providing Representation
28. Representation may take at least four forms. First, geographical representation 
implies that each region, be it a town or a city, a province or an electoral district, has 
members of the legislature whom it chooses and who are ultimately accountable to 
their area. Second, the ideological divisions within society may be represented in the 
legislature, whether through representatives from political parties or independent 
representatives or a combination of both. Third, a legislature may be representative 
of the party-political situation that exists within the country even if political parties 
do not have an ideological base. If half the voters vote for one political party but 
that party wins no, or hardly any, seats in the legislature, then that system cannot be 
said to adequately represent the will of the people. Fourth, the concept of descriptive 
representation considers that the legislature should be to some degree a ‘mirror of the 
nation’ which should look, feel, think and act in a way which reflects the people as 
a whole. An adequately descriptive legislature would include both men and women, 
the young and the old, the wealthy and the poor, and reflect the different religious 




Making Elections Accessible and Meaningful
29. Elections are all well and good, but they may mean little to people if it is difficult 
to vote or if at the end of the day their vote makes no difference to the way the country 
is governed. The ‘ease of voting’ is determined by factors such as how complex the 
ballot paper is, how easy it is for the voter to get to a polling place, how up-to-date the 
electoral register is, and how confident the voter will be that his or her ballot is secret. 
30. Electoral participation—at least as a free choice—is also thought to increase when 
the outcome of elections, either at a national level or in the voter’s particular district, 
is likely to make a significant difference to the future direction of government. If you 
know that your preferred candidate has no chance of winning a seat in your particular 
district, what is the incentive to vote? In some electoral systems the ‘wasted votes’ (i.e. 
valid votes which do not go towards the election of any candidate, as distinct from 
spoiled or invalid ballot papers, which are excluded from the count) can amount to a 
substantial proportion of the total national vote. 
31. Lastly, the actual power of the body being elected helps determine whether its election 
has any meaning. Hollow elections in authoritarian systems which offer no genuine 
choice, where legislatures have little real influence on the formation of governments 
or on government policy, are far less important than elections to legislatures which 
actually have the power to determine central elements in people’s everyday lives. 
32. Even within democratic systems, the choice of electoral system can influence the 
legitimacy of institutions. For example, the Australian Senate between 1919 and 1946 
was elected by a highly disproportional electoral system (the Alternative Vote in multi-
member districts), which produced lopsided and unrepresentative results. This tended 
to undermine the actual legitimacy of the Senate itself in the eyes of both electors 
and politicians and, some observers argued, also undermined public support for the 
institutions of federal government in general. After the system was altered to a fairer 
proportional system (the Single Transferable Vote) in 1948 the Senate began to be 
perceived as more credible and representative, and thus respect for it and its relative 
importance in decision making increased. 
Providing Incentives for Conciliation
33. Electoral systems can be seen not only as ways to constitute governing bodies 
but also as a tool of conflict management within a society. Some systems, in some 
circumstances, will encourage parties to make inclusive appeals for electoral support 
outside their own core vote base; for instance, even if a party draws its support primarily 
from black voters, a particular electoral system may give it the incentive to appeal 
also to white, or other, voters. Thus, the party’s policy platform would become less 
divisive and exclusionary, and more unifying and inclusive. Similar electoral system 
incentives might make parties less ethnically, regionally, linguistically or ideologically 
exclusive. Examples of how different electoral systems have worked as tools of conflict 
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management are given throughout this Handbook. 
34. On the other side of the coin, electoral systems can encourage voters to look outside 
their own group and think of voting for parties which traditionally have represented 
a different group. Such voting behaviour breeds accommodation and community 
building. Systems which give the voter more than one vote or allow the voter to order 
candidates preferentially provide the space for voters to cut across preconceived social 
boundaries. At the 1998 Good Friday agreement election in Northern Ireland, for 
instance, vote transfers under the STV system benefited ‘pro-peace’ parties while still 
providing broadly proportional outcomes. At the 2003 election, however, a shift in 
first-preference votes towards hard-line parties tended to outweigh such effects. 
Facilitating Stable and Efficient Government
35. The prospects for a stable and efficient government are not determined by the 
electoral system alone, but the results a system produces can contribute to stability in a 
number of important respects. The key questions are whether voters perceive the system 
to be fair, whether government can efficiently enact legislation and govern, and whether 
the system avoids discriminating against particular parties or interest groups.
36. The perception of whether results are fair or not varies widely from country to 
country. Twice in the United Kingdom (UK) (in 1951 and 1974) the party winning the 
most votes in the country as a whole won fewer seats than its opponents, but this was 
considered more a quirk of a basically sound system (FPTP—see paragraphs 76–79) 
than an outright unfairness which should be reversed. Conversely, similar results in 
New Zealand in 1978 and 1981, in which the National Party retained office despite 
winning fewer votes than the Labour opposition, are credited as starting the reform 
movement which led to the change of electoral system (see the case study on New 
Zealand). 
37. The question whether the government of the day can enact legislation efficiently is 
partly linked to whether it can assemble a working majority in the legislature, and this 
in turn is linked to the electoral system. As a general rule of thumb, plurality/majority 
electoral systems are more likely to produce legislatures where one party can outvote 
the combined opposition, while PR systems are more likely to give rise to coalition 
governments. Nevertheless, it has to be remembered that PR systems can also produce 
single-party majorities, and plurality/majority systems can leave no one party with a 
working majority. Much depends on the structure of the party system and the nature 
of the society itself. 
38. Finally, the system should, as far as possible, act in an electorally neutral manner 
towards all parties and candidates; it should not openly discriminate against any political 
grouping. The perception that electoral politics in a democracy is an uneven playing 
field is a sign that the political order is weak and that instability may not be far around 




Lesotho Congress for Democracy won every seat in the legislature with only 60 per cent 
of the votes under an FPTP system. The public unrest that followed, culminating in a 
request for military intervention in the country by the Southern African Development 
Community, demonstrated that such a result was not merely unfair but also dangerous, 
and the electoral system was consequently changed for future elections (see the case 
study on Lesotho). 
Holding the Government Accountable
39. Accountability is one of the bedrocks of representative government. Its absence may 
indeed lead to long-term instability. An accountable political system is one in which the 
government is responsible to the voters to the highest degree possible. Voters should be 
able to influence the shape of the government, either by altering the coalition of parties 
in power or by throwing out of office a single party which has failed to deliver. Suitably 
designed electoral systems facilitate this objective. 
40. The conventional wisdom in this area may be simplistic. Traditionally, plurality/
majority systems like FPTP were seen as leading to single parties taking office, while 
PR systems were associated with multiparty coalitions. While the broad logic of this 
association remains valid, there have been sufficient examples in recent years of FPTP 
elections leading to multiparty cabinets (e.g. in India) or of PR elections leading to 
the election of a strong single-party government (e.g. in South Africa) to raise doubts 
about the automatic assumption that one kind of electoral system will lead to particular 
governance outcomes. But clearly, electoral systems do have a major impact on broader 
issues of governance, for both presidential and parliamentary systems. 
Holding Individual Representatives Accountable
41. Accountability at the individual level is the ability of the electorate to effectively 
check on those who, once elected, betray the promises they made during the campaign 
or demonstrate incompetence or idleness in office and ‘throw the rascals out’. Some 
systems emphasize the role of locally popular candidates, rather than on candidates 
nominated by a strong central party. 
Plurality/majority systems have traditionally been seen as maximizing the ability of 
voters to throw out unsatisfactory individual representatives. Again, this sometimes 
remains valid. However, the connection becomes tenuous where voters identify 
primarily with parties rather than candidates, as in the UK. At the same time, open 
and free list systems and STV are designed to allow voters to exercise candidate choice 
in the context of a proportional system. 
Encouraging Political Parties
42. The weight of evidence from both established and new democracies suggests that 
longer-term democratic consolidation—that is, the extent to which a democratic regime 
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is insulated from domestic challenges to the stability of the political order—requires the 
growth and maintenance of strong and effective political parties, and thus the electoral 
system should encourage this rather than entrench or promote party fragmentation. 
Electoral systems can be framed specifically to exclude parties with a small or minimal 
level of support. The development of the role of parties as a vehicle for individual 
political leaders is another trend which can be facilitated or retarded by electoral system 
design decisions. 
Most experts also agree that the electoral system should encourage the development 
of parties which are based on broad political values and ideologies as well as specific 
policy programmes, rather than narrow ethnic, racial or regional concerns. As well as 
lessening the threat of societal conflict, parties which are based on these broad ‘cross-
cutting cleavages’ are more likely to reflect national opinion than those which are based 
predominantly on sectarian or regional concerns. 
Promoting Legislative Opposition and Oversight
43. Effective governance relies not only on those in power but, almost as much, 
on those who oppose and oversee them. The electoral system should help ensure 
the presence of a viable opposition grouping which can critically assess legislation, 
question the performance of the executive, safeguard minority rights, and represent 
its constituents effectively. Opposition groupings should have enough representatives 
to be effective (assuming that their performance at the ballot box warrants it) and in 
a parliamentary system should be able to present a realistic alternative to the current 
government. Obviously the strength of the opposition depends on many other factors 
besides the choice of electoral system, but if the system itself makes the opposition 
impotent, democratic governance is inherently weakened. A major reason for the 
change to an MMP electoral system in New Zealand, for example, was the systematic 
under-representation of smaller opposition parties under FPTP. At the same time, the 
electoral system should hinder the development of a ‘winner takes all’ attitude which 
leaves rulers blind to other views and the needs and desires of opposition voters, and sees 
both elections and government itself as zero-sum contests. 
In a presidential system, the president needs the reliable support of a substantial group 
of legislators: however, the role of others in opposing and scrutinizing government 
legislative proposals is equally important. The separation of powers between legislature 
and executive effectively gives the task of executive oversight to all legislators, not only 
the opposition members. This makes it important to give particular thought to the 
elements of the electoral system which concern the relative importance of political 





Making the Election Process Sustainable 
44. Elections do not take place on the pages of academic books but in the real world, 
and for this reason the choice of any electoral system is, to some degree, dependent 
on the cost and administrative capacities of the country involved. Although donor 
countries often provide substantial financial support for the first, and even the second, 
election in a country in transition to democracy, this is unlikely to be available in the 
long term even if it were desirable. A sustainable political framework takes into account 
the resources of a country both in terms of the availability of people with the skills to be 
election administrators and in terms of the financial demands on the national budget. 
For example, a poor country may not be able to afford the multiple elections required 
under a Two-Round System or be able easily to administer a complicated preferential 
vote count. However, simplicity in the short term may not always make for cost-
effectiveness in the longer run. An electoral system may be cheap and easy to administer 
but it may not answer the pressing needs of a country—and when an electoral system 
is at odds with a country’s needs the results can be disastrous. Alternatively, a system 
which appears at the outset to be a little more expensive to administer and more 
complex to understand may in the long run help to ensure the stability of the country 
and the positive direction of democratic consolidation. 
Taking into Account ‘International Standards’
45. Finally, the design of electoral systems today takes place in the context of a number 
of international covenants, treaties and other kinds of legal instruments affecting 
political issues. While there is no single complete set of universally agreed international 
standards for elections, there is consensus that such standards include the principles of 
free, fair and periodic elections that guarantee universal adult suffrage, the secrecy of 
the ballot and freedom from coercion, and a commitment to the principle of one person, 
one vote. Moreover, while there is no legal stipulation that a particular kind of electoral 
system is preferable to another, there is an increasing recognition of the importance of 
issues that are affected by electoral systems, such as the fair representation of all citizens, 
the equality of women and men, the rights of minorities, special considerations for the 
disabled, and so on. These are formalized in international legal instruments such as the 
1948 Universal Declaration of Human Rights and the 1966 International Covenant on 
Civil and Political Rights, and in the various conventions and commitments concerning 
democratic elections made by regional organizations such as the European Union (EU) 
and the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE).
Conclusions
46. The ten criteria outlined above are at times in conflict with each other or even 
mutually exclusive. The designer of an electoral system must therefore go through 
a careful process of prioritizing which criteria are most important to the particular 
political context before moving on to assess which system will do the best job. A 
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useful way forward is first to list the things which must be avoided at all costs, such as 
political catastrophes which could lead to the breakdown of democracy. For example, 
an ethnically divided country might want above all to avoid excluding minority ethnic 
groups from representation in order to promote the legitimacy of the electoral process 
and avoid the perception that the electoral system was unfair. In contrast, while 
these issues might still be important to it, a fledgling democracy elsewhere might 
have different priorities—perhaps to ensure that a government can enact legislation 
efficiently without fear of gridlock, or that voters are able to remove discredited leaders 
if they so wish. Establishing the priorities among such competing criteria can only be 
the domain of the domestic actors involved in the institutional design process. 
The Process of Change 
47. The process through which an electoral system is designed or altered has a great 
effect on the type of the system which results, its appropriateness for the political 
situation, and the degree of legitimacy and popular support it will ultimately enjoy. 
Electoral systems are very rarely designed on a blank slate where no precedents exist. 
Even the design efforts in Afghanistan and Iraq have historical multiparty competitive 
precedents to draw on (albeit distant in time and casting little light on what may work 
in the future). 
Some key questions of electoral system design are: Who designs? That is, who puts the 
idea of electoral system change onto the political agenda, and who has the responsibility 
for drawing up a proposed new or amended system and through what type of process? 
What are the mechanisms built into the political and legal framework for reform and 
amendment? What process of discussion and dialogue is necessary to ensure that a 
proposed new or amended system is accepted as legitimate? Once change has been 
decided upon, how is it implemented? 
Who Designs?
48. There are several ways by which electoral systems come into being. 
First, they can be inherited without significant alteration from colonial or occupying 
administrations (Malawi, Mali, the Solomon Islands and Palau being examples). 
Second, they can result from peace process negotiations between communal groups 
seeking to bring an end to division or war (e.g. Lesotho, South Africa and Lebanon). In 
these circumstances the electoral system choice may not be open to full public scrutiny 
or debate. 
Third, the system may be effectively imposed by the groups responsible for post-
conflict political reconstruction (e.g. the Coalition authorities in Iraq and the appointed 




Fourth, elements of a previous authoritarian regime may have a strong role in designing 
a new electoral system during the period when they are being divested of power (as in 
Chile).
Fifth, an expert commission may be set up to investigate the electoral system alone (as 
in the UK or Mauritius) or as part of the broader constitutional context (as in Fiji). 
This may lead to recommendations being put to a national referendum (as was the case 
in New Zealand) or to a legislative vote on the commission’s recommendations (as in 
Fiji).
Sixth, citizens may be involved more widely in the design process by the establishment 
of a non-expert citizens’ assembly on the electoral system. This was the approach 
adopted by the Canadian province of British Columbia; it led to a recommendation 
for a change from FPTP to STV that would be put to a province-wide referendum for 





The British Columbia Citizens’ Assembly on Electoral Reform
CASE STUDY: British Columbia
The government of the Canadian province of British Columbia, with the full 
endorsement of the province’s Legislative Assembly, has initiated a historic, unique and 
precedent-setting process on electoral reform by establishing the Citizens’ Assembly 
on Electoral Reform. This is the first time that a government has given a randomly 
selected group of citizens the opportunity and responsibility to independently review 
the electoral system and have its recommendation submitted to the public for approval 
at a referendum. 
The 1996 election for the British Columbia provincial legislature was conducted 
under an FPTP system. It resulted in the New Democratic Party (NDP), with 39 per 
cent of the popular vote, winning 39 seats in the Legislative Assembly—more than the 
33 seats gained by the Liberal Party, which had won 42 per cent of the popular vote. The 
NDP, with less popular support than the Liberal Party, thus formed the government for 
the next five years. This result motivated the Liberal Party to make electoral reform a 
priority in its political campaign for the next election. At the 2001 election the Liberal 
Party promised to implement electoral reform through a Citizens’ Assembly: following 
an election victory which gave it 97 per cent of the seats in the legislature with 58 per 
cent of the popular vote, it clearly had the mandate to pursue these objectives. 
The typical approach used in Canada for the development of public policy issues 
where the government is seeking public review is to establish a commission or board 
of public inquiry, usually led by judges, experts or political leaders. After inviting 
submissions from the public, and following a period of wider consultation, the 
government makes a decision on the actions that will follow, taking into account the 
report produced by the commission. 
The blueprint of the Citizens’ Assembly and the framing of its terms of reference 
were prepared by Gordon Gibson, an author on democracy and former political party 
leader active in business and public affairs, and the new government in consultation 
with electoral reform experts. There were two unique and precedent-setting features 
for British Columbia: the people appointed would not be experts or specialists in the 
field of electoral reform, but would instead be randomly selected citizens from across 
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the province; and, if a change were recommended, the question would be put directly 
to the citizens of the province at a referendum and would not be filtered through the 
government.
The Citizens’ Assembly that resulted was a non-partisan and independent group of 
160 men and women of all ages from across the province of British Columbia, chosen 
by random selection from the electoral register. The selection phase was designed to give 
a balanced list of men and women, reflective of the age distribution of the population 
of British Columbia as reported in the 2001 census, including two members from the 
aboriginal community, and representing the whole of the province. This was followed 
by an intense learning phase for the Assembly during which various electoral system 
experts produced learning materials (all also available to the general public) and held 
sessions with the members to inform them of the different systems available and discuss 
their advantages and disadvantages. 
At the conclusion of the learning phase a report, Preliminary Statement to the People 
of British Columbia, was sent to various groups in society, including members of the 
Legislative Assembly, libraries, municipal district offices, schools and universities, to 
inform the public of the preliminary conclusions of the Citizens’ Assembly. This report 
was followed by a phase of public hearings, during which about 3,000 people attended 
some 50 hearings held in all areas of the province. During the subsequent deliberation 
phase, plenary sessions and discussion groups were held at which the Assembly 
narrowed down the choice of electoral systems to two and, as a group, sketched out the 
details of each system. The first day of that phase featured a repeat of some of the best 
presentations heard during the public hearings—presentations that advocated a variety 
of electoral systems and features. The objectives of all these phases were to identify 
the elements essential to a British Columbian electoral system, review thoroughly all 
electoral system options in the light of these elements and, most importantly, to increase 
public awareness, inclusion and participation. The three essential elements arrived at 
in the end were voter choice, local representation and proportionality. Finally, in late 
October 2004, the Assembly presented its recommendation, in which it supported (by 
146 in favour to seven against) changing the FPTP system to STV. The completion of 
the Citizens’ Assembly process then required the publication of the formal final report 
and the submission of the recommendation to referendum. 
This participatory model attracted significant interest from groups across Canada. 
The concept was recommended to other governments within Canada as a good way of 
involving citizens in issues that should be the domain of citizens, and a similar process 
to the one in British Columbia was initiated by the Ontario government. 
Other elections in Canada have also contributed to the growing support for a review 
of electoral processes. Federal majority governments have often been elected with 
significantly less than 50 per cent of the popular vote. As a result, a number of initiatives 
for a change of the electoral system at federal level, including Fair Vote Canada (FVC), 
have emerged, as have many individual lobbyists and advocates. 
There is reason to think that the experience with the British Columbia Citizens’ 
Assembly will have significant impact on the future of the debate on electoral system 
change, and on the process of review and change in particular, on a federal level in 
Canada. Following pressure from both the NDP and the Conservative Party, the 
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following amendment to the Speech from the Throne was unanimously accepted in 
October 2004: ‘an Order of Reference to the Standing Committee on Procedure and 
House Affairs instructing the committee to recommend a process that engages citizens 
and parliamentarians in an examination of our electoral system with a review of all 
options’. 
The future impact of the British Columbia Citizens’ Assembly on the process of review 
and change of electoral systems on an international scale remains to be seen, but it 
is safe to say that its establishment and work have raised interest in and added to the 














What are the Mechanisms for Reform and Amendment?
49. While electoral systems are an extremely important institution affecting the way 
in which a country’s system of government works, traditionally they have not been 
formally specified in constitutions, the highest source of law. In recent years, however, 
this has started to change. 
Today, a number of countries have ‘embedded’ details about the electoral system in 
their constitution or in a separate schedule to the constitution. The significance of this 
for electoral reformers is that constitutionally entrenched laws are usually much harder 
to change than ordinary laws, usually requiring a special majority in the legislature, 
a national referendum or some other confirmatory mechanism, which shields such 
systems from easy alteration. For example, the South African constitution states 
that the electoral system for the National Assembly elections shall result ‘in general 
in proportionality’ and so reform options are limited to PR-type systems unless a 
constitutional amendment is made. 
However, the details of the electoral system are still more often to be found in regular 
law and thus can be changed by a simple majority in the legislature. This may have 
the advantage of making the system more responsive to changes in public opinion and 
political needs, but it also contains the danger of majorities in a legislature unilaterally 
altering systems to give them political advantage. 
50. The opportunities for reform rely on both the legal mechanisms for change and 
the political context within which calls for change are made. Not all movements for 
electoral system change are successful. Almost all recent examples of major change have 
occurred in one of two sets of circumstances. The first is in the course of a transition to 
democracy or shortly afterwards, when the whole political framework is ‘up for grabs’. 
The second is when there is a crisis of governance in an established democracy. Two 
examples are the perceived illegitimacy of two successive majority governments elected 
with fewer votes than their major opponents in New Zealand, and the perception that 
high levels of corruption in Italy and Japan were endemic to the political system rather 
than the results of the actions of particular individuals. The cases of New Zealand and 
Japan are illustrated in case studies in this Handbook. 
51. Even when there is huge popular distrust and dissatisfaction with the political 
system, change still needs to be agreed by the current holders of power. Political elites 
are only likely to act if they can see benefit to themselves from change or if they are 
frightened of the electoral consequences to themselves of failing to change. Even 
when convinced, they will, unsurprisingly and almost inevitably, seek to choose a 
system that maximizes the benefit to themselves. If they are unsure how this can be 
achieved or if different interests seek different solutions, negotiated compromises may 
be likely—perhaps involving mixed systems. However, agreements and changes may 
not turn out to have the effects intended by their proponents or may produce other, 
unintended effects. In Mexico, reforms in 1994 designed by the governing party to 
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make concessions to the opposition led to the most disproportional result in recent 
years (see the case study on Mexico). 
52. The cases of South Africa and Chile illustrate the fact that political realities and 
the desire of ruling parties to maintain their power and influence can be just as much 
a block on electoral system reform as legal hurdles. In South Africa there have been 
widespread calls for an element of local accountability to be built in to the closed-list 
PR system of large electoral districts under which elected representatives are perceived 
as detached from their electors. These were reinforced by the majority findings of a 
presidential commission which reported in January 2003, but the government shied 
away from changes that would reduce its control over candidate selection and caucus 
voting behaviour, and declined to entertain reform (see the case study on South Africa). 
In Chile General Pinochet’s legacy was to rig the electoral system to advantage his 
allies. More than a decade after his removal from power, that system remains effectively 
unchanged (see the case study on Chile). 
53. In New Zealand (see the case study), the use of referendums during the process of 
change resulted initially from a political move—an attempt by the leader of one major 
party to wrong-foot the other major party during a general election campaign. In the 
first referendum, the electorate was asked whether it wanted change at all and to indicate 
its preferred new system from four options. In the second, the chosen new system was 
pitted against the retention of the previous system. As a result, the new multi-member 
proportional system was adopted with a clear expression of public legitimacy. 
54. Electoral systems will inevitably need to adapt over time if they are to respond 
adequately to new political, demographic and legislative trends and needs. However, 
once a system is in place, those who have benefited from it are likely to resist change. 
Without a transition or a major political crisis as catalyst, it appears that change at 
the margins may well be more likely than fundamental reform. In post-conflict 
transitions, this creates a tension between the practical constraints that may affect the 
implementation of elections driven for example by the political imperatives of a peace 
agreement, and the desirability of getting the system right at the beginning. 
To try to engineer improvements within existing systems, reformers may consider 
changing district magnitude (see paragraphs 113–118), threshold levels (see paragraph 
119) or quota formulae (see annex B). Many significant reforms proposed in the past 
few years have involved adding a List PR element on to an existing FPTP system to 
create a mixed, more proportional system (e.g. the changes enacted in Lesotho and 
Thailand: see the case studies). 
Advice on Debate and Dialogue
55. It is the task of reformers not only to understand the legal form of the technical 
arguments for and the implications of potential change but also to understand and 




framework of the country. Significant voices in civil society, academia and the media 
may contribute to developing a public perception that change is necessary. But a 
sufficient number of those in power will need to be convinced of the benefits, including 
the benefits to themselves. 
56. Even with the current increased interest in electoral systems, the number of people, 
both in elite circles and in society generally, who understand the likely impact of 
changes may be very limited. This is further complicated by the fact that the operation 
of electoral systems in practice may be heavily dependent on apparently minor points of 
detail. Reformers may need not only to fully work through and explain the legal detail 
that would be necessary to implement change, but also to make technical projections 
and simulations (often using data from previous elections) to show, for example, the 
shape and implications of proposals on electoral districts or the potential impact on 
the representation of political parties. Technical simulations can also be used to ensure 
that all contingencies are covered and to evaluate apparently unlikely outcomes: it is 
better to answer questions while change is being promoted than in the middle of a crisis 
later! 
57. Voter involvement programmes, for example, inviting members of the public to 
participate in mock elections under a potential new system, may attract media attention 
and increase familiarity with proposals for change. They may also help to identify the 
problems—for example, voter difficulty with ballot papers—which a new system may 
generate. 
Advice on Implementation 
58. Voters, election administrators, politicians and commentators all tend to be 
comfortable with what is familiar. Years of use may have smoothed the rough edges 
of established systems. A new system can thus be a leap into the unknown, and 
problems in implementation can arise from its unfamiliarity. This cannot be avoided 
completely, and the planners of change cannot sit back when legislative changes are in 
place. A process of change is complete only with intensive voter education programmes 
to explain to all participants how the new system works and with the design and 
agreement of user-friendly implementing regulations. 
59. The most effective voter education—and election administrator education—takes 
time. However, time is often in short supply to an electoral management body (EMB) 
organizing an election under a new system. All good negotiators use time pressure 
before a final agreement is reached, and this is particularly true when the new system 
is the product of hard negotiation between political actors. An effective EMB will 
nonetheless prepare as much as possible as early as possible. 
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Assessing the Impact of Change
60. Having discussed the process of change in some depth, a word of caution is needed. 
Because electoral systems have psychological as well as mechanical effects, the long-
term effect of changes may take some time to work through. Parties, candidates and 
voters may take two or three elections to fully observe and respond to the effects and 
incentives of particular changes. The tendency towards mixed systems may accentuate 
this, as the overall effect on candidates and voters of mixed incentives may be less 
clear. 
Judgement may be necessary as to whether problems in a new or amended electoral 
system are merely transitional or whether they show that the system is fundamentally 
flawed and requires urgent amendment or replacement. In the aftermath of George 
Speight’s 2000 coup, such a debate is currently taking place in Fiji: will the Alternative 
Vote settle down so that parties and voters respond to incentives for inter-ethnic 
moderation, or does the course of events since its adoption in 1997 indicate that it is 
fundamentally unsound in the Fijian context? 
Trends in Electoral System Reform
61. The Italian referendum in 1993, leading to a change to a Mixed Member 
Proportional System for the elections the following year, marked the beginning of a 
series of significant changes in electoral systems all over the world. In the vast majority 
of the cases, changes have been made on the margins, with a new seat allocation 
formula, a new number of electoral districts, or an extra few appointed members in the 
legislature; but as many as 26 other countries have since followed Italy’s example and 
gone through reform processes that have altered their electoral system completely (see 
Table 1). 
As Table 1 shows, the trend is rather clear. Most countries that have changed electoral 
systems have done so in the direction of more proportionality, either by adding a PR 
element to a plurality system (making it a Parallel or MMP system) or by completely 
replacing their old system with List PR. The most common switch has been from a 
plurality/majority system to a mixed system, and there is not one example of a change 
in the opposite direction. The new plurality/majority systems all come from within the 
same family except for the case of Madagascar, which moved from a List PR system, 
not to a pure plurality/majority system, but to a hybrid where the FPTP share is larger 




Table 1: Recent Changes to Electoral Systems 
  New System(Family) 
 Previous System  Plurality/Majority Mixed Proportional Other
         (Family)   Representation
 Plurality Bermuda Lesotho Iraq Jordan
 /Majority (BV to FPTP) (FPTP to MMP) (TRS to List PR) (BV to SNTV)
  Fiji Monaco Rwanda Afghanistan
  (FPTP to AV) (TRS to Parallel) (FPTP to List PR) (FPTP to SNTV)
  Montserrat New Zealand Sierra Leone
  (FPTP to TRS) (FPTP to MMP) (FPTP to List PR)
  Papua New Guinea Philippines South Africa
  (FPTP to AV) (BV to Parallel) (FPTP to List PR)
  Mongolia Thailand Moldova
  (BV to TRS) (BV to Parallel) (TRS to List PR)
   Ukraine
   (TRS to Parallel)
   Russian Federation
   (TRS to Parallel)
 Mixed  Mexico Macedonia
   (Parallel to MMP) (Parallel to List PR)
    Croatia
    (Parallel to List PR)
 Proportional  Madagascar Bolivia
 Representation (List PR to FPTP  (List PR to MMP)
 & List PR) 
  Italy
  (List PR to MMP)
  Venezuela
  (List PR to MMP)
Other  Japan
  (SNTV to Parallel)
Note: Independent countries’ and related territories’ reforms to electoral systems for national-level 
legislatures (for countries or territories with bicameral legislatures, the system for the lower house) 
over the period 1993–2004. Kyrgyzstan changed from a TRS to a Parallel system and back to TRS 
again within this period and is not included in the table.
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Design Components
62. Once a decision has been made about the important goals to be achieved—and 
the important pitfalls to be avoided—in a new electoral system, there are a group 
of electoral system design tools which can be used to help achieve these goals. They 
include, among others, electoral system family and type, district magnitude, the relative 
role of political parties and candidates, the form of the ballot paper, the procedures for 
drawing electoral boundaries, the electoral registration mechanisms, the timing and 
synchronization of elections, and quotas and other special provisions. 
These tools will work differently in different combinations. Their use may depend 
on the level of information that is or can be available within a society, for example 
the numbers, diversity and location of the population. Their effect will also depend 
on other institutional framework tools, such as the choice between parliamentarism 
and presidentialism, the requirements for registration and management of political 
parties, the relationship between political parties and elected members, and the role 
of instruments of direct democracy—referendums, citizens’ initiatives, and recall. It 
is worth emphasizing again that there is never a single ‘correct solution’ that can be 






63. There are countless electoral system variations, as noted in paragraph 9 
above, but essentially they can be divided into 12 main systems, the majority of which 
fall into three broad families. The most common way to look at electoral systems is to 
group them according to how closely they translate national votes won into legislative 
seats won, that is, how proportional they are. To do this, one needs to look at both the 
votes-to-seats relationship and the level of wasted votes. For example, South Africa 
used a classically proportional electoral system for its elections of 2004, and with 69.69 
per cent of the popular vote the African National Congress (ANC) won 69.75 per cent 
of the national seats. The electoral system was highly proportional, and the number 
of wasted votes (i.e. those which were cast for parties which did not win seats in the 
Assembly) was only 0.74 per cent of the total. In direct contrast, in Mongolia in 2000, a 
Two-Round System only requiring a plurality of 25 per cent of the votes for candidates 
to be elected resulted in the Mongolian People’s Revolutionary Party (MPRP) winning 
72 seats in the 76-member Parliament with around 52 per cent of the popular vote. 
This result was mirrored in Djibouti’s Party Block Vote election of 2003 when all 65 
legislative seats were won by the Rassemblement Populaire pour le Progrès with 62.7 
per cent of the vote. 
64. However, under some circumstances non-proportional electoral systems (such as 
FPTP) can give rise to relatively proportional overall results, for example, when party 
support is concentrated in regional fiefdoms. This was the case in another Southern 
African country, Malawi, in 2004. In that election the Malawian Congress Party won 
30 per cent of the seats with 25 per cent of the votes, the United Democratic Front won 
27 per cent of the seats with 25 per cent of the votes, and the Alliance for Democracy 
won a little more than 3 per cent of the seats with just under 4 per cent of the votes. 
The overall level of proportionality was high, but the clue to the fact that this was not 
inherently a proportional system, and so cannot be categorized as such, was that the 
wasted votes still amounted to almost half of all votes cast.
2. The World of Electoral 
Systems
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Equally, some design factors accentuate disproportionality. Systems with a high level 
of malapportionment often produce disproportional results, as do proportional systems 
with high thresholds—which can result in a high level of wasted votes, as in Turkey in 
2002 where a 10 per cent threshold resulted in 46 per cent of votes being wasted. 
65. If we take the proportionality principle into account, along with some other 
considerations such as how many members are elected from each district and how many 
votes the voter has, we are left with the family structure illustrated in fi gure 1. 
Figure 1: The Electoral System Families 
 
 The Electoral System Families 
 Plurality/Majority Mixed Proportional Other
   Representation
 FPTP TRS AV BV PBV PAR- MMP LIST STV SNTV LV BC
      ALLEL  PR
Plurality/Majority Systems
66. The distinguishing feature of plurality/majority systems is that they usually 
use single-member districts. In an FPTP system (sometimes known as a plurality 
single-member district system) the winner is the candidate with the most votes but 
not necessarily an absolute majority of the votes (see paragraphs 76–79). When this 
system is used in multi-member districts it becomes the Block Vote. Voters have as 
many votes as there are seats to be fi lled, and the highest-polling candidates fi ll the 
positions regardless of the percentage of the vote they achieve (see paragraphs 80–85). 
This system—with the change that voters vote for party lists instead of individual 
candidates—becomes the Party Block Vote (see paragraphs 86–88). Majoritarian 
systems, such as the Alternative Vote and the Two-Round System, try to ensure that 
the winning candidate receives an absolute majority (i.e. over 50 per cent). Each 
system in essence makes use of voters’ second preferences to produce a winner with an 




67. The rationale underpinning all PR systems is to consciously reduce the disparity 
between a party’s share of the national vote and its share of the parliamentary seats; if 
a major party wins 40 per cent of the votes, it should win approximately 40 per cent of 
the seats, and a minor party with 10 per cent of the votes should also gain 10 per cent 
of the legislative seats. Proportionality is often seen as being best achieved by the use of 
party lists, where political parties present lists of candidates to the voters on a national 
or regional basis (see paragraphs 106–108), but preferential voting can work equally 
well: the Single Transferable Vote, where voters rank-order candidates in multi-member 
districts, is another well-established proportional system (see paragraphs 109–112). 
Mixed Systems
68. Parallel systems use both a PR element and a plurality/majority (or other) element 
running independently of each other. Mixed Member Proportional (MMP) systems 
also use two elements (one of which is a PR system), with the difference that the PR 
element compensates for any disproportionality arising under the plurality/majority or 
other system, normally leading to a much more proportional outcome than a Parallel 
system. Parallel and MMP systems have been widely adopted by new democracies in 
Africa and the former Soviet Union (see paragraphs 128–137). 
Other Systems
69. Three systems do not fit neatly under any one of the above-mentioned categories. 
The Single Non-Transferable Vote is a multi-member-district, candidate-centred 
system in which voters have one vote. Limited Vote is very much like SNTV but gives 
voters more than one vote (however, unlike Block Vote, not as many as there are seats 
to be filled). Borda Count is a preferential system in single- or multi-member districts 
(see paragraphs 138–144). 
70. As Table 2 and the map which comes with this book illustrate, just under half (91, 
or 46 per cent of the total) of the 199 countries and territories of the world which have 
direct elections to the legislature use plurality/majority systems; another 72 (36 per 
cent) use PR-type systems; 30 (15 per cent) use mixed systems; and only six (3 per cent) 
use one of the other systems. When the different systems are classified by population 
size, the dominance of plurality/majority systems becomes even more pronounced, 
with legislatures elected by FPTP, Block Vote, PBV, AV or TRS methods representing 
collectively 2.65 billion people (54 per cent of the total population of these 199 
countries). PR electoral systems are used in countries totalling 1.19 billion inhabitants, 
mixed systems are used to represent 1.07 billion people, and the population in countries 













Table 2: Electoral Systems for National Legislatures
Note: As of November 2004. Includes only elections to national legislatures and lower houses. 
Based on the methodology used by Arend Lijphart in Patterns of Democracy: Government Forms 
and Performance in Thirty-Six Countries (1999). ‘Established democracies’ include all countries 
considered democratic now, and at least for the last 20 years, ‘new democracies’ include all countries 
that are considered democratic now and have been at least for the past 10 years, and ‘others’ are the 
ones which  have not been considered democratic throughout the past 10 years by the Freedom House 
country ratings (2004) (see <http://www.freedomhouse.org/ratings/index.htm>). For countries 
and territories not included in the Freedom House country ratings (countries with a population 
less than 250,000) we have based our classifications on other sources. Fourteen countries are not 
included in this table because they do not have direct elections or have transitional governments. 
Countries which use two electoral systems running side by side (hybrids) are classified by the system 
under which the largest number of seats in the legislature is elected. 
 1 = Percentage of the 199 countries covered that have this type of electoral system. 
 2 = Percentage of the total population of the 199 countries that live in this type of electoral system. 
 3  = Number of countries/territories.
 4  = Percentage of the established democracies that have this type of electoral system. 
 5  = Percentage of the population in the established democracies that live in this 
   type of electoral system. 
 6  = Number of countries/territories. 
 7  = Percentage of the new democracies that have this type of electoral system.
 8  = Percentage of the population in the new democracies that live in this 
   type of electoral system. 
 9  = Number of countries/territories. 
 Number of  Total Population Established Population New  Population  Other Population
 Countries/  Demo-  Demo-  Countries
 Territories  cracies  cracies
  1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11
FPTP 47 23.6%  2 148 870 177 43.5% 22 32.4% 1 458 403 073 70.3% 4 13.0% 205 865 0.1% 21 21.0% 690 261 239 27.0%
BV 15 7.5%  32 102 545 0.6% 8 11.8% 1 515 622 0.1% 0 0 0 0 7 7.0% 30 586 923 1.2%
PBV 4 2.0% 30 423 015 0.6% 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 4 4.0% 30 423 015 1.2%
AV 3 1.5%  26 214 298 0.5% 2 2.9% 25 333 424 1.2% 0 0 0 0 1 1.0% 880 874 0.0%
TRS 22 11.1% 409 376 918 8.3% 3 4.4% 60 534 006 2.9% 2 6.5% 14708 102 4.8% 17 17.0% 334 134 810 13.1%
List PR 70 35.2% 1 181 718 922 23.9% 21 30.9% 195 051 175 9.4% 19 61.3% 168 528 219 55.0% 30 30.0% 818 139 528 32.%
STV 2 1.0% 4 366 409 0.1% 2 2.9% 4 366 409 0.2% 0 0 0 0 0 0.0% 0 0
MMP 9 4.5% 298 619 263 6.0% 4 5.9% 153 200 059 7.4% 1 3.2% 10 032 375 3.3% 4 4.0% 135 386 829 5.3%
Parallel  21 10.6% 773 091 334 15.7% 2 2.9% 175 931 177 8.5% 5 16.1% 112 701 569 36.8% 14 14.0% 484 458 588 18.9%
SNTV 4 2.0% 34 327 534 0.7% 2 2.9% 202 655 0.0% 0 0 0 0 2 2.0% 34 124 879 1.3%
Modified  1 0.5% 12 809 0.0% 1 1.5% 12 809 0.0% 0 0  0 0 0.0% 0 0
BC
LV  1 0.5% 27 833 0.0% 1 1.5% 27 833 0.0% 0 0 0 0 0 0.0% 0 0
Total 199  4 939 151 057  68  2 074 578 242  31  306 176 130  100  2 558 396 685
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71. In terms of the number of countries which use them, List PR systems are the most 
popular, with 70 out of 199 countries and related territories, giving them 35 per cent of 
the total, followed by the 47 cases of FPTP systems (24 per cent of the 199 countries 
and territories). When it comes to numbers of people, however, FPTP systems are used 
in countries which contain almost twice as many people as List PR countries. The 2.1 
billion figure in Table 2 is inflated by the size of India (population 1.1 billion) and 
the United States (293 million), but FPTP is also used by many tiny Caribbean and 
Oceanian islands as well. The largest country that uses List PR is Indonesia, with 238 
million people, but it is predominantly a system used by middle-sized West European, 
Latin American and African countries. Next in order are Parallel systems (16 per cent 
of world population) and Two-Round systems (8 per cent of world population). While 
TRS systems are used in more countries, therefore, Parallel systems represent more 
people. This is largely because the Russian Federation (144 million inhabitants) and 
Japan (127 million) use classic Parallel systems. 
 10  = Percentage of the ‘other’ countries that have this type of electoral system. 
 11  = Percentage of the population in the ‘other’ countries that live in this type of
   electoral system.
Sources: International IDEA databases; for the classification of democracies, Freedom House 
country ratings, <http://www.freedomhouse.org/ratings/index.htm>; and, for population, US 
Central Intelligence Agency World Factbook and additional estimates for countries and territories 












Table 3: The Distribution of Electoral Systems across National Legislatures 
 Africa Americas Asia Eastern  Western Oceania Middle  Total
    Europe Europe  East
FPTP 15 17 5 0 1 7 2 47
BV 1 3 2 0 3 2 4 15
PBV 3 0 1 0 0 0 0 4
AV 0 0 0 0 0 3 0 3
TRS 8 3 6 1 1 1 2 22
List PR 16 19 3 13 15 0 4 70
STV 0 0 0 0 2 0 0 2
MMP 1 3 0 2 2 1 0 9
Parallel 4 0 8 7 1 1 0 21
SNTV 0 0 1 0 0 2 1 4
BC 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1
LV 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 1
Total 48 45 26 23 26 18 13 199
Note: As of 2004. Includes only elections to national legislatures; for countries with bicameral 










































3 - Total population (in millions)
2 - Electoral Systems: 
Number of Countries and Territories
Figure 2: Electoral System Families: 
1 - Number of Countries and Territories 
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72. The Block Vote is used in 15 countries and territories, 8 per cent of the countries 
included, but its 32 million people only represent 0.7 per cent of the total population 
of the 199 countries in Table 2. Conversely, Mixed Member Proportional systems are 
used in only nine countries—Albania, Bolivia, Germany, Hungary, Italy, Lesotho, 
Mexico, New Zealand and Venezuela—but their collective population of 299 million 
represents 6 per cent of the total population. The Single Transferable Vote, Limited 
Vote, Modified Borda Count, Alternative Vote, Party Block Vote and Single Non-
Transferable Vote systems are the rarest electoral systems in use today, with only one to 
four examples of each. The use of AV in Australia, Fiji and Papua New Guinea means 
that 26 million people live under AV systems, while the SNTV systems of Afghanistan, 
Jordan, the Pitcairn Islands and Vanuatu represent 34 million people, and the Republic 
of Ireland and Malta’s STV systems 4 million. 
73. If we look at electoral systems in ‘established democracies’, then we find that PR 
systems are more numerous, with 21 (31 per cent) out of the 68 countries, but the size 
of India and the United States still means that 70 per cent of people living in these 68 
countries live under FPTP systems. There are a disproportionate number of MMP 
systems among established democracies—6 per cent of the total, while worldwide 
MMP systems are found in only 4.5 per cent of all countries. Both the world’s examples 
of STV, the Republic of Ireland and Malta, fall into the category of established 
democracies. 
74. Across continents, the distribution of electoral systems is more mixed. As Table 
3 and the attached map show, FPTP systems make up approximately 35 per cent of 
the total in Africa, the Americas and Oceania. The system is less common in Europe, 
Asia and Middle East. List PR systems are similarly spread throughout Africa and the 
Americas. However, List PR is more dominant in both Eastern and Western Europe, 
and together the two PR systems (List PR and STV) constitute almost two-thirds of all 
















3. The Systems and 
their Consequences
Plurality/Majority Systems
What Plurality/Majority Systems Are
75. The principle of plurality/majority systems is simple. After votes have been cast and 
totalled, those candidates or parties with the most votes are declared the winners (there 
may also be additional conditions). However, the way this is achieved in practice varies 
widely. Five varieties of plurality/majority systems can be identified: First Past The Post 
(FPTP), Block Vote (BV), Party Block Vote (PBV), Alternative Vote (AV), and the 
Two-Round System (TRS). 
First Past The Post (FPTP)
76. The First Past The Post system is the simplest 
form of plurality/majority system, using single-
member districts and candidate-centred voting. 
The voter is presented with the names of the 
nominated candidates and votes by choosing one, 
and only one, of them. The winning candidate is 
simply the person who wins most votes; in theory 
he or she could be elected with two votes, if every 
other candidate only secured a single vote. 
77. To date, pure FPTP systems are found primarily in the UK and those countries 
historically influenced by Britain. Along with the UK, the cases most often analysed 
are Canada, India and the United States. FPTP is also used by a number of Caribbean 
countries; in Latin America by Belize; in Asia by five countries, Bangladesh, Burma, 
India, Malaysia and Nepal; and by many of the small island countries of the South 
Pacific. In Africa 15 countries, mostly former British colonies, use FPTP systems. 
First Past The Post is the simplest form 
of plurality/majority electoral system. 
The winning candidate is the one 
who gains more votes than any other 
candidate, even if this is not an absolute 
majority of valid votes. The system uses 
single-member districts and the voters 
vote for candidates rather than political 
parties. 
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In total, of the 213 countries listed in annex A (including transitional countries and 
countries with no direct elections) 22 per cent use FPTP systems. 
78. Advantages. First Past The Post, like other plurality/majority electoral systems, is 
defended primarily on the grounds of simplicity and its tendency to produce winners 
who are representatives beholden to defined geographic areas. The most often cited 
advantages are that: 
a. It provides a clear-cut choice for voters between two main parties. The inbuilt 
disadvantages faced by third and fragmented minority parties under FPTP in many 
cases cause the party system to gravitate towards a party of the ‘left’ and a party of 
the ‘right’, alternating in power. Third parties often wither away and almost never 
reach a level of popular support above which their national vote achieves a comparable 
percentage of seats in the legislature. 
b. It gives rise to single-party governments. The ‘seat bonuses’ for the largest party 
common under FPTP (e.g. where one party wins 45 per cent of the national vote but 
55 per cent of the seats) mean that coalition governments are the exception rather than 
the rule. This state of affairs is praised for providing cabinets which are not shackled by 
the restraints of having to bargain with a minority coalition partner. 
c. It gives rise to a coherent opposition in the legislature. In theory, the flip side of 
a strong single-party government is that the opposition is also given enough seats 
to perform a critical checking role and present itself as a realistic alternative to the 
government of the day. 
d. It advantages broadly-based political parties. In severely ethnically or regionally 
divided societies, FPTP is commended for encouraging political parties to be ‘broad 
churches’, encompassing many elements of society, particularly when there are only 
two major parties and many different societal groups. These parties can then field a 
diverse array of candidates for election. In Malaysia, for example, the Barisan Nasional 
government is made up of a broadly-based umbrella movement which fields Malay, 
Chinese and Indian candidates in areas of various ethnic complexions.
e. It excludes extremist parties from representation in the legislature. Unless an extremist 
minority party’s electoral support is geographically concentrated, it is unlikely to win 
any seats under FPTP. (By contrast, under a List PR system with a single national-level 
district, a fraction of 1 per cent of the national vote can ensure representation in the 
legislature.) 
f. It promotes a link between constituents and their representatives, as it produces a 
legislature made up of representatives of geographical areas. Elected members represent 
defined areas of cities, towns or regions rather than just party labels. Some analysts 
have argued that this ‘geographic accountability’ is particularly important in agrarian 
societies and in developing countries. 
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g. It allows voters to choose between people rather than just between parties. Voters 
can assess the performance of individual candidates rather than just having to accept 
a list of candidates presented by a party, as can happen under some List PR electoral 
systems. 
h. It gives a chance for popular independent candidates to be elected. This may be 
particularly important in developing party systems, where politics still revolves more 
around extended ties of family, clan or kinship and is not based on strong party-
political organizations. 
i. Finally, FPTP systems are particularly praised for being simple to use and understand. 
A valid vote requires only one mark beside the name or symbol of one candidate. Even 
if the number of candidates on the ballot paper is large, the count is easy for electoral 
officials to conduct. 
79. Disadvantages. However, FPTP is frequently criticized for a number of reasons. 
These include:
a. It excludes smaller parties from ‘fair’ representation, in the sense that a party which 
wins approximately, say, 10 per cent of the votes should win approximately 10 per 
cent of the legislative seats. In the 1993 federal election in Canada the Progressive 
Conservatives won 16 per cent of the votes but only 0.7 per cent of the seats, and in the 
1998 general election in Lesotho the Basotho National Party won 24 per cent of the 
votes but only 1 per cent of the seats. This is a pattern which is repeated time and time 
again under FPTP. 
b. It excludes minorities from fair representation. As a rule, under FPTP parties put up 
the most broadly acceptable candidate in a particular district so as to avoid alienating 
the majority of electors. Thus it is rare, for example, for a black candidate to be given a 
major party’s nomination in a majority white district in the UK or the USA, and there 
is strong evidence that ethnic and racial minorities across the world are far less likely 
to be represented in legislatures elected by FPTP. In consequence, if voting behaviour 
does dovetail with ethnic divisions, then the exclusion from representation of members 
of ethnic minority groups can be destabilizing for the political system as a whole. 
c. It excludes women from the legislature. The ‘most broadly acceptable candidate’ 
syndrome also affects the ability of women to be elected to legislative office because they 
are often less likely to be selected as candidates by male-dominated party structures. 
Evidence across the world suggests that women are less likely to be elected to the legislature 
under plurality/majority systems than under PR ones. The Inter-Parliamentary Union’s 
study of Women in Parliament found that, as at June 2004, on average 15.6 per cent of 
the representatives in lower houses of legislatures were women. Comparing established 
democracies in 2004, those using FPTP averaged 14.4 per cent women in the legislature, 
but the figure was almost double that —27.6 per cent— in those countries that use some 
















Indian FPTP ballot paper
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INDIA: First Past The Post 
on a Grand Scale
Vijay Patidar 
CASE STUDY: India
India remains by far the largest democracy in the world, with over 670 million electors 
in the parliamentary election of 2004. Its parliamentary government and FPTP 
electoral system are a legacy of British colonialism, which ended in 1947. The British 
introduced self-government to India in stages, and it was not until the end of colonial 
rule and the adoption of the Indian Constitution in November 1949 by a Constituent 
Assembly that universal suffrage was achieved. The Constituent Assembly, which 
comprised eminent jurists, lawyers, constitutional experts and political thinkers, and 
laboured for almost three years, debated at great length which electoral system would be 
best suited to India before finally choosing to retain the FPTP electoral system. Various 
systems of proportional representation were considered and attracted many advocates, 
given India’s extremely diverse and multi-ethnic society, but FPTP was chosen, mainly 
to avoid fragmented legislatures and to help the formation of stable governments—
stability being a major consideration in a country emerging from immediate post-
colonial communal bloodshed and with widespread poverty and illiteracy. 
Under the Indian Constitution, voters elect a 543-member Lok Sabha, or lower 
house, from single-member districts. By contrast, the upper house of Parliament, the 
Rajya Sabha or Council of States, and the corresponding upper houses of some states, 
are indirectly elected by members of the state legislative assemblies. There is also a 
president who is elected by an electoral college composed of members of both houses of 
Parliament and the legislatures of the states, and a vice president who is elected by the 
members of the Rajya Sabha and the Lok Sabha only. 
General elections are held once every five years, but the president may dissolve the 
Lok Sabha on the advice of the prime minister before its term is over, as in the recent 
case of 2004, or if he or she is convinced that no stable government can be formed, as in 
1991. The prime minister holds office for as long as he or she can command a majority 
in the Lok Sabha. All the successive Congress Party governments which ruled India 
continuously until 1977 served for almost five years, close to the maximum allowed in 
the constitution. From 1977 to 1997, governments were less stable, and a number of 
prime ministers had to resign as a result of party splits or votes of no confidence before 
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completing their full term. Since 1997, a period of stability seems to be emerging again, 
now under coalitions of parties. All these political environments have arisen from the 
same FPTP electoral system.
The major effect of the electoral system until 1977 was to guarantee majority 
governments based on a minority of voter support. The FPTP electoral system initially 
resulted in the ruling Congress Party securing stable majorities in the Lok Sabha, 
usually against a fragmented opposition. This fragmentation was characterized by a 
rise in popularity for regional and state parties in some areas. When the opposition 
parties combined to form coalitions and started putting up common candidates against 
the Congress candidates (as was the case in the 1977 and 1989 general elections), 
the Congress majorities vanished. Moreover, the nature of the system meant that 
small changes in share of the vote often had a dramatic impact upon the number of 
parliamentary seats won, as the following table, relating votes for the Congress Party to 
the number of seats won at successive elections, illustrates. 
The Congress Party’s Performance in Indian General Elections: The dramatically 
large effect of the FPTP electoral system on the number of seats with slight changes 
in voting trend
Year of General  Percentage of Total Percentage Change Number of Seats Percentage Change
Election Votes Polled by in Votes Polled by Obtained by the in Parliamentary
 the Congress Party the Congress Party Congress Party  Seats Held
1971 (won)  43.7% - 352 (64.8%) -
1977 (lost)  34.5% –21.0% 154 (28.4%) –56.2%
1980(won)  42.7% - 353 (65.0%) -
1984(won)  48.1% - 405 (74.6%) -
1989 (lost)  39.5% –17.8% 197 (36.3%) –51.4%
1991(won)  36.5% - 232 (42.7%) -
1996 (lost)  28.8% –21.1% 140 (25.8%) –39.7%
1998 (lost)  25.8% –10.3% 141 (26.0%) +0.7%
1999 (lost)  28.3% +9.6% 114 (21.0%) –19.1%
2004 (won) 26.7% -5.7% 145 (26.7%) +27.2%
The same disproportionality between the share of votes obtained and the share of 
parliamentary seats won under the Indian FPTP electoral system can be seen in the 
case of the other major political party, the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP), which led a 









The BJP’s Performance in Indian General Elections 
Year of General Election Percentage of Total Votes  Number of Seats 
 Polled for the BJP  obtained by the BJP 
 1984 7.7% 2 (0.4%)
 1989 11.5% 86 (15.8%)
 1991 20.0% 121 (22.3%)
 1996 20.3% 161 (29.7%)
 1998 25.6% 182 (33.5%)
 1999 23.6% 182 (33.5%)
 2004 22.2% 138 (25.4%)
Thus the overall results of elections to the Lok Sabha have not been anywhere near 
proportional. Support can often be divided by setting candidates of the same caste, 
religion or region against each other. In this context, FPTP gives an incentive to 
electoral participants to encourage multiple candidacies by their opposition, and its 
effect can be to produce a winner who has much less than an absolute majority of the 
total vote. However, despite the divided nature of India’s multi-ethnic democracy, 
the electoral system has retained a considerable degree of support, due in part to the 
practice of reserving seats for socially underprivileged and historically disadvantaged 
groups known as scheduled castes and scheduled tribes. These communities are thinly 
spread all over India, and the classical operation of FPTP would have resulted in them 
getting a comparatively very small number of parliamentary seats. The constitution, 
however, reserves districts for them in proportion to their numbers in the population, 
thus reserving 79 seats for the 15 per cent scheduled castes population and 41 seats for 
the 8 per cent scheduled tribes population. In these districts, although all electors have 
voting rights, only a member of the scheduled caste or tribe may stand for election. This 
has ensured that their parliamentary representation is in line with their proportion of 
the population. 
A constitutional amendment which seeks to reserve 33 per cent of seats for women 
representatives at the national- and state-level legislatures has long been debated, but 
without any success so far, although 33 per cent of the seats have been reserved for 
women at the Panchayat (district) level, the third tier of government, since 1993. 
The depth of popular support for the integrity of the electoral system became evident 
in 1977 when the election of the incumbent prime minister, Indira Gandhi, was set 
aside by a court after Congress had won a two-thirds legislative majority in 1971. She 
responded by curtailing fundamental constitutional rights for two years (1975–77), an 
authoritarian interlude in India’s otherwise unbroken history of competitive democracy. 
In the 1977 elections, her government lost power through a fair poll, signalling the 
unwillingness of India’s voters to accept undemocratic practices. 
For a period of 20 years, from 1977 to 1997, the FPTP electoral system seemed to 
have ushered in an era of instability, principally because of the formation of coalitions 
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without common principles and the pursuit of narrow self-interest by political 
parties. The non-Congress opposition parties (without the communists) took over 
in government in 1977 by uniting into a composite entity, the Janata Party. It split 
within two years. In December 1989, a successor party, the Janata Dal, came to power, 
supported by the communist parties and the Hindu revivalist Bharatiya Janata Party 
(BJP); this government lasted ten months. At the general election of 1996, no party was 
able to form a stable government. The BJP won 161 seats and the Congress 140. But 
the strength of the electoral system re-emerged in 1999 when a firm alliance of parties 
under the leadership of the BJP was able to form a government and almost complete its 
full term. Similarly, after the May 2004 general election, the Indian National Congress 
Party, along with left parties and others, formed a coalition government at the national 
level. 
In 2000, the government of India established a National Commission to Review 
the Working of the Constitution. This commission’s consultation process considered 
whether various provisions relating to the electoral process in the constitution should be 
amended or expanded. Its report, submitted to the government in 2002, recommended 
against any constitutional change in the electoral field, emphasizing that such changes 
as were needed could be brought about by amendments in the ordinary electoral 
legislation and even by subordinate legislation or executive instructions. 
However, the National Commission also observed that, at the last three general 
elections at national level, an average of two-thirds of Indian MPs had been elected 
under FPTP without a majority of 50 per cent plus one and with a plurality only, 
and considered the questions this raises about the legitimacy of representation. As a 
consequence, and in the context of the nationwide introduction of electronic voting 
which then took place in 2004, the National Commission recommended that 
the government and the Election Commission of India conduct a careful and full 
examination of the introduction of a Two-Round system, with the second round 
conducted between the two leading candidates in each district on the day after the first 
round. The report of the Election Commission of India following the 2004 election did 
not follow up on this proposal, although it did recommend both the introduction of a 
‘none of these candidates’ option on ballot paper and the abolition of the provision by 
which one person is able to stand in two different single-member districts. 
The FPTP electoral system is often said to work best in countries where there are 
two major political parties. In India, by contrast, the Congress Party ruled continuously 
at the centre from 1952 to 1977 without any viable opposition. This monopoly ended in 
1977. From single-party dominance, the pattern on the political arena changed, first to 
one of a competition between a single party and a coalition of parties, and from there to 
a competition between two coalitions of political parties—a trend that continued at the 
2004 general election. The BJP started its upward mobility in the Indian Parliament 
with a shrill Hindu agenda, but after one full term in office the imperatives of electoral 
politics compelled it to scale down its ultra-rightist militant stance. It had to adopt 
an inclusive agenda, enabling it to appeal to Muslim, tribal, backward class and other 
Dalit (downtrodden) voters—who were once considered to be in the exclusive domain 
of the Congress Party.
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d. It can encourage the development of political parties based on clan, ethnicity or 
region, which may base their campaigns and policy platforms on conceptions that are 
attractive to the majority of people in their district or region but exclude or are hostile to 
others. This has been an ongoing problem in African countries like Malawi and Kenya, 
where large communal groups tend to be regionally concentrated. The country is thus 
divided into geographically separate party strongholds, with little incentive for parties 
to make appeals outside their home region and cultural–political base. 
e. It exaggerates the phenomenon of ‘regional fiefdoms’ where one party wins all the 
seats in a province or area. If a party has strong support in a particular part of a country, 
winning a plurality of votes, it will win all, or nearly all, of the seats in the legislature for 
that area. This both excludes minorities in that area from representation and reinforces 
the perception that politics is a battleground defined by who you are and where you live 
rather than what you believe in. This has long been put forward as an argument against 
FPTP in Canada. 
f. It leaves a large number of wasted votes which do not go towards the election of any 
candidate. This can be particularly dangerous if combined with regional fiefdoms, 
because minority party supporters in the region may begin to feel that they have no 
realistic hope of ever electing a candidate of their choice. It can also be dangerous where 
alienation from the political system increases the likelihood that extremists will be able 
to mobilize anti-system movements. 
g. It can cause vote-splitting. Where two similar parties or candidates compete under 
FPTP, the vote of their potential supporters is often split between them, thus allowing 
a less popular party or candidate to win the seat. Papua New Guinea provides a 
particularly clear example (see the case study). 
h. It may be unresponsive to changes in public opinion. A pattern of geographically 
concentrated electoral support in a country means that one party can maintain 
exclusive executive control in the face of a substantial drop in overall popular support. 
In some democracies under FPTP, a fall from 60 per cent to 40 per cent of a party’s 
share of the popular vote nationally can result in a fall from 80 per cent to 60 per cent 
in the number of seats held, which does not affect its overall dominant position. Unless 
sufficient seats are highly competitive, the system can be insensitive to swings in public 
opinion. 
i. Finally, FPTP systems are dependent on the drawing of electoral boundaries. All 
electoral boundaries have political consequences: there is no technical process to 
produce a single ‘correct answer’ independently of political or other considerations 
(as illustrated in annex E). Boundary delimitation may require substantial time and 
resources if the results are to be accepted as legitimate. There may also be pressure to 
manipulate boundaries by gerrymandering or malapportionment. This was particularly 
apparent in the Kenyan elections of 1993 when huge disparities between the sizes of 
















contributed to the ruling Kenyan African National Union party’s winning a large 
majority in the legislature with only 30 per cent of the popular vote. 
Block Vote (BV)
80. The Block Vote is simply the use of plurality 
voting in multi-member districts. Voters have as 
many votes as there are seats to be filled in their 
district, and are usually free to vote for individual 
candidates regardless of party affiliation. In most 
BV systems they may use as many, or as few, of 
their votes as they wish. 
81. The Block Vote is common in countries with weak or non-existent political parties. 
In 2004, the Cayman Islands, the Falkland Islands, Guernsey, Kuwait, Laos, Lebanon, 
the Maldives, Palestine, the Syrian Arab Republic, Tonga and Tuvalu all use Block Vote 
electoral systems. The system was also used in Jordan in 1989, in Mongolia in 1992, 
and in the Philippines and Thailand until 1997, but was changed in all these countries 
as a result of unease with the results it produced. 
82. Advantages. The Block Vote is often applauded for retaining the voter’s ability to vote 
for individual candidates and allowing for reasonably-sized geographical districts, while 
at the same time increasing the role of parties compared with FPTP and strengthening 
those parties which demonstrate most coherence and organizational ability. 
83. Disadvantages. However, the Block Vote can have unpredictable and often 
undesirable impacts on election outcomes. For example, when voters cast all their 
votes for the candidates of a single party, the system tends to exaggerate most of the 
disadvantages of FPTP, in particular its disproportionality. When parties nominate 
a candidate for each vacancy in a Block Vote system and encourage voters to support 
every member of their slate, this is particularly likely. In Mauritius in 1982 and 1995, 
for example, the party in opposition before the election won every seat in the legislature 
with only 64 per cent and 65 per cent of the vote, respectively. This created severe 
difficulties for the effective functioning of a parliamentary system based on concepts 
of government and opposition. The use of ‘best loser’ seats in Mauritius (see paragraph 
153) only partially compensates for this weakness. 
84. In Thailand, the Block Vote was seen as having encouraged the fragmentation of 
the party system. Because it enables electors to vote for candidates of more than one 
party in the same district, members of the same party may be encouraged to compete 
against each other for support. The Block Vote is thus sometimes seen as being a 
contributor to internal party factionalism and corruption. 
85. In recent years, a number of countries have therefore abandoned the Block Vote 
in favour of other systems. Thailand and the Philippines both changed from BV to a 
Block Vote is a plurality/majority 
system used in multi-member districts. 
Electors have as many votes as there 
are candidates to be elected. The 
candidates with the highest vote totals 
win the seats. Usually voters vote for 
candidates rather than parties and in 
most systems may use as many, or as 
few, of their votes as they wish. 
45
PALESTINE: 




The Declaration of Principles or Oslo Agreement, reached in late 1993 between Israel 
and the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO), contained a provision for an elected 
Palestinian Council to be established. The implementation of the Oslo Agreement 
required the negotiation of a further detailed agreement, the Interim Agreement. 
This was completed in Taba in September 1995 and included detailed provisions for 
holding elections to the Palestinian Legislative Council and, separately, for the head 
of its Executive Authority. The president (Raees) of the Palestinian Authority and the 
Palestinian Legislative Council were then elected on 20 January 1996. 
Preparations for the elections began in 1994 in parallel with the negotiations for the 
Interim Agreement. The election law and the conduct of the elections were entirely the 
responsibility of the Palestinians, although some details of the election arrangements 
were required to be consistent with the provisions of the Interim Agreement. The final 
version of the law and the major regulations were put in place only in late 1995. 
The political context of the election strongly influenced the available options for 
the electoral system. There was little doubt in anyone’s mind that Yasser Arafat would 
be elected president, and for the presidential election a single-round FPTP system was 
adopted with little discussion. The assumption was borne out in practice when Arafat 
received over 80 per cent of the vote against one other candidate. 
The choice of system for the Legislative Council elections was much less 
straightforward. First, agreement within the Palestinian community on accepting and 
participating in the Interim Agreement process was not unanimous. The emerging 
Palestinian Authority conducted lengthy discussions backstage with members of 
Hamas and other Islamic movements which included the question of their participation 
in elections. Second, the political party system was embryonic. Fatah had the character 
of a national liberation movement, a political form for which a continuing need was 
perceived because of the need for unity in moving into ‘final status’ negotiations with 
Israel (which were not successful). Some other small parties had formed, but many 
potential candidates were considering standing independently of Fatah. Third, there 
were some precedents to hand: local elections had been held in Gaza in the 1940s, using 
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Egyptian procedures, and in West Bank cities and towns in the 1970s, using Jordanian 
procedures inherited from traditions under the British Mandate. There was pressure in 
particular to follow Jordanian practice. 
The choice of a candidate-based electoral system therefore emerged in response 
to three pressures: the wish to provide a channel for informal candidacies of persons 
linked to movements which formally rejected the process; the desire of a number of 
prominent figures to stand as independents; and the recollection of historic elections. 
The importance placed on simplicity, transparency, speed of counting and confidence 
in the results also led to a decision in favour of counting at the polling station, thus 
eliminating preferential systems such as the Alternative Vote (AV) or the Single 
Transferable Vote (STV) as options. The perception of where natural boundaries 
existed on the ground thus led to the choice of the Block Vote (BV), with districts 
which varied in magnitude from 12 in Gaza City down to one in the small towns of 
Jericho, Salfit and Tubas. 
A further discussion centred on the representation of minorities, in particular the 
Christian community (which accounted for some 10 per cent of the electorate) and 
the Samaritans (a concentrated community of a few hundred people near Nablus). 
Six reserved seats were created within the Block Vote system for Christians in the four 
districts with the highest concentration of Christians (two each in Bethlehem and 
Jerusalem, and one each in Ramallah and Gaza City) and one reserved seat was created 
for Samaritans in Nablus. Christian candidates had the option to declare themselves 
as Christian. If the Block Vote count showed that there were not sufficient declared 
Christian candidates among those in the top positions, the candidate with the lowest 
vote of those who would otherwise have been elected would be replaced by the declared 
Christian candidate with the next—highest vote—as indeed happened in all four 
districts. This meant that there were representatives on the Legislative Council elected 
with fewer votes than some other candidates who were not elected. While there was 
some debate on this, it was accepted as legitimate in the context of wide representation 
and in the aftermath of a successful election. 
In practice, the BV electoral system achieved much of what was expected of it. 
Eighty-seven candidates were nominated in Gaza City, but voters coped well with a 
ballot paper about a metre long. While few candidates associated with those who rejected 
the peace process stood, at least one member was elected who might be considered as 
a bridge to those movements. Candidates on Fatah slates gained an advantage, but 
voters made clear distinctions between more and less popular individuals. Leading 
independent figures were elected, as were representatives from minorities. Small towns 
with a fiercely independent identity gained their own representative. The president and 
the Legislative Council took office in 1996 with a wide degree of legitimacy within the 
Palestinian community.
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mixed system in the late 1990s. In both cases, a major justification for the change was 
the need to combat vote-buying and strengthen the development of political parties 
(see the case study on Thailand). 
Party Block Vote (PBV)
86. Under Party Block Vote, unlike FPTP, there are multi-member districts. Voters 
have a single vote, and choose between party lists of candidates rather than between 
individuals. The party which wins most votes takes all the seats in the district, and its 
entire list of candidates is duly elected. As in FPTP, there is no requirement for the 
winner to have an absolute majority of the votes. As of 2004, PBV was used as the only 
system or the major component of the system in four countries—Cameroon, Chad, 
Djibouti and Singapore. 
87. Advantages. PBV is simple to use, encourages 
strong parties and allows for parties to put up 
mixed slates of candidates in order to facilitate 
minority representation. It can be used to help 
to ensure balanced ethnic representation, as it 
enables parties to present ethnically diverse lists 
of candidates for election—and may indeed be 
designed to require them to do so. In Djibouti each 
party list must include a mix of candidates from different ethnic groups. In Singapore, 
most members of Parliament (MPs) are elected from multi-member districts known as 
group representation constituencies. Of the candidates on each party or group list, at 
least one must be a member of the Malay, Indian or some other minority community. 
Singapore also uses ‘best loser’ seats for opposition candidates in some circumstances. 
Other countries, for example, Senegal and Tunisia, use the Party Block Vote as the 
plurality/majority part of their Parallel system (see the case study on Senegal). 
88. Disadvantages. However, the Party Block Vote also suffers from most of the 
disadvantages of FPTP, and may indeed produce highly disproportional results where 
one party wins almost all of the seats with a simple majority of the votes. In Djibouti’s 
1997 election, the ruling Union for the Presidential Majority coalition won every seat, 
leaving the two opposition parties without any representation in the legislature. 
The Alternative Vote (AV)
89. Elections under Alternative Vote are usually held in single-member districts, like 
FPTP elections. However, AV gives voters considerably more options than FPTP when 
marking their ballot paper. Rather than simply indicating their favoured candidate, under 
AV electors rank the candidates in the order of their choice, by marking a ‘1’ for their 
favourite, ‘2’ for their second choice, ‘3’ for their third choice and so on. The system thus 
enables voters to express their preferences between candidates rather than simply their first 
choice. For this reason, it is often known as ‘preferential voting’ in the countries which use 
Party Block Vote - A plurality/majority 
system using multi-member districts 
in which voters cast a single party-
centred vote for a party of choice, and 
do not choose between candidates. The 
party with most votes will win every 
















it. (The Borda Count, STV and the Supplementary 
Vote are also preferential systems.) 
90. AV also differs from FPTP in the way votes 
are counted. Like FPTP or TRS, a candidate who 
has won an absolute majority of the votes (50 per 
cent plus one) is immediately elected. However, 
if no candidate has an absolute majority, under 
AV the candidate with the lowest number of first 
preferences is ‘eliminated’ from the count, and 
his or her ballots are examined for their second 
preferences. Each ballot is then transferred to 
whichever remaining candidate has the highest 
preference in the order as marked on the ballot 
paper. This process is repeated until one candidate 
has an absolute majority, and is declared duly 
elected. AV is thus a majoritarian system. 
The Alternative Vote is a preferential 
plurality/majority system used in 
single-member districts. Voters use 
numbers to mark their preferences 
on the ballot paper. A candidate 
who receives an absolute majority 
(50 per cent plus 1) of valid first-
preference votes is declared elected. 
If no candidate achieves an absolute 
majority of first preferences, the least 
successful candidates are eliminated 
and their votes reallocated according 
to their second preferences until one 
candidate has an absolute majority. 
Voters vote for candidates rather than 
political parties. 
















91. It is possible, but not essential, in preferential systems such as AV to require voters to 
number all, or most, of the candidates on the ballot paper. This avoids the possibility of 
votes becoming ‘wasted’ at a later stage in the count because they bear no further valid 
preferences. However, it can lead to an increase in the number of invalid votes, and it 
can sometimes give substantial importance to preferences between candidates to which 
the voter is indifferent or actively dislikes. 
92. AV is used in Australia, Fiji and Papua New Guinea. It is thus a good example of the 
regional diffusion of electoral systems discussed above (see paragraph 74): all national-
level examples of the Alternative Vote at present occur in Oceania. However, a number 
of sub-national jurisdictions in Europe and North America also use variants of AV, and 
it is used for presidential elections in the Republic of Ireland. 
93. Advantages. One advantage of transferring ballots is that it enables the votes of 
several candidates to accumulate, so that diverse but related interests can be combined 
to win representation. AV also enables supporters of candidates who have little hope 
of being elected to influence, via their second and later preferences, the election of a 
major candidate. For this reason, it is sometimes argued that AV is the best system 
for promoting centrist politics, as it can compel candidates to seek not only the votes 
of their own supporters but also the ‘second preferences’ of others. To attract these 
preferences, candidates must make broadly-based appeals rather than focusing on 
narrower issues. The experience of AV in Australia tends to support these arguments: 
the major parties, for example, typically try to strike bargains with minor parties for 
the second preferences of their supporters prior to an election—a process known as 
‘preference swapping’. Furthermore, because of the majority support requirement, AV 
increases the consent given to elected members, and thus can enhance their perceived 
legitimacy. 
The experience of AV in Papua New Guinea and in Australia suggests that it can provide 
significant incentives for accommodatory and cooperative politics. In recent years AV, 
or its variant the Supplementary Vote, has also been adopted for presidential and 
mayoral elections in Bosnia, London and San Francisco (see paragraphs 182–186). 
94. Disadvantages. Nevertheless, AV also has a number of disadvantages. First, it 
requires a reasonable degree of literacy and numeracy to be used effectively, and 
because it operates in single-member districts it can often produce results that are 
disproportional when compared to PR systems—or even in some cases compared with 
FPTP. Also, the potential of AV for promoting centrist outcomes is very dependent on 
underlying social and demographic conditions: while it successfully promoted inter-
ethnic accommodation in Papua New Guinea during the 1960s and 1970s and has now 
been reintroduced there (see the case study), it has been criticized in another Pacific 
country, Fiji, since it was implemented there in 1997. Moreover, as the earlier discussion 
of its use in the Australian Senate from 1919 to 1946 noted (see paragraph 32), AV does 
not work well when applied to larger, multi-member districts. 
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PAPUA NEW GUINEA: 
Electoral Incentives for 
Inter-Ethnic Accommodation
Ben Reilly
CASE STUDY: Papua New Guinea
The South Pacific country of Papua New Guinea (PNG) has used two different electoral 
systems—the Alternative Vote (AV) from 1964 to 1975, when it was an Australian territory, 
and FPTP from 1975 to 2002. It has since reverted to the alternative vote again. 
Its experience is interesting for a number of reasons. First, PNG is one of the few 
developing countries with an unbroken record of continuous competitive elections and 
numerous peaceful changes of government. Second, the change from one electoral 
system to another has had a series of unexpected consequences which illustrate the 
different effects apparently similar electoral systems can have. Third, PNG is one of the 
few countries to have adopted, abandoned, and then re-adopted a particular electoral 
system. 
Papua New Guinea inherited the AV system from Australia and used it for three 
elections in 1964, 1968 and 1972. Unlike Australia, however, PNG is a highly 
ethnically fragmented society, with over 850 separate languages and several thousand 
competing clan and tribal groups. 
Its experience lends support to the claims that AV can promote inter-ethnic 
accommodation and moderation in deeply divided societies by allowing voters to 
express not just their first choice of candidate but also their second and later choices. 
Because of the nature of PNG society, under AV most voters invariably gave their 
first preference to their own clan or ‘home’ candidate. In many seats, however, this 
was not enough for any single candidate to gain a majority of votes; they needed the 
second preferences of other groups as well. In order to gain a majority, candidates had 
to ‘sell’ themselves as a good ‘second-best’ choice to other clan groups—which meant, 
in general, someone who would be attentive to the interests of all groups, not just their 
own. It also meant that those candidates who formed alliances and cooperated with 
each other would often be more successful than candidates who attempted to win the 
seat from their own voter base alone. 
This gave many candidates an incentive to act in an accommodating manner to 
other clans. The mechanics of the system also ensured that the winning candidate 















cases, the winning candidate was not the one who had the biggest ‘bloc’ of supporters 
but rather the one who could successfully build support across several groups. 
Thinking that it would be a simpler system which would have similar effects to 
AV, Papua New Guinea changed to an FPTP electoral system at independence in 
1975. However, the different incentives provided by the new FPTP system led to 
quite different results from those expected. Because candidates no longer needed an 
absolute majority of votes cast in order to be successful—just more votes than any other 
group—the candidate from the largest clan would often win the seat outright. There 
was no incentive to cooperate with anyone else. Electoral violence increased because it 
was in some candidates’ interests to stop opponents’ supporters from voting rather than 
to campaign for their second preferences as they had done under AV. Also, because 
there were so many clans all trying to win the seat, candidates learned that they could 
be successful with very limited support. 
At the 2002 elections, over half of the MPs in the Parliament were elected with less 
than 20 per cent of the vote. Several candidates who won seats gained only 5 per cent. 
In an electoral cycle increasingly dominated by concerns about corruption, power and 
money politics, this led to a range of negative campaign tactics, such as encouraging 
rival candidates to stand in order to ‘split’ a dominant clan’s voter base. This increased 
pressure for the reintroduction of AV. In 2003, the PNG Parliament re-adopted what 
it called ‘limited’ preferential voting for all future elections. Voters will be required to 
mark a minimum of three preferences. 
The Papua New Guinea case illustrates just how dependent much of the accepted 
wisdom regarding electoral systems is on the structure of the society concerned. 
Despite having an FPTP electoral system, PNG had a very fluid party system, based on 
individuals rather than ideologies. All governments under FPTP were weak coalitions, 
which sometimes changed on the floor of the Parliament as well as at elections. The 
single-member system of representation resulted in high levels of turnover of politicians 
from one election to the next, as members could not both be in Port Moresby at sessions 
of the Parliament and be continually visible in their districts. 
Accordingly, a strong sense of accountability on the part of many local members to 
their electorate developed: without it their chances of re-election would be slim. This 
matches a strong sense on the part of the electorate that the function of their member 
is to deliver direct benefits to the community, building on Melanesian tradition that a 
‘big man’ ensures that his community shares in his wealth and good fortune. As one 
member has memorably put it, ‘When people elect me to Parliament, they think I own 
the Bank of Papua New Guinea.’ 
Under the AV system, this sense of accountability tended to be spread across a 
number of groups, thus helping to manage inter-ethnic conflicts. However, this was 
itself a reflection of the extreme fragmentation of the country’s society. 
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The Two-Round System (TRS)
95. The central feature of the Two-Round System is as the name suggests: it is not 
one election but takes place in two rounds, often a week or a fortnight apart. The first 
round is conducted in the same way as a single-round plurality/majority election. In the 
most common form of TRS, this is conducted using FPTP. It is, however, also possible 
to conduct TRS in multi-member districts using Block Vote (as in Kiribati) or Party 
Block Vote (as in Mali). A candidate or party that receives a specified proportion of the 
vote is elected outright, with no need for a second ballot. This proportion is normally 
an absolute majority of valid votes cast, although 
several countries use a different figure when using 
TRS to elect a president (see paragraph 179). If no 
candidate or party receives an absolute majority, 
then a second round of voting is held and the 
winner of this round is declared elected. 
96. The details of how the second round is 
conducted vary in practice from case to case. The 
most common method is for it to be a straight 
run-off contest between the two highest vote-
winners from the first round; this is called majority 
run-off TRS. It produces a result that is truly 
majoritarian in that one of the two participants 
will necessarily achieve an absolute majority 
of votes and be declared the winner. A second 
method, majority-plurality TRS, is used for legislative elections in France, the country 
most often associated with the Two-Round System. In these elections, any candidate 
who has received the votes of over 12.5 per cent of the registered electorate in the first 
round can stand in the second round. Whoever wins the highest number of votes in the 
second round is then declared elected, regardless of whether they have won an absolute 
majority or not. Unlike majority run-off, this system is not truly majoritarian, as there 
may be up to five or six candidates contesting the second round of elections. 
97. Two-Round systems are used to elect 22 national legislatures and are the most 
common method used worldwide for the direct election of presidents (see paragraph 
178). Alongside France, many of the other countries which use TRS were territorial 
dependencies of the French Republic or have been historically influenced in some way 
by the French. For elections to the legislature, TRS is used by the Central African 
Republic, Congo (Brazzaville), Gabon, Mali, Mauritania and Togo in francophone 
Sub-Saharan Africa, by Egypt in North Africa, by the Comoros Islands, Haiti, Iran, 
Kiribati, and Viet Nam, and by some of the post-Soviet republics (Belarus, Kyrgyzstan, 
Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan). A few other countries such as Georgia, Kazakhstan 
and Tajikistan also use TRS to elect district representatives as part of a mixed electoral 
system. 
The Two-Round System is a plurality/
majority system in which a second 
election is held if no candidate or party 
achieves a given level of votes, most 
commonly an absolute majority (50 
per cent plus one), in the first election 
round. A Two-Round System may take 
a majority-plurality form—more than 
two candidates contest the second 
round and the one who wins the highest 
number of votes in the second round 
is elected, regardless of whether they 
have won an absolute majority—or a 
majority run-off form—only the top two 


















a. First and foremost, TRS allows voters to have a second chance to vote for their chosen 
candidate, or even to change their minds between the first and the second rounds. It 
thus shares some features in common with preferential systems like the Alternative 
Vote, in which voters are asked to rank-order candidates, while also enabling voters to 
make a completely fresh choice in the second round if they so desire. 
b. TRS can encourage diverse interests to coalesce behind the successful candidates 
from the first round in the lead-up to the second round of voting, thus encouraging 
bargains and trade-offs between parties and candidates. It also enables the parties and 
the electorate to react to changes in the political landscape that occur between the first 
and the second rounds of voting. 
c. TRS lessens the problems of ‘vote-splitting’, the common situation in many plurality/
majority systems where two similar parties or candidates split their combined vote 
between them, thus allowing a less popular candidate to win the seat. Also, because 
electors do not have to rank-order candidates to express their second choice, TRS may 
be better suited to countries where illiteracy is widespread than systems which use 
preferential numbering like the Alternative Vote or the Single Transferable Vote. 
99. Disadvantages 
a. TRS places considerable pressure on the electoral administration by requiring it to 
run a second election a short time after the first, thus significantly increasing both the 
cost of the overall election process and the time that elapses between the holding of an 
election and the declaration of a result. This can lead to instability and uncertainty. 
TRS also places an additional burden on the voter, and sometimes there is a sharp 
decline in turnout between the first round and the second. 
b. TRS shares many of the disadvantages of FPTP. Research has shown that in France it 
produces the most disproportional results of any Western democracy, and that it tends 
to fragment party systems in new democracies. 
c. One of the most serious problems with TRS is its implications for deeply divided 
societies. In Angola in 1992, in what was supposed to be a peacemaking election, rebel 
leader Jonas Savimbi came second in the first round of a TRS presidential election to 
Jose dos Santos with 40 per cent of the vote as opposed to dos Santos’ 49 per cent. As 
it was clear that he would lose the run-off phase, he had little incentive to play the 
democratic opposition game and immediately restarted the civil war in Angola, which 
went on for another decade. In Congo (Brazzaville) in 1993, prospects of a government 
landslide in the second round of a TRS election prompted the opposition to boycott 
the second round and take up arms. In both cases, the clear signal that one side would 
probably lose the election was the trigger for violence. In Algeria in 1992, the candidate 
of the Islamic Salvation Front (Front Islamique du Salut, FIS) led in the first round, and 
the military intervened to cancel the second round.
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KYRGYZSTAN: 




In contemporary Central Asia, elections are as much political theatre as contests for 
office. After the break-up of the Soviet Union in late 1991, most of the countries in 
the region descended into one-man rule or civil war. The semi-competitive elections 
held in the last months of the Soviet order gave way to elections of acclamation in the 
first years of independence, with political power becoming increasingly centralized 
in the hands of the founding presidents of the republics. For a time it appeared that 
Kyrgyzstan might resist the temptation of authoritarianism; however, by the mid-1990s 
its president had begun to limit society’s ability to hold the state and its representatives 
accountable. 
The election that brought to power the country’s first and only president, Askar 
Akaev, illustrates the role of changing rules in shaping electoral outcomes. In the late 
Soviet era, parliaments selected the head of state—the chair of the Supreme Soviet—in 
each republic. In Kyrgyzstan, the election law stipulated that if the Parliament failed to 
produce a winner after two rounds of voting all the candidates would be disqualified. 
In October 1990, this quirk in the electoral rules allowed Akaev—a little-regarded 
Gorbachev loyalist who was opposed to the dominant conservative forces in the Kyrgyz 
Communist Party—to win the next round of the parliamentary election for head of 
state of the Kyrgyz Republic. The following year, Kyrgyzstan, like most other Soviet 
republics, introduced popular direct elections for a newly-designed office of president 
whose powers supplanted those of the collapsing Communist Party. In October 1991, 
just weeks before Kyrgyzstan became an independent country, Akaev won the election 
for the presidency unopposed. He won the two subsequent presidential elections—in 
December 1995 and October 2000—by wide margins in the first round, although 
widespread violations were reported during both elections. 
The rules governing presidential elections in Kyrgyzstan are a mixture of traditional 
and unconventional elements. Elections are held every five years and are decided by a 
two-round majority run-off system: if no candidate receives an absolute majority in the 
first round, the two candidates with the most votes proceed to a second round, where 









the electorate turns out for either the first or the second round. Presidents may serve for 
no more than two terms, although the Constitutional Court in Kyrgyzstan, unlike its 
counterpart in the Russian Federation, made an exception for the sitting president by 
ruling that his first term did not count because it began before the limit of two terms 
was adopted in the 1993 constitution. 
To stand for president, a candidate must be at least 35 and not more than 65 years of 
age. Candidates must also satisfy several further requirements. First, they must undergo 
an examination by the Language Commission to ensure that they are fluent in the state 
language, Kyrgyz. This requirement, introduced to discourage Russians and Russified 
Kyrgyz from contesting the presidency, was used in the 2000 election to disqualify 
Akaev’s most prominent challenger, Feliks Kulov. Second, they must pay from their 
personal funds a deposit equal to 1,000 times the minimum monthly wage—essentially 
the lifetime income of a poor person. For the deposit to be returned, a candidate 
must receive 10 per cent of the vote, and proposals now being debated by Parliament 
would increase that to 15 per cent. A further barrier to entry is the requirement that a 
candidate receive 50,000 signatures, of which at least 3 per cent must come from each 
of the country’s eight territories—a provision designed to ensure that a president has 
adequate support in both the north and the south, whose elites have been at odds in 
recent years. 
The relative stability of the rules governing presidential elections in Kyrgyzstan 
contrasts with the frequent changes made in the parliamentary electoral system. Perhaps 
the most dramatic have been to the size and structure of the Parliament. Independent 
Kyrgyzstan inherited from the Soviet era a unicameral Parliament of 350 deputies who 
had been elected in February 1990 in single-member districts using a two-round voting 
system. Following constitutional changes made in 1994 by referendum—the president’s 
preferred means of enhancing his powers and reducing those of the Parliament—this 
unicameral assembly was replaced by a bicameral legislature, with 60 members in 
the Legislative Assembly and 45 in the Assembly of People’s Representatives. In the 
parliamentary elections of February 1995 and February 2000, the entire Assembly of 
People’s Representatives and 45 members of the Legislative Assembly were elected in 
45 single-member districts using two-round voting. The remaining 15 members of the 
Legislative Assembly were elected by List PR using closed lists and a single nationwide 
district with a 5 per cent formal threshold, that is, parties must secure at least 5 per 
cent of the total vote nationwide to be represented in the Parliament. For the 15 PR 
seats, each party had the right to put forward a list of 30 persons, and in cases where 
candidates from the list also stood in single-member districts and won, their names 
were removed from the party list. 
The reduction of the number of deputies from 350 to 105, ostensibly designed as a 
cost-saving measure, facilitated presidential control of the Parliament by trebling the 
size of the single-member districts and thus reducing the ability of smaller parties to 
win seats. The presence of a handful of List PR seats in the new Parliament did little to 
compensate for the disadvantages that a diminutive Parliament posed for small parties. 
Moreover, the post-communist elections have returned parliaments whose 
composition differed dramatically from that of the rubber-stamp Soviet legislatures. 
Communist Party control of candidate nomination had worked in such a way as to 
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create bodies in which those who had passed the approval process comprised a broad 
cross-section of society. In contrast, the post-communist assemblies in Kyrgyzstan were 
almost exclusively male and had a disproportionate number of executive officials and 
the newly rich. 
Kyrgyzstan has recently changed the rules for parliamentary elections again. 
Revisions to the constitution adopted by referendum in February 2003 called for the 
105-member bicameral assembly to be replaced at the next parliamentary election with 
a unicameral legislature of 75 members. The new election law of January 2004, which 
has been much criticized inside and outside Kyrgyzstan, provides that the 75 deputies 
will be elected in single-member districts using a two-round majority run-off voting 
system. Further reducing the size of the Assembly and abandoning the party list seats 
is likely to reduce the representation of minorities yet again, increase the executive 
branch’s influence over the legislature and emasculate an already weak party system. 
It may also strengthen the political salience of the regions by giving the central party 
leaders less influence over the selection of candidates. 
Because the smaller number of seats in recent parliaments produced larger electoral 
districts, it has been easier for ethnic Kyrgyz to win seats than for members of 
ethnic minorities. Where the ethnic Kyrgyz majority is now over-represented in the 
Parliament, the substantial Uzbek, Russian and German minorities are all significantly 
under-represented. In particular, the Uzbeks hold a share of the seats which is less than 
half of their share of the population. 
In recent years, the political opposition in Kyrgyzstan has found it increasingly 
difficult to contest presidential and parliamentary elections. The deference of the 
judiciary, the Electoral Commission and the Language Commission to presidential 
authority has led to the selective prosecution and disqualification of electoral candidates. 
Moreover, presidential influence on the media has prevented the opposition from 
waging effective campaigns. In the 2000 presidential election, for example, President 
Akaev received almost ten hours of coverage on the national television channel, KTR, 
while his principal opponent received less than five minutes. One of the few sources 
of independent reporting on electoral campaigns, the foreign press, is threatened with 
legal sanctions if it criticizes establishment candidates. Voting irregularities are also 
widespread. The conduct of elections as well as the changing electoral rules has impeded 
the development of political competition in Kyrgyzstan. 
For most of the first decade of independence, elections to representative assemblies 
below the national level were held in single-member districts using a two-round voting 
system. Since 1999, however, regional and local assembly elections have been conducted 
in multi-member districts using SNTV. Although the governors of the country’s seven 
regions are still appointed by the president, the chief executives of cities, districts and 
villages are now selected by the members of the local assemblies. The sole exception to 
this pattern is the capital, Bishkek, where the mayor is directly elected. 
As in Georgia and Ukraine, the manipulation of electoral rules and the conduct 
of elections ultimately delegitimized the elections themselves, which contributed to 
the March 24, 2005 revolution in Kyrgyzstan that overthrew the Akaev presidency 




What Proportional Representation Is
100. The rationale underpinning all PR systems is the conscious translation of a party’s 
share of the votes into a corresponding proportion of seats in the legislature. There 
are two major types of PR system—List PR and Single Transferable Vote (STV). PR 
requires the use of electoral districts with more than one member: it is not possible to 
divide a single seat elected on a single occasion proportionally. In some countries, such 
as Israel and the Netherlands, the entire country forms one multi-member district. In 
other countries, for example, Argentina or Portugal, electoral districts are based on 
provinces, while Indonesia lays down the range of permissible sizes for electoral districts 
and gives the task of defining them to its EMB. 
101. PR systems are a common choice in many new democracies, and 23 established 
democracies use some variant of PR (see Table 2). PR systems are dominant in Latin 
America, Africa and Europe. Most of the 72 PR systems identified in this Handbook 
use some form of List PR; only two use STV. 
102. There are many important issues which can 
have a major impact on how a PR system works in 
practice. The greater the number of representatives 
to be elected from a district (see paragraphs 113 
–118 on district magnitude), the more proportional the electoral system will be. PR 
systems also differ in the range of choice given to the voter—whether the voter can 
choose between political parties, individual candidates, or both. 
103. Advantages. In many respects, the strongest arguments for PR derive from the 
way in which the system avoids the anomalous results of plurality/majority systems 
and is better able to produce a representative legislature. For many new democracies, 
particularly those which face deep societal divisions, the inclusion of all significant 
groups in the legislature can be a near-essential condition for democratic consolidation. 
Failing to ensure that both minorities and majorities have a stake in developing political 
systems can have catastrophic consequences (see the case study on Lesotho). 
104. PR systems in general are praised for the way in which they: 
a. Faithfully translate votes cast into seats won, and thus avoid some of the more 
destabilizing and ‘unfair’ results thrown up by plurality/majority electoral systems. 
‘Seat bonuses’ for the larger parties are minimized and small parties can gain access to 
the legislature by polling a small number of votes.
b. Encourage or require the formation of political parties or groups of like-minded 
candidates to put forward lists. This may clarify policy, ideology or leadership 
differences within society, especially when, as in Timor-Leste at independence, there is 
no established party system.
Proportional representation requires 
the use of electoral districts with more 
















c. Give rise to very few wasted votes. When thresholds are low, almost all votes cast 
in PR elections go towards electing a candidate of choice. This increases the voters’ 
perception that it is worth making the trip to the polling booth at election time, as they 
can be more confident that their vote will make a difference to the election outcome, 
however small. 
d. Facilitate minority parties’ access to representation. Unless the threshold is unduly 
high, or the district magnitude is unusually low, then any political party with even a 
small percentage of the vote can gain representation in the legislature. This fulfils the 
principle of inclusion, which can be crucial to stability in divided societies and has 
benefits for decision making in established democracies. 
e. Encourage parties to campaign beyond the districts in which they are strong or where 
the results are expected to be close. The incentive under PR systems is to maximize the 
overall vote regardless of where those votes might come from. Every vote, even from an 
area where a party is electorally weak, goes towards gaining another seat. 
f. Restrict the growth of ‘regional fiefdoms’. Because PR systems reward minority parties 
with a minority of the seats, they are less likely to lead to situations where a single party 
holds all the seats in a given province or district. This can be particularly important 
to minorities in a province which may not have significant regional concentrations or 
alternative points of access to power. 
g. Lead to greater continuity and stability of policy. The West European experience 
suggests that parliamentary PR systems score better with regard to governmental 
longevity, voter participation and economic performance. The rationale behind this 
claim is that regular switches in government between two ideologically polarized 
parties, as can happen in FPTP systems, makes long-term economic planning more 
difficult, while broad PR coalition governments help engender a stability and coherence 
in decision making which allow for national development. 
h. Make power-sharing between parties and interest groups more visible. In many new 
democracies, power-sharing between the numerical majority of the population who 
hold political power and a small minority who hold economic power is an unavoidable 
reality. Where the numerical majority dominates the legislature and a minority sees its 
interests expressed in the control of the economic sphere, negotiations between different 
power blocks are less visible, less transparent and less accountable (e.g. in Zimbabwe 
during its first 20 years of independence). It has been argued that PR, by including all 
interests in the legislature, offers a better hope that decisions will be taken in the public 
eye and by a more inclusive cross-section of the society. 
105. Disadvantages. Most of the criticisms of PR in general are based around the 
tendency of PR systems to give rise to coalition governments and a fragmented party 
















a. Coalition governments, which in turn lead to legislative gridlock and consequent 
inability to carry out coherent policies. There are particularly high risks during 
an immediate post-conflict transition period, when popular expectations of new 
governments are high. Quick and coherent decision making can be impeded by 
coalition cabinets and governments of national unity which are split by factions. 
b. A destabilizing fragmentation of the party system. PR can reflect and facilitate a 
fragmentation of the party system. It is possible that extreme pluralism can allow tiny 
minority parties to hold larger parties to ransom in coalition negotiations. In this respect, 
the inclusiveness of PR is cited as a drawback of the system. In Israel, for example, 
extremist religious parties are often crucial to the formation of a government, while 
Italy endured many years of unstable shifting coalition governments. Democratizing 
countries are often fearful that PR will allow personality-based and ethnic-cleavage 
parties to proliferate in their undeveloped party systems. 
c. A platform for extremist parties. In a related argument, PR systems are often criticized 
for giving a stage in the legislature to extremist parties of the left or the right. It has been 
argued that the collapse of Weimar Germany was in part due to the way in which its PR 
electoral system gave a toehold to extremist groups of the extreme left and right. 
d. Governing coalitions which have insufficient common ground in terms of either their 
policies or their support base. These coalitions of convenience are sometimes contrasted 
with coalitions of commitment produced by other systems (e.g. through the use of AV), 
in which parties tend to be reciprocally dependent on the votes of supporters of other 
parties for their election, and the coalition may thus be stronger. 
e. Small parties getting a disproportionately large amount of power. Large parties may 
be forced to form coalitions with much smaller parties, giving a party that has the 
support of only a small percentage of the votes the power to veto any proposal that 
comes from the larger parties. 
f. The inability of the voter to enforce accountability by throwing a party out of power. 
Under a PR system it may be very difficult to remove a reasonably-sized centre party 
from power. When governments are usually coalitions, some political parties are ever-
present in government, despite weak electoral performances from time to time. The 
Free Democratic Party (FDP) in Germany was a member of the governing coalition for 
all but eight of the 50 years from 1949 to 1998, although it never gained more than 12 
per cent of the vote. 
g. Difficulties either for voters to understand or for the electoral administration to 
implement the sometimes complex rules of the system. Some PR systems are considered 
to be more difficult than non-PR systems and may require more voter education and 
training of poll workers to work successfully. 
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List Proportional Representation (List PR)
106. In its most simple form, List PR involves 
each party presenting a list of candidates to the 
electorate in each multi-member electoral district. 
Voters vote for a party, and parties receive seats 
in proportion to their overall share of the vote 
in the electoral district. Winning candidates are 
taken from the lists in order of their position on 
the lists. 
The choice of List PR does not in itself completely 
specify the electoral system: more details must 
be determined. The system used to calculate the 
allocation of seats after the votes have been counted can be either a Highest Average or 
a Largest Remainder Method (see the glossary at annex B). The formula chosen has a 
small but sometimes critical effect on the outcomes of elections under PR. In Cambodia 
in 1998, a change in the formula a few weeks before polling day turned out to have 
the effect of giving the largest party 64 seats, instead of 59, in a 121-seat National 
Assembly. The change had not been well publicized, and it was with difficulty that the 
opposition accepted the results. This example clearly demonstrates the importance for 
electoral system designers of apparently minor details. 
There are several other important issues that need to be considered in defining precisely 
how a List PR system will work.  A formal threshold may be required for representation 
in the legislature (see paragraphs 119–121): a high threshold (for example 10 per cent, as 
used by Turkey) is likely to exclude smaller parties, while a low threshold (for example 
1.5 per cent, as used by Israel) may promote their representation.  In South Africa, 
there is no formal threshold, and in 2004 the African Christian Democratic Party won 
six seats out of 400 with only 1.6 per cent of the national vote.  List PR systems also 
differ depending on whether and how the voter can choose between candidates as well 
as parties, that is, whether lists are closed, open or free (panachage)(see paragraphs 122 
–126).  This choice has implications for the complexity of the ballot paper.
Other choices include arrangements for formal or informal ‘vote pooling’; the scope for 
agreements between parties, such as that provided by systems which use apparentement 
(see paragraph 127); and the definition of district boundaries.
107. Advantages 
a. In addition to the advantages attached to PR systems generally, List PR makes it more 
likely that the representatives of minority cultures/groups will be elected. When, as is 
often the case, voting behaviour dovetails with a society’s cultural or social divisions, 
then List PR electoral systems can help to ensure that the legislature includes members 
of both majority and minority groups. This is because parties can be encouraged by 
the system to craft balanced candidate lists which appeal to a whole spectrum of voters’ 
Under a List Proportional Represen-
tation system each party or grouping 
presents a list of candidates for a multi-
member electoral district, the voters 
vote for a party, and parties receive 
seats in proportion to their overall 
share of the vote. In some (closed list) 
systems the winning candidates are 
taken from the lists in order of their 
position on the lists. If the lists are 
‘open’ or ‘free’ the voters can influence 

















Cambodian closed List PR ballot paper
interests. The experience of a number of new democracies (e.g. South Africa, Indonesia, 
Sierra Leone) suggests that List PR gives the political space which allows parties to 
put up multiracial, and multi-ethnic, lists of candidates. The South African National 
Assembly elected in 1994 was 52 per cent black (11 per cent Zulu, the rest being of 
Xhosa, Sotho, Venda, Tswana, Pedi, Swazi, Shangaan and Ndebele extraction), 32 per 
cent white (one-third English-speaking, two-thirds Afrikaans-speaking), 7 per cent 
Coloured and 8 per cent Indian. The Namibian Parliament is similarly diverse, with 
representatives from the Ovambo, Damara, Herero, Nama, Baster and white (English- 
and German-speaking) communities. 
b. List PR makes it more likely that women will be elected. PR electoral systems are 
almost always more friendly to the election of women than plurality/majority systems. 
In essence, parties are able to use the lists to promote the advancement of women 
politicians and allow voters the space to elect women candidates while still basing 
their choice on other policy concerns than gender. As noted above, in single-member 
districts most parties are encouraged to put up a ‘most broadly acceptable’ candidate, 
and that person is seldom a woman. In all regions of the world PR systems do better 
than FPTP systems in the number of women elected and 14 of the top 20 nations when 
it comes to the representation of women use List PR. In 2004, the number of women 
representatives in legislatures elected by List PR systems was 4.3 percentage points 
higher than the average of 15.2 per cent for all legislatures, while that for legislatures 
elected by FPTP was 4.1 percentage points lower. 
108. Disadvantages. In addition to the general issues already identified relating to PR 
systems, the following additional disadvantages may be considered: 
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SOUTH AFRICA: 
Electoral Systems, Conflict 
Management and Inclusion
Andrew Reynolds
CASE STUDY: South Africa
The National Assembly parliamentary and provincial elections held in South Africa in 
1994 marked the high point of a period of tumultuous change from authoritarian rule 
to multiparty democracy in Southern Africa as a whole. At midnight on 27 April 1994 
perhaps the most despised flag in Africa was lowered, heralding the end of 300 years of 
colonialism and four decades of apartheid. Those first multiparty democratic elections 
opened the stage to political movements which had been driven underground by the 
Pretoria regime’s policy of racial divide and rule. Nelson Mandela’s African National 
Congress (ANC) was poised on the threshold of power; the Pan-Africanist Congress 
of Azania (PAC) was challenging it within the same community, while Mangosotho 
Buthelezi’s Inkatha Freedom Party (IFP) hoped to build on its hegemony in the north 
of the province of KwaZulu-Natal. These new parties joined F. W. De Klerk’s National 
Party (NP), the liberal Democratic Party (DP) and the new Freedom Front (FF)—a 
descendant of the ‘white right’ parties of the old constitutional dispensation—in 
battling for the votes of millions of newly-enfranchised people. 
Elections were conducted under List PR with half the National Assembly (200 
members) being chosen from nine provincial lists and the other half being elected 
from a single national list. In effect, the country used one nationwide constituency 
(with 400 members) for the conversion of votes into seats, and no formal threshold for 
representation was imposed. 
The Droop Quota was used to allocate seats, and surplus seats were awarded by an 
adaptation of the Largest Remainder Method. Early drafts of the electoral law put the 
threshold for parliamentary representation at 5 per cent of the national vote but, in a 
concession to the smaller parties, the ANC and the NP agreed in early 1994 to drop 
any ‘mandatory’ threshold. However, only those parties with 20 or more MPs, 5 per 
cent of the Assembly, were guaranteed portfolios in the first government’s cabinet of 
national unity. 
The fact that the ‘Mandela liberation-movement juggernaut’ would have won the 
National Assembly elections under almost any electoral system cannot diminish the 












system, as an integral part of other power-sharing mechanisms in the new constitution, 
was crucial to creating the atmosphere of inclusiveness and reconciliation which 
precipitated the decline of the worst political violence and has made post-apartheid 
South Africa something of a beacon of hope and stability to the rest of troubled 
Africa. 
Nevertheless, in 1990, upon Nelson Mandela’s release from prison, there was no 
particular reason to believe that South Africa would adopt PR. The ‘whites-only’ 
Parliament had always been elected by an FPTP system, while the ANC, now in 
a powerful bargaining position, expected to be clearly advantaged if FPTP were 
maintained. As only five electoral districts, out of over 700, had white majorities, the 
ANC, with 50–60 per cent of the popular vote, expected to win 70 per cent or 80 per 
cent of the parliamentary seats easily due to the vagaries of FPTP voting. But the ANC 
did not opt for this course because it realized that the disparities of a ‘winner-takes-all’ 
electoral system would be fundamentally destabilizing in the long run for minority 
and majority interests. List PR also avoided the politically charged and controversial 
question of having to draw constituency boundaries and, furthermore, it fitted in with 
the executive power-sharing ethos which both the ANC and the Nationalists saw as a 
key tenet of the interim constitution. 
It is probable that, even with their geographical pockets of electoral support, the 
Freedom Front (which won nine seats in the new National Assembly), the Democratic 
Party (seven seats), the Pan-Africanist Congress (five seats), and the African Christian 
Democratic Party (two seats) would have failed to win a single parliamentary seat if 
the elections had been held under a single-member district FPTP electoral system. 
While these parties together only had 6 per cent of the members of the new Assembly, 
their importance inside the structures of government far outweighs their numerical 
strength. 
A reading of the detailed results reveals, somewhat surprisingly, that in 1994 List 
PR may not have particularly advantaged the medium-sized NP and the IFP over and 
above the number of seats they would have expected to win under an FPTP system. 
This was primarily due to the ‘national referendum’ nature of the campaign, which 
led to a two-party battle between the old and the new—the ANC versus the IFP in 
KwaZulu-Natal province, and the ANC versus the NP in the rest of the country. 
Furthermore, the ethnically homogeneous nature of constituencies and the strong 
geographical concentrations of support in South Africa meant that the NP and the IFP 
would have won only slightly fewer seats under a constituency system. However, FPTP 
would in all likelihood have given the ANC a small ‘seat bonus’, increasing its share 
of the seats in the National Assembly beyond its share of the popular vote (which was 
62 per cent) and beyond the two-thirds majority needed to draft the new constitution 
without reference to other parties. 
The practice of having one ballot for the National Assembly and one for the 
provincial parliament also proved to be an important innovation in the electoral system 
design. Until a few months before the election, the ANC was still insisting on a single 
ballot which would be counted for both the national and provincial elections. This was 
quite clearly a manoeuvre to advantage the larger, nationally-based parties and was 
only changed through the pressure of an alliance of business leaders, the Democratic 
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Party, and international advisers. The eventual results did show that large numbers of 
voters had split their national and provincial ballots between two parties, and it appears 
as though the major beneficiaries of separating the ballots were the small Democratic 
Party and the Freedom Front. Both polled more than 200,000 votes in the provincial 
elections over and above their national result, which went a long way to explain the 
490,000 drop between the NP’s national and provincial totals. 
The choice of electoral system has also had an impact upon the composition of 
the Parliament along the lines of ethnicity and gender. The South African National 
Assembly sworn into office in May 1994 contained over 80 former members of the 
whites-only parliament, but that was where the similarities between the old and the 
new ended. In direct contrast to South Africa’s troubled history, black sat with white, 
communist with conservative, Zulu with Xhosa, and Muslim with Christian. To a 
significant extent the diversity of the new National Assembly was a product of the use 
of List PR. The national, and unalterable, candidate lists allowed parties to present 
ethnically heterogeneous groups of candidates which, it was hoped, would have cross-
cutting appeal. The resulting National Assembly was 52 per cent black (including 
Xhosa-, Zulu-, Sotho-, Venda-, Tswana-, Pedi-, Swazi-, Shangaan- and Ndebele-
speaking), 32 per cent white (English- and Afrikaans-speaking), 8 per cent Indian, 
and 7 per cent Coloured—this compared to an electorate which was estimated to be 73 
per cent black, 15 per cent white, 9 per cent Coloured, and 3 per cent Indian. Women 
made up 27 per cent of MPs. 
In 1999 the proportion of black MPs rose to 58 per cent and that of Coloured MPs 
rose to 10 per cent, while whites made up 26 per cent and Indians 5 per cent. In 2004 
the black proportion (65 per cent) came closer to their population share, while whites 
made up 22 per cent. Numbers of Coloured and Indian MPs held roughly steady. The 
proportion of women MPs rose to 30 per cent in 1999 and to 33 per cent in 2004. There 
is a widespread belief in South Africa that if FPTP had been introduced there would 
have been far fewer women, Indians and whites, with more black and male MPs. 
Finally, more polarized forms of representation would be expected under FPTP, 
with whites (of different parties) representing majority white constituencies, Xhosas 
representing Xhosas, Zulus representing Zulus, and so on. While problems with lack 
of district accountability and of remoteness are perceived effects of the present South 
African List PR system, it has meant that citizens have a variety of MPs to approach 
when the need arises. 
Nevertheless, there is a continuing debate in South Africa about how to increase 
democratic accountability and the representativeness of the MPs. It was widely accepted 
that the first non-racial election was more of a referendum about which parties should 
draw up the new constitution. But subsequent elections have been about constituting a 
representative Parliament, and many political actors and voters argue that the electoral 
system needs to be altered to take this into account. 
Today, all the major political parties still support the principle of PR. Without 
greatly increasing the difficulty of the ballot, voters could be allowed to choose between 
candidates as well as parties, without the PR character of the Parliament being affected 
in any way. One option is to elect MPs in smaller multi-member constituencies in order 












the moment the regional lists represent areas so large that any form of local advocacy 
is entirely lost. A second option is to adopt the MMP system, with half the members 
elected from single-member districts while the other half come from compensatory 
PR lists. Both these options were considered by a 12-member Task Team, led by 
Frederick van Zyl Slabbert, a former leader of the Democratic Party, and briefed to 
consider reform options in 2002. This Task Team had an inbuilt ANC- Independent 
Electoral Commission (IEC) majority, and was appointed by the president to review 
the electoral system in the light of complaints that the List PR system did not include 
adequate geographical representation. It ultimately recommended that South Africa 
should retain its List PR system but change it to a two-tier system, splitting the country 
into 69 constituencies electing between three and seven MPs, and keeping 100 seats as 
‘compensatory’ national seats. However, the ANC government rejected this reform for 
the 2004 general election and appears to be unwilling to implement a new system for 
2009.
South African closed 
List PR ballot paper
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INDONESIA: 




The development of political institutions able to provide stable and effective 
government has been a daunting challenge in Indonesia, a huge and ethnically diverse 
country of nearly 20,000 islands whose unity was based on common resistance to 
colonialism. Political identity in Indonesia is a complex subject, in the past often based 
on links to different strands of Islam, to a more secular nationalism, or in some areas to 
Christianity—to which assessment of leadership qualities and the impact of corruption 
now, in 2004, appear to have been added. Devising electoral systems that are inclusive 
and effective in the context of the Indonesian unitary state has never been easy. 
The first general election in Indonesia after the 1945 proclamation of independence 
took place in 1955. A PR system using 15 regions was adopted without challenge. Seats 
were distributed in proportion to population, with a small extra allocation for Outer 
Island regions. The Largest Remainder Method using the Hare Quota was adopted. 
Parties or organizations could nominate lists, and individual candidates could also 
be nominated. Voters could vote either for a list or by writing in the name of one 
candidate. 
The resulting legislature included representatives of 27 parties and lists, plus one 
individual member. The four largest parties all received between 16 per cent and 23 
per cent of the vote. Not only was no single party able to command a majority in 
the legislature; not even two parties were. It was difficult to form governments, and 
their ability to retain the confidence of the legislature was limited. The Constituent 
Assembly, elected shortly afterwards to draw up a permanent constitution, had a similar 
political balance and failed to reach agreement. 
General loss of confidence in political institutions and rebellions against the unitary 
state led President Soekarno to impose an authoritarian regime in 1959. This lasted 
until it was replaced by the New Order of President Soeharto in the mid-1960s, which 
established virtually complete dominance of the executive, legislative and judicial 
branches. Elections took place, but campaigns were heavily restricted, many candidates 
were disqualified, and the rules were applied disproportionately against opponents of 
the government. The desire for complete central control over the choice of candidates 
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contributed to the choice of closed-list PR. Soeharto sought to allay fears of Javanese 
political domination, and Java received only just over half of the seats to be elected, 
despite having over 70 per cent of the registered electorate in 1955. Although this figure 
has fallen, it was still 61 per cent in 2004. 
The Transition to Democracy: The 1999 Elections
After the Soeharto regime fell in 1998, new electoral legislation was finalized in 
late January 1999. The electoral system—described as a ‘proportional system with 
district characteristics’—was unique. It was the clear product of incremental political 
negotiation against a time deadline. This agreement was reached in the legislature 
by the parties of the Soeharto era, which were under pressure from the new parties 
and others outside the negotiations, in addition to defending their own positions and 
coming under pressure from their own power bases. Given these pressures, it is unlikely 
that the end result of the negotiation could have been substantially different. 
At the June 1999 election, each voter cast a single vote for a political party. The 27 
provinces were retained as electoral districts, ranging in magnitude from four to 82 
seats. The number of seats won by each party in each province was determined using 
the principles of PR, and each candidate on each party list was linked by the party to 
one of the second-tier districts (kota, city authorities, and kabupaten, authorities in 
non-city areas) within the province. Because of deep-rooted concern to maintain the 
unity of the state, there were provisions that made it impossible to register a specifically 
regional party. The law on political parties required all parties contesting the elections 
to be organized in at least nine provinces. 
The legislation was not clear on essential detail. The method for converting votes 
cast into seats gained was not included. Nor were there rules for identifying which 
candidates from a party’s list would occupy the seats gained by that party. These issues 
were resolved only at a very late stage. 
The final seat allocation regulations retained the Largest Remainder Method 
using the Hare Quota. The allocation of candidates to seats won was much more 
complex. In practice, few central party leaderships even complied with the regulations, 
and leaderships took de facto powers simply to tell the Election Commission which 
candidates had been elected to the seats their party had won. 
The 1999 elections were nonetheless judged to have been the first since 1955 to be 
acceptable overall, despite specific or localized concerns. Five parties gained more than 
2 per cent of the vote: their relative strengths varied widely in the different parts of 
Indonesia. Sixteen other parties gained representation. 
Reflection on the 1999 elections was rapidly overtaken by a full review of the 1945 
constitution. The completion of this review in 2002 led to fundamental changes, 
including the introduction of the separation of powers, the principle of checks and 
balances, direct election of the president and vice-president, and the establishment of a 
regionally based elected second chamber with very limited powers. Four portmanteau 
amendments were passed to the constitution, completely changing the way in which 
the institutions will work in future, and five new laws—on elections, presidential 
elections, political parties, the structure of elected bodies, and the establishment of 











mainstream of the family of presidential democracies. 
Single-Member Plurality Fails to Find Favour for Elections to the Legislature
After 1999, there was considerable advocacy of a single-member district (SMD) 
plurality system among the media and in academia in particular, as the accountability 
of elected members was widely perceived to be lacking in the legislature elected in 1999. 
Even if the 1999 electoral system is viewed not as a political deal but as a brave attempt 
to marry the principles of List PR and the accountability of elected members to the 
electoral district, no constituency–member link was created in practice. 
However, simulations made after the 1999 elections suggested that a plurality SMD 
system would be likely to produce results in Indonesia that were more disproportional 
than almost anywhere else in the world. Steadily worsening relations between the 
legislature elected in 1999 and many academic, media and civil society actors also 
meant that support for SMD systems by the latter became steadily less persuasive. 
It became evident that a plurality system would almost certainly fail to reflect the 
diversity of Indonesia, that introducing an acceptable districting process for the 2004 
election would take time and involve considerable difficulty, and that plurality systems 
were not likely to favour the election of women. 
The 2004 Electoral System
The new constitutional requirements agreed in 2002 state that the participants in 
elections to the lower chamber of the legislature (the National Assembly) are political 
parties, thus limiting the available options for the electoral system in the new electoral 
law. The government’s draft election law provided for a PR system using multi-member 
districts, responding to the pressure for greater accountability by proposing open lists 
and the dividing up of larger provinces. This basic form was finally adopted, with 
multi-member districts of a magnitude of between three and 12 seats to be drawn up 
by the Election Commission. Subsequent debate led to multi-member districts whose 
magnitude is towards the higher end of this range. The restricted open-list system 
finally agreed requires voters to vote for one party and, if they wish, one candidate from 
that party. However, this will only result in the election of a particular candidate out of 
the order in which names appear on the party list if that candidate gains more than a 
full Hare Quota of individual votes—which made its likely effect minimal, as proved 
to be the case in practice in the 2004 elections to the legislature. 
As a result of the creation of the regional chamber, some parties argued the case 
for ‘one person, one vote, one value’ (OPOVOV) for the legislature, with the same 
population for every seat, while others backed the retention of a representational bias 
in favour of the Outer Islands. The final compromise is a complex formula basing the 
number of seats for each province on a minimum of 325,000 population per seat in 
small provinces and a maximum of 425,000 population per seat in large ones, with a 
minimum of three seats per province. 
The central party leaderships showed little inclination to relax their hold on their 
parties. The larger parties toughened the requirements for parties to participate in both 
the 2004 and subsequent elections. 











open or closed list, OPOVOV, the balance between Java and the Outer Islands, and 
party participation were all negotiated between the parties when the final deal was 
struck. A broadly-based campaign did, however, lead to the adoption of a ‘maybe-
quota’ for gender representation: parties are required to ‘bear in their hearts’ the 
desirability of including at least 30 per cent women candidates on their lists. While 
there is no enforcement provision, this proved an important tool to encourage more 
women candidates, and 12 per cent of the members of the 2004 legislature are women-
a significant improvement on 1999. 
The 2004 legislative election results reflected both change and continuity. The same 
five parties that polled more than 3 per cent in 1999 did so again, and were joined by 
two more. Seventeen parties were represented altogether. 
Elections to the Regional Chamber: SNTV Springs a Surprise
The constitution provides that candidates for the new regional chamber (the Regional 
Representatives’ Council) should be individuals, not parties. Four members are to be 
elected per province. The draft law proposed the Block Vote system, clearly designed 
to advantage parties with support outside Java where provinces are smaller. SNTV was 
proposed as an alternative by the party that was strongest in Java, and was agreed as 
part of the final deal. 
The first election to the regional chamber took place in 2004 and demonstrated a 
known weakness of SNTV: with an average of 30 candidates contesting the four seats 
in each province, many candidates were elected with less than 10 per cent of the vote. 
However, strong campaigns by women candidates meant that an unexpected 21 per 
cent of the members of the new chamber are women—a level unprecedented in a freely 
elected body in Indonesia. 
Direct Presidential Elections
The president and vice-president are now directly elected, with candidates pairing up 
to form tickets. A two-round majority run-off system is used, with the aim of ensuring 
that the successful candidates have sufficient support across a large and diverse country. 
For a ticket to be elected on the first round, it must not only poll an absolute majority 
of votes cast but also meet a distribution requirement of 20 per cent of the vote in at 
least half the provinces. While a majority winner will almost certainly achieve this, 
the requirement prevents a ticket whose support is solid in Java and minimal elsewhere 
from winning an election in the first round. In the first direct presidential election in 
2004, five tickets contested the first round in July, with none polling over 35 per cent; 
in the second round in September, Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono gained victory with 61 
per cent of the votes. 
The Political Reality: Negotiating a Deal
The 1999 electoral system agreement had to be acceptable both to the parties of the 
New Order, which still held the levers of power, and to the new parties outside on 
the street. The constitutional review that followed the 1999 election also required 
agreement across the political spectrum. The 2004 election law is yet another deal, 
similar in principle to that of 1999, but with important differences of detail. Each time, 
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there were a limited number of practical solutions given the inherited traditions and 
the political background and positions of the actors. However, there are positive signs 
for democracy in the new Indonesian institutional framework: it is fortunate that some 
long-term vision existed alongside the inevitable perceptions of short-term political 
advantage among the parties and individuals who shaped the changes.
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a. Weak links between elected legislators and their constituents. When List PR is used 
and seats are allocated in one single national district, as in Namibia or Israel, the system 
is criticized for destroying the link between voters and their representatives. Where 
lists are closed voters have no opportunity to determine the identity of the persons 
who will represent them and no identifiable representative for their town, district or 
village, nor can they easily reject an individual representative if they feel that he or 
she has performed poorly in office. Moreover, in some developing countries where the 
society is mainly rural, voters’ identification with their region of residence is sometimes 
considerably stronger than their identification with any political party or grouping. 
This criticism, however, may relate more to the distinction between systems in which 
voters vote for parties and systems in which they vote for candidates. 
b. Excessive entrenchment of power within party headquarters and in the hands of 
senior party leaderships—especially in closed-list systems. A candidate’s position on the 
party list, and therefore his or her likelihood of success, is dependent on currying favour 
with party bosses, whose relationship with the electorate is of secondary importance. 
In an unusual twist to the List PR system, in Guyana parties publish their list of 
candidates not ranked but simply ordered alphabetically. This allows party leaders even 
more scope to reward loyalty and punish independence because seats are only allocated 
to individuals once the result of the vote is known. 
c. The need for some kind of recognized party or political groupings to exist. This 
makes List PR particularly difficult to implement in those societies which do not have 
parties or have very embryonic and loose party structures, for example, many of the 
island countries of the Pacific. 
The Single Transferable Vote (STV)
109. STV has long been advocated by political scientists as one of the most attractive 
electoral systems, but its use for legislative elections has been limited to a few cases—the 
Republic of Ireland since 1921, Malta since 1947, and once in Estonia in 1990. It is also 
used for elections to the Australian Federal Senate and in several Australian states, and 
for European and local elections in Northern Ireland. It has been adopted for local 
elections in Scotland and in some authorities in New Zealand. It was also chosen as the 
recommendation of the British Columbia Citizens’ Assembly (see the case study on British 
Columbia). 
The core principles of the system were independently invented in the 19th century by 
Thomas Hare in Britain and Carl Andræ in Denmark. STV uses multi-member districts, 
and voters rank candidates in order of preference on the ballot paper in the same manner as 
under the Alternative Vote system. In most cases this preference marking is optional, and 
voters are not required to rank-order all candidates; if they wish they can mark only one. 
After the total number of first-preference votes are tallied, the count then begins by 
















THE REPUBLIC OF IRELAND: 
The Single Transferable 
Vote in Action
Michael Gallagher
CASE STUDY: The Republic of Ireland
The Irish lower house of Parliament, Dáil Éireann, is elected by the STV system—
proportional representation by means of the Single Transferable Vote. This relatively 
unusual system owes its origins to the circumstances of the Republic of Ireland’s 
achievement of independence in 1922. The departing rulers, the British, wanted some 
form of PR in order to protect the Protestant minority, while the new state’s political 
elite favoured PR in principle. With neither having much awareness of PR list systems, 
STV was adopted by agreement as the electoral system and has remained the electoral 
system ever since. 
The Dáil is of central importance in the Irish political system. It elects the 
government, which needs to retain majority support in the Dáil in order to survive. 
Much less important is the presidency, although, unusually for a parliamentary system, 
the president is directly elected. Elections for the presidency take place under the 
Alternative Vote (AV) system. 
The 166 members of the Dáil are elected from around 40 constituencies, each 
returning three, four or five members. Voting is straightforward: voters merely indicate 
their favoured candidate (by writing ‘1’ beside that candidate’s name on the ballot 
paper), and can go on to indicate their second and third choices and so on in the same 
way. Voters can rank candidates not only within but also across parties. Although most 
vote along party lines, it is not necessary to do so, and some vote along geographical 
lines, that is, they give their highest preferences, regardless of party, to the candidates 
from their own local area. The counting process, especially the distribution of ‘surplus’ 
votes, looks complicated to the uninitiated, but it is worth emphasizing that the voters 
do not have to be familiar with all the details; they need only to know how to cast their 
vote and to be satisfied that the counting process is ‘fair’ and transparent. 
The electoral system is entrenched in the constitution and consequently cannot be 
changed without a referendum. On two occasions (1959 and 1968) the largest party, 
Fianna Fáil, instigated a referendum to replace STV by the British FPTP system, 
using the argument each time that any kind of PR was likely to create a problem of 
unstable coalition government. The proposed change was rejected by the voters on each 
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occasion, by margins of 52 per cent to 48 per cent in 1959, and 61 per cent to 39 per 
cent in 1968. 
On the basis of the criterion of stable government, anyone evaluating the record of 
STV in the Republic of Ireland would not, in fact, see its performance as a problem. 
Since the mid-1940s, governments (both coalition and single-party) have lasted three, 
four or five years, the only exception being a short-lived period of instability in the early 
1980s. The voters, through their ranking of candidates of different parties, are able to 
indicate their wishes regarding potential coalition partners for their preferred party. 
STV has generally delivered highly proportional outcomes, with Fianna Fáil 
receiving only a modest ‘bonus’ (around 48 per cent of the seats for 45 per cent of the 
votes at elections over the period 1945–92). However, the small size of the electoral 
districts (four seats per constituency on average) creates the potential for the largest 
party to reap a benefit if it can attract second- and third-preference votes from 
supporters of other parties, and this happened at the two most recent elections. These 
produced the least proportional results ever: in 2002, Fianna Fáil won 41 per cent of 
the votes and 49 per cent of the seats. 
The system continues to allow representation to small parties and to independents, 
13 of whom were elected in 2002. While many PR systems enable small parties to win 
seats in the Parliament, STV seems to give an unusual opportunity to independent 
candidates to do the same because of its essentially candidate-centred rather than 
party-centred nature. 
Much of the praise and criticism of STV in the Republic of Ireland hinges on the 
same factor, namely the power it gives to voters to choose among candidates of the same 
party. This creates intense intra-party competition, especially among candidates of 
Fianna Fáil, which nominates between two and four candidates in each constituency. 
Statistics show that more incumbent Fianna Fáil MPs lose their seat to a running-mate 
than to a candidate of another party. 
Critics argue that, as a result, incumbents become over-active at constituency level 
in order to curry favour with the voters and do not spend enough time on politics at 
national level, for example, on scrutinizing the government or discussing legislation 
in committees. They argue that this has an adverse effect on the calibre of Irish 
parliamentarians (in that individuals who could make a contribution at national level 
are discouraged by the likely casework load they would have to discharge if elected) and 
that it leads to short-termism and undue regard for localism in government thinking. 
They suggest that internal party competition for votes may lead to divided, incohesive 
political parties. 
The defenders of the system, in contrast, see voters’ opportunity to choose among 
candidates of their party as a virtue. They argue that it allows the voters to replace 
incumbents by more able and more active newcomers and that, at a time of decreasing 
interest in conventional politics, this gives MPs a strong incentive to keep in close 
contact with the voters and thus fulfil the role of linking citizens to the political system. 
They maintain that there is no evidence that Irish MPs are of lower calibre than those 
elsewhere and that the Republic of Ireland’s recent record of impressive economic growth 
shows that there cannot be too much wrong with the behaviour of governments. They 















their behaviour in Parliament, with no factions or recognizable subgroups. 
In 2002 an all-party parliamentary committee considered the arguments for and 
against changing the system. It concluded that the public was strongly attached to STV, 
that a change to any other system would reduce the power of the individual voter, and 
that some of the alleged failings of the political system for which critics blamed STV 
were caused by other factors. As this conclusion indicates, there is no significant body 
of opinion in favour of amending or replacing the existing system. 
Any evaluation of STV in the Republic of Ireland needs to take account of the 
characteristics of the country. It is a small country in terms of both area and population, 
and the ratio of MPs to population (about 1 : 20,000) is relatively high by international 
standards. This may foster closer links between MPs and their constituents, regardless 
of the electoral system, than are likely in a larger country. In addition, the Republic of 
Ireland is a prosperous, highly educated society where the political system as a whole is 
well established and is universally regarded as legitimate. Irish society does not have any 
significant cleavages (for example, ethnic, linguistic or religious). 
For all these reasons we need to be careful about drawing firm conclusions about 
how STV would operate in other contexts. We can, though, say that there is no sign that 
the electorate in the Republic of Ireland would like to replace it by any other system.
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Australian Senate Single Transferable Vote ballot paper
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used is normally the Droop quota, calculated by the simple formula: 
Quota =                   +1
110. The result is determined through a series of counts. At the first count, the total 
number of first-preference votes for each candidate is ascertained. Any candidate who 
has a number of first preferences greater than or equal to the quota is immediately 
elected. 
In second and subsequent counts, the surplus votes 
of elected candidates (i.e. those votes above the 
quota) are redistributed according to the second 
preferences on the ballot papers. For fairness, all 
the candidate’s ballot papers are redistributed, but 
each at a fractional percentage of one vote, so that 
the total redistributed vote equals the candidate’s 
surplus (except in the Republic of Ireland, which 
uses a weighted sample). If a candidate had 100 
votes, for example, and their surplus was five votes, 
then each ballot paper would be redistributed at 
the value of 1/20th of a vote. 
After any count, if no candidate has a surplus of 
votes over the quota, the candidate with the lowest total of votes is eliminated. His 
or her votes are then redistributed in the next count to the candidates left in the race 
according to the second and then lower preferences shown. The process of successive 
counts, after each of which surplus votes are redistributed or a candidate is eliminated, 
continues until either all the seats for the electoral district are filled by candidates who 
have received the quota, or the number of candidates left in the count is only one more 
than the number of seats to be filled, in which case all remaining candidates bar one are 
elected without receiving a full quota. 
111. Advantages. The advantages claimed for PR generally apply to STV systems. 
In addition, as a mechanism for choosing representatives, STV is perhaps the most 
sophisticated of all electoral systems, allowing for choice between parties and between 
candidates within parties. The final results retain a fair degree of proportionality, and 
the fact that in most actual examples of STV the multi-member districts are relatively 
small means that a geographical link between voter and representative is retained. 
Furthermore, voters can influence the composition of post-election coalitions, as has 
been the case in the Republic of Ireland, and the system provides incentives for inter-
party accommodation through the reciprocal exchange of preferences between parties. 
STV also provides a better chance for the election of popular independent candidates 
than List PR, because voters are choosing between candidates rather than between 
parties (although a party-list option can be added to an STV election; this is done for 
the Australian Senate). 
The Single Transferable Vote is a 
preferential system in which the voter 
ranks the candidates in a multi-member 
district and the candidates that surpass  
a specified quota of first-preference votes 
are immediately elected. In successive 
counts, votes are redistributed from 
least successful candidates, who are 
eliminated, and votes surplus to the 
quota are redistributed from successful 
candidates, until sufficient candidates 
are declared elected. Voters normally 
vote for candidates rather than political 



















112. Disadvantages. The disadvantages claimed for PR generally also apply to STV 
systems. In addition: 
a. STV is sometimes criticized on the grounds that preference voting is unfamiliar in 
many societies, and demands, at the very least, a degree of literacy and numeracy. 
b. The intricacies of an STV count are quite complex, which is also seen as being a 
drawback. This has been cited as one of the reasons why Estonia decided to abandon the 
system after its first election. STV requires continual recalculations of surplus transfer 
values and the like. Because of this, votes under STV need to be counted at counting 
centres instead of directly at the polling place. Where election integrity is a salient issue, 
counting in the actual polling places may be necessary to ensure legitimacy of the vote, 
and there will be a need to choose the electoral system accordingly. 
c. STV, unlike List PR, can at times produce pressures for political parties to fragment 
internally because members of the same party are effectively competing against 
each other, as well as against the opposition, for votes. This could serve to promote 
‘clientelistic’ politics where politicians offer electoral bribes to groups of defined voters. 
d. STV can lead to a party with a plurality of votes nonetheless winning fewer seats 
than its rivals. Malta amended its system in the mid-1980s by providing for some extra 
compensatory seats to be awarded to a party in the event of this happening. 
Many of these criticisms have, however, proved to be little trouble in practice. STV 
elections in the Republic of Ireland and Malta have tended to produce relatively stable, 
legitimate governments comprising one or two main parties. 
PR-Related Issues
District Magnitude
113. There is near-universal agreement among electoral specialists that the crucial 
determinant of an electoral system’s ability to translate votes cast into seats won 
proportionally is the district magnitude, which is the number of members to be elected 
in each electoral district. Under a system such as FPTP, AV or the Two-Round System, 
there is a district magnitude of one; voters are electing a single representative. By 
contrast, all PR systems, some plurality/majority systems such as Block Vote and PBV, 
and some other systems such as Limited Vote and SNTV, require electoral districts 
which elect more than one member. Under any proportional system, the number 
of members to be chosen in each district determines, to a significant extent, how 
proportional the election results will be. 
114. The systems which achieve the greatest degree of proportionality will use very 
large districts, because such districts are able to ensure that even very small parties are 
represented in the legislature. In smaller districts, the effective threshold (see paragraph 
121) is higher. For example, in a district in which there are only three members to be 
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CHILE:




Chile’s electoral system can only be understood in the context of the long period of 
authoritarian rule under General Augusto Pinochet (1973–90), whose aim was to 
establish a regime of protected, authoritarian democracy, of which the electoral system 
was one component. The dictatorship abolished PR, which had been in force prior to 
the military coup of 11 September 1973. PR was the response to the cleavages in Chile’s 
social structure since the 19th century and had produced a multiparty system. By the 
1960s this had consolidated into six major parties—two on the left (the Socialists and 
the Communists), two in the centre (the Christian Democrats and the Radicals), and 
two on the right (the Liberals and the Conservatives, who merged in 1966 to form the 
National Party). 
The Binomial System: a Legacy of Authoritarianism 
In Chile’s bicameral constitutional arrangements, the Chamber of Deputies, the 
lower house, consists of 120 members elected for a four-year term, two for each of 
the 60 electoral districts. The Senate has 38 elected members, two for each of the 19 
districts, elected for an eight-year term: there are elections for half of the seats every 
four years, simultaneously with elections to the Chamber of Deputies. There are in 
addition nine non-elected members, the ‘institutional’ or ‘designated’ senators, named 
by the National Security Council (four), the Supreme Court (three) and the president 
(two), and one ex-officio life member, former President Eduardo Frei Ruiz-Tagle. (The 
original 13 senatorial districts of the 1980 constitution were expanded to 19 in the 
1989 constitutional reforms to reduce the power of the non-elected senators.) These 
arrangements were negotiated by Pinochet and his supporters as they fell from power 
during the transition to democracy. 
Parties, coalitions or independents present lists, normally containing a maximum of 
two candidates per district, in elections both for the Chamber of Deputies and for the 
Senate. Voters vote for the candidate of their choice. The first seat goes to whichever list 
receives the most votes in total: the representative elected is the individual candidate on 
that list who receives the highest vote. To take both seats, the most successful list must 
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receive twice the number of votes of the second list. This system forces the parties to 
form electoral coalitions because the effective threshold is very high: 33.4 per cent of 
the total vote for the top list is required to win one seat. However, a list needs to receive 
66.7 per cent of the total vote to be guaranteed both seats. 
There are two major electoral coalitions, which in 2001 won all the seats in the 
Chamber of Deputies except one. The centre–left Concertación por la Democracia is 
formed by four parties opposed to the Pinochet regime (the Socialists, the Democracy 
Party, the Christian Democrats and the Radicals) and has ruled since the return 
to democracy in March 1990. The right-wing opposition Alliance for Chile (the 
Independent Democrat Union, UDI, and National Renewal, RN) supported the 
Pinochet regime. In practice the Concertación list contains one candidate from each 
of two groupings within the coalition, that is, one from the Christian Democrats and 
another from the Socialists, the Democracy Party and the Radicals. There is no district 
in which there is competition between the Socialists and the Democracy Party. On the 
opposition list, the UDI and National Renewal normally present one candidate each 
in all districts. 
The result of this electoral system is that almost all districts return one representative 
from the Concertación and one from the Alliance for Chile. The system could create 
competition between the two candidates on a list for the one seat it will win, but in 
practice even this is severely limited by elite accommodation within both coalitions. 
This electoral system is unique because in practice it favours the largest minority, 
not the majority. It is thus not a majoritarian system. It is a system which uses a 
proportional mechanism, but the results it produces are not proportional, since it allows 
an electoral list to take half the seats with only 34 per cent of the votes. The only reason 
why this distortion has not occurred in practice is the limits to electoral competition. 
The electoral system was set up by the military regime following the plebiscite of 5 
October 1988. The plebiscite had two goals: to approve the 1980 constitution and to 
elect General Pinochet as president for a further eight years. In this non-competitive 
election (there was no other candidate), Pinochet was defeated by the Concertación. 
This triggered the transition to democracy, with congressional and presidential 
elections in 1989, the presidential election being won by the opposition candidate 
Patricio Aylwin (Christian Democrat). The electoral system was designed to favour 
the two right-wing parties, which had backed Pinochet’s candidacy, in the face of a 
predictable electoral victory for their opponents. 
In the three presidential and four congressional elections held since 1990, the 
Concertación has received most votes, but has never controlled the Senate because the 
majority of the institutional senators have supported the opposition. 
The Drawbacks of the Binomial System for the Parties and for Democracy 
Several objections to the electoral system have been voiced. First, it forces the parties 
into electoral coalitions because of the high vote threshold required to win a seat. 
Second, it has a negative impact on representation because it has kept the Communist 
Party out of Congress, despite its relevance up to 1973 and its 5–7 per cent share of the 
national vote in the new democracy. Third, since each coalition will normally win one 









alliances and parties. These disputes endanger stability in the coalitions; in the 2001 
senatorial elections the UDI and the RN avoided them and named a single consensus 
candidate in seven of the nine districts, or ran only a weak competitor who would not 
challenge the leadership’s candidate. Fourth, the system hands enormous power to the 
party leaders, who virtually choose the winners when they make up the lists. With no 
real competition in many districts, the elections hold little interest for the voters, and 
even less so when there is no candidate of their own party to vote for. 
The deficiencies have led the government to propose that there should be electoral 
reforms and to suggest that, instead of the two-member districts, larger districts that 
would yield more proportional results would be more appropriate. This has made little 
headway, however, because the Concertación parties fear the resulting uncertainty, and 
the opposition defends the current system because of the advantage it gives them. 
Presidential Elections
The 1980 constitution establishes a two-round system for presidential elections. An 
absolute majority is required for victory in the first round, with a run-off round (ballotage) 
if this does not occur. The institution of ballotage tends to strengthen coalition politics. 
The winners of the presidential elections in 1989 and 1993—Christian Democrats 
Patricio Aylwin and Eduardo Frei, respectively—were elected with absolute majorities, 
but in 1999 there was only a scant 30,000-vote difference between Ricardo Lagos and 
his right-wing opponent, Joaquín Lavín. Lagos won with 50.27 per cent of the vote in 
the second round. (Under the previous (1925) constitution, when no candidate won 
an absolute majority, Congress decided the presidency, as occurred in 1946, 1958 and 
1970. In each case it elected the candidate with the highest vote.) 
Registration and Voting: Voluntary or Compulsory? 
A further problem perceived in the current electoral system is that registration is 
voluntary but voting is compulsory. New electoral registers were opened in February 
1987, when the military regime was preparing the October 1988 plebiscite, the old 
registers having been burned by the military in 1973. The democratic opposition 
mobilized strongly to get voters registered; its strategy was to defeat Pinochet at the 
polls in order to achieve democracy, and it succeeded in getting 92 per cent of eligible 
voters to register. Since then, however, the number of registered voters has not increased 
in line with the voting age population, as young people now show little interest in 
participating in elections. In the 2001 congressional elections 80 per cent of 10 million 
potential voters were registered; in the 2004 municipal elections the figure was 77 per 
cent. 
Low registration among young voters led the government to propose automatic 
registration and voluntary voting. The Concertación parties support automatic 
registration, but there is no consensus on voluntary voting. They fear that overall 
participation will fall and that the financial costs of campaigning to mobilize voters 
will rise and rise, thus favouring the right-wing parties. The opposition, particularly the 
UDI, rejects automatic registration and supports voluntary voting. 
Supporters of the binomial system claim that it has helped governability because 









view is mistaken: the Concertación as a coalition was created before the binomial 
system was introduced, as an alliance to work against authoritarian rule and promote 
a return to democracy by politicians who had learned from their past conflicts (which 
led to the crisis and breakdown of democracy in 1973) and had agreed on a strategy of 
elite cooperation within a political system somewhat comparable to a consociational 
democracy. The country is governable despite the binomial system, not because of it. 
The system cannot last indefinitely because it damages the political parties and poses 
limitations to democracy, but it will be difficult to abolish because change would create 
uncertainty about the impact on party support. It would also require a constitutional 
amendment, because the binomial character of the Senate is in the constitution. There 
is consensus in Congress between the Concertación and the Alliance for Chile on 
eliminating the non-elected senators and former presidents as life members.
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elected, a party must gain at least 25 per cent +1 of the vote to be assured of winning 
a seat. A party which has the support of only 10 per cent of the electorate would be 
unlikely to win a seat, and the votes of this party’s supporters could therefore be said to 
have been wasted. In a nine-seat district, by contrast, 10 per cent +1 of the vote would 
guarantee that a party wins at least one seat. 
The problem is that as districts are made larger—both in terms of the number of seats 
and often, as a consequence, in terms of their geographic size as well—so the linkage 
between an elected member and his or her constituency grows weaker. This can have 
serious consequences in societies where local factors play a strong role in politics or where 
voters expect their member to maintain strong links with the electorate and act as their 
‘delegate’ in the legislature. 
115. Because of this, there has been a lively debate about the best district magnitude. 
Most scholars agree, as a general principle, that district magnitudes of between three 
and seven seats tend to work quite well, and it has been suggested that odd numbers 
such as three, five and seven work better in practice than even numbers, particularly in 
a two-party system. However, this is only a rough guide, and there are many situations 
in which a higher number may be both desirable and necessary to ensure satisfactory 
representation and proportionality. In many countries, the electoral districts follow pre-
existing administrative divisions, perhaps state or provincial boundaries, which means 
that there may be wide variations in their size. However, this approach both eliminates 
the need to draw additional boundaries for elections and may make it possible to relate 
electoral districts to existing identified and accepted communities. 
116. Numbers at the high and low ends of the spectrum tend to deliver more extreme 
results. At one end of the spectrum, a whole country can form one electoral district, 
which normally means that the number of votes needed for election is extremely low and 
even very small parties can gain election. In Israel, for example, the whole country forms 
one district of 120 members, which means that election results are highly proportional, 
but also means that parties with only small shares of the vote can gain representation and 
that the link between an elected member and any geographical area is extremely weak. 
At the other end of the spectrum, PR systems can be applied to situations in which there 
is a district magnitude of only two. For example, a system of List PR is applied to two-
member districts in Chile. As the case study indicates, this delivers results which are quite 
disproportional, because only two parties can win representation in each district. This 
has tended to undermine the benefits of PR in terms of representation and legitimacy. 
117. These examples, from the opposite ends of the spectrum, both serve to underline 
the crucial importance of district magnitude in any PR electoral system. It is arguably 
the single most important institutional choice when designing a PR system, and is 
also of crucial importance for a number of non-PR systems as well. The Single Non-
Transferable Vote, for example tends to deliver moderately proportional results despite 
not being in essence a proportional formula, precisely because it is used in multi-member 
















becomes the Alternative Vote, which retains some of the advantages of STV but not 
its proportionality. In Party Block Vote and Block Vote systems, as district magnitude 
increases, proportionality is likely to decrease. To sum up, when designing an electoral 
system, district magnitude is in many ways the key factor in determining how the system 
will operate in practice, the strength of the link between voters and elected members, 
and the overall proportionality of election results. 
118. On a related note, the party magnitude (the average number of successful candidates 
from the same party in the same electoral district) is an important factor in determining 
who will be elected. If only one candidate from a party is elected in a district, that 
candidate may well be male and a member of the majority ethnic or social groups in the 
district. If two or more are elected, balanced tickets may have more effect, making it 
likely that more women and more candidates from minorities will be successful. Larger 
districts (seven or more seats in size) and a relatively small number of parties will increase 
the party magnitude. 
The Threshold
119. All electoral systems have thresholds of representation: that is, the minimum level of 
support which a party needs to gain representation. Thresholds can be legally imposed 
(formal thresholds) or exist as a mathematical property of the electoral system (effective 
or natural thresholds). 
120. Formal thresholds are written into the constitutional or legal provisions which 
define the PR system. In the mixed systems of Germany, New Zealand and Russia, 
for example, there is a 5 per cent threshold in the PR section: parties which fail to 
secure 5 per cent of the vote nationwide are ineligible to be awarded seats from the PR 
lists. This concept had its origins in the desire to limit the election of extremist groups 
in Germany, and is designed to stop very small parties from gaining representation. 
However, in both Germany and New Zealand there exist ‘back-door’ routes for a party 
to be entitled to seats from the lists; in the case of New Zealand a party must win at least 
one constituency seat, and in the case of Germany three seats, to bypass the threshold 
requirements. In Russia in 1995 there were no back-door routes, and almost half of the 
party-list votes were wasted. 
Elsewhere, legal thresholds range from 0.67 per cent in the Netherlands to 10 per cent 
in Turkey. Parties which gain less than this percentage of the vote are excluded from 
the count. A striking example of this was the 2002 Turkish election, in which so many 
parties failed to clear the 10 per cent threshold that 46 per cent of all votes were wasted. 
In all these cases the existence of a formal threshold tends to increase the overall level of 
disproportionality, because votes for those parties which would otherwise have gained 
representation are wasted. 
In Poland in 1993, even with a comparatively low threshold of 5 per cent for parties and 
8 per cent for coalitions, over 34 per cent of the votes were cast for parties and coalitions 
which did not surmount it. 
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121. An effective, hidden or natural threshold is created as a mathematical by-product 
of features of electoral systems, of which district magnitude is the most important. For 
example, in a district with four seats under a PR system, just as any candidate with more 
than 20 per cent of the vote will be elected, any candidate with less than about 10 per 
cent (the exact figure will vary depending on the configuration of parties, candidates 
and votes) is unlikely to be elected. 
Open, Closed and Free Lists
122. While the List PR system is based on the principle that parties or political 
groupings present candidates, it is possible to give voters a degree of choice within 
List PR between the candidates nominated as well as between the parties. There are 
essentially three options that can be chosen—open, closed and free lists. 
123. The majority of List PR systems in the world are closed, meaning that the order 
of candidates elected by that list is fixed by the party itself, and voters are not able 
to express a preference for a particular candidate. The List PR system used in South 
Africa is a good example of a closed list. The ballot paper contains the party names and 
symbols, and a photograph of the party leader, but no names of individual candidates. 
Voters simply choose the party they prefer; the individual candidates elected as a result 
are predetermined by the parties themselves. This means that parties can include some 
candidates (perhaps members of minority ethnic and linguistic groups, or women) who 
might have difficulty getting elected otherwise. 
The negative aspect of closed lists is that voters have no say in determining who 
the representative of their party will be. Closed lists are also unresponsive to rapid 
changes in events. In East Germany’s pre-unification elections of 1990, the top-ranked 
candidate of one party was exposed as a secret-police informer only four days before the 
election, and immediately expelled from the party; but because lists were closed electors 
had no choice but to vote for him if they wanted to support his former party. 
124. Many List PR systems in Western Europe use open lists, in which voters can 
indicate not just their favoured party but their favoured candidate within that party. In 
most of these systems the vote for a candidate as well as a party is optional and, because 
most voters plump for parties only rather than candidates, the candidate-choice option 
of the ballot paper often has limited effect. However, in Sweden over 25 per cent of the 
voters regularly choose a candidate as well as a party, and a number of individuals are 
elected who would not be if the list were closed. 
125. Finland, contrary to Brazil (see case study) where voters may either cast their vote 
for a candidate or for a political party, voters must vote for candidates: the number 
of seats received by each party is determined by the total number of votes gained by 
its candidates, and the order in which the party’s candidates are elected to these seats 
is determined by the number of individual votes they receive. While this gives voters 
much greater freedom over their choice of candidate, it also has some less desirable side 
effects. Because candidates from within the same party are effectively competing with 
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in a Presidential System
José Antonio Cheibub
CASE STUDY: Brazil
In 2002 Brazilians went to the polls to choose a new president, the members of the 
bicameral national legislature, governors for the component parts of the federation 
(26 states plus the Federal District of Brasília), and members of the unicameral state 
legislative assemblies. This was the fourth direct election since the end of the military 
regime in 1985 of the president and all other major legislative and executive posts. 
Presidential elections in Brazil take place under a two-round majority run-off 
system, with candidates competing for votes throughout the country’s 8,511,965 sq km 
area. Following a constitutional amendment approved in June 1997, presidents are now 
allowed to run for re-election once. Fernando Henrique Cardoso, the incumbent at the 
time the amendment was approved, won re-election in 1998 in the first round with 53.1 
per cent of the vote. However, Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva polled 46 per cent in the first 
round in 2002 and was elected in the run-off round. 
The rules governing legislative elections have remained essentially unchanged since 
they were first established in 1946. The Senate is the chamber where the regions of 
Brazil are represented: each of the 27 component parts of the federation is represented 
by three senators who are elected by plurality for an eight-year term. Membership 
is renewed every four years by one-third and two-thirds, in alternation: when two 
senators are to be elected, voters have two votes under a Block Vote (BV) system.
The Chamber of Deputies has 513 members who compete in 27 multi-member 
electoral districts, corresponding to the 26 states and Brasília. Their magnitude is 
determined by population, subject to the restriction that no state can have fewer than 
eight or more than 70 representatives. Elections take place under a system of open-list 
PR. Each voter has one vote to cast, which can be given to a political party or to an 
individual. Votes given to candidates from each party are pooled and added to the 
votes received by that party to give a total party vote, which is used to determine the 
number of seats to be allocated to each party. The candidates with the most votes on 
each party list win the seats allocated to that party. Seat allocation has been made 
under the D’Hondt Formula since 1950. Parties that do not gain a full quota in a 
district are, however, excluded from gaining a seat. Until 1998 the calculation of the 
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quota was based on the total number of valid and blank votes, making the threshold for 
representation higher. 
Deliberate Malapportionment
The rules for the Chamber of Deputies elections are probably the most controversial 
element of the Brazilian electoral system. The floor and the ceiling on the size of 
electoral districts mean that representation in the Chamber in terms of population is 
uneven across the states. This seriously violates the principle of ‘one person, one vote, 
one value’ (OPOVOV), as the number of votes necessary to elect one representative 
in São Paulo, which has over 25 million voters and 70 seats, is ten times higher 
than it is in Amapá, which has about 290,000 voters and eight seats. The resulting 
malapportionment benefits the less populous states, which tend to be poorer and more 
reliant on agriculture, and is disadvantageous to the larger states, which are richer and 
more industrialized. For this reason it has been blamed as one of the main mechanisms 
for reinforcing traditionalism in politics and thereby weakening political parties. 
However, this needs to be qualified. The only significant loser from malapportionment 
is the state of São Paulo, where the number of representatives would increase by about 
40 if the size of the electoral districts reflected population size strictly. Some other 
states are marginally under-represented, the second-biggest loss occurring in Minas 
Gerais (about four representatives). The losses due to malapportionment are therefore 
concentrated. They also reflect the goals of the makers of the 1946 constitution, who 
were concerned with finding a formula that would prevent São Paulo (and to a lesser 
extent Minas Gerais) from dominating the federation as they had done during the 
period known as the First Republic (1899–1930). 
To the extent that malapportionment favours relatively poor states politically, it may 
help to promote a regional redistribution of wealth that is of no small consequence in a 
country with such high levels of regional inequality as Brazil. 
In addition, the frequent assumption that over-represented states are capable of 
systematically blocking legislation of national scope remains to be proved. It is not 
necessarily the case that the pattern of politics that characterizes the over-represented 
states is any different from the one in the under-represented ones. Clientelistic practices 
exist in all states, and elections are mass phenomena that generate a high degree of 
competition. If clientelism characterizes Brazilian politics, malapportionment of the 
Chamber of Deputies is unlikely to be a significant cause. 
Competition Between Parties—and Within Parties 
One of the main features of the system of open-list PR for the Chamber of Deputies 
is that it induces both inter- and intra-party competition. These elections are quite 
competitive. For example, in 2002 a total of 4,901 candidates stood for the 513 seats 
in the Chamber. In only nine of the 27 districts were there fewer than 100 candidates; 
the lowest number was 66 for eight seats in Tocantins. There were 793 candidates for 
70 seats from São Paulo, 602 for 46 seats from Rio, and 554 for 53 seats from Minas 
Gerais. Parties compete with each other. Candidates, seeking to be elected for the seats 
which their parties gain, compete among themselves for the votes their parties obtain. 








of Brazil’s political parties, to clientelistic ties between voters and their representatives, 
and to a national legislature that is primarily concerned with local rather than national, 
and clientelistic rather than programmatic, issues. 
Again, this view needs to be qualified. First, the view that it is personalism that 
mainly drives voters’ decisions in elections to the legislature in Brazil is far from well 
established. Although the proportion of preference votes (when the voter chooses a 
specific candidate, not simply the party) is far larger than the proportion of party votes, 
these figures say very little about how voters actually decide. If voters give greater relative 
weight to the individual than to the party, many voters who vote for a specific candidate 
would presumably also vote for that candidate even if he or she were to change parties. 
While no studies have tried to address this issue directly, scattered evidence indicates 
that representatives who switch parties in the middle of the legislative term are less 
likely to be re-elected, which suggests that they are not able to carry with them the 
votes that got them elected in the first place. 
Voters and Their Representatives
Even less is known about the ties between voters and their representatives. A great 
deal of effort has been spent trying to uncover the pattern of clientelism and localized 
favours that must have served as the basis for a successful electoral campaign and 
legislative career. Successful candidates, it is said, are those who bring ‘pork’ to their 
‘constituency’. In Brazil’s multi-member district system, however, the individual 
member is one of at least eight representing the district, which makes it difficult to 
establish the link between a particular member and a new spending project. Even 
though some candidates may and do try to carve de facto geographic constituencies 
for themselves, this is not the only, and may not even be the most effective, way of 
getting into the Chamber of Deputies. One study of the geographical distribution 
of the votes of successful candidates demonstrates that in 1994 and 1998 only about 
17 per cent of representatives adopted such a strategy, that is, were able to obtain the 
largest share of votes in a cluster of geographically concentrated localities. The others 
adopted different strategies, such as sharing with competitors a relatively defined 
geographic area, dominating localities that were distant from each other, or obtaining 
relatively small shares of their total vote in geographically dispersed areas. Given the 
level of competition of elections and the lack of legally protected constituencies, it is 
unlikely that a representative will feel safe about his or her ‘bailiwick’. Indeed, rates of 
re-election are not very high: estimates put it at around 60 per cent of those who seek 
re-election. Thus, clientelism does not characterize, at least not exclusively, the ties 
between representatives and voters. 
Does the Electoral System Contribute to Party Fragmentation?
There is much we still need to know about the way in which the system of open-list PR 
with large electoral districts, such as the one that exists in Brazil, operates. We do know, 
however, that elections are extremely competitive, that the advantage of incumbency is 
relatively weak, and that deputies’ relations with their electoral districts differ, so that 
there is no dominant strategy for a successful candidacy. 








inside the Chamber of Deputies is at least questionable. While it is beyond the scope 
of this overview to discuss the mechanisms which the president and the party leaders 
may use to shape the behaviour of individual deputies, deputies face other pressures in 
addition to the demands of localized and particularistic constituencies. These pressures 
are a counterbalance to increased party fragmentation. 
Party fragmentation in the Brazilian legislature has been held responsible for a 
number of the malaises the country has suffered from in the past 15 years. The high 
degree of fragmentation of the party system is usually attributed to a combination 
of factors, which include the electoral system and its individualistic tendencies, the 
characteristics of presidential systems, and the strong federalism adopted by the 1988 
constitution. 
The degree of fragmentation in the Chamber of Deputies has, however, remained 
constant, at around eight effective parties, since the 1990 election. Some aspects of the 
electoral law tend to favour the larger parties and work against fragmentation. Examples 
include the adding of blank votes to the base on which the electoral quota is calculated 
(which makes the quota larger and hence more difficult to achieve), and the exclusion 
of all parties that do not obtain one quota in a district from winning a remainder seat. 
The links between presidentialism and party systems are not yet well enough 
understood. This leaves federalism as a possible cause of fragmentation of the party 
system. Some of the national parties in Brazil are de facto coalitions of regional parties. 
Smaller parties emerge out of these coalitions for purely local reasons, thus leading to 
a multiplication of parties at the national level. Whether this is the real or the only 
reason why new parties emerge, it remains unclear whether federalism is a cause of 
fragmentation or simply a reflection of the variety of regional interests that a country as 
large as Brazil must accommodate in order to operate democratically. 
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conflict and fragmentation. It also means that the potential benefits to the party of 
having lists which feature a diverse slate of candidates can be overturned. In open-
list PR elections in Sri Lanka, for example, the attempts of major Sinhalese parties to 
include minority Tamil candidates in winnable positions on their party lists have been 
rendered ineffective because many voters deliberately voted for lower-placed Sinhalese 
candidates instead. In Kosovo a switch from closed to open lists actually enhanced the 
presence of more extremist candidates. On the same note, open lists have sometimes 
proved to be disadvantageous for the representation of women in highly patriarchal 
societies, although in Poland voters have shown themselves willing to use open list to 
elect more women than would have resulted from the nominations made by the parties 
if closed list had been used. 
126. Other devices are used in a small number of jurisdictions to add additional 
flexibility to open-list systems. In Luxembourg and Switzerland, electors have as many 
votes as there are seats to be filled and can distribute them to candidates either within 
a single party list or across several party lists as they see fit. The capacity to vote for 
more than one candidate across different party lists (known as panachage) or to cast 
more than one vote for a single highly favoured candidate (known as cumulation) both 
provide an additional measure of control to the voter and are categorized here as free 
list systems. 
Apparentement
127. High effective thresholds can serve to discriminate against small parties–indeed, 
in some cases this is their express purpose. But in many cases an inbuilt discrimination 
against smaller parties is seen as undesirable, particularly where several small parties 
with similar support bases ‘split’ their combined votes and consequently fall below the 
threshold, when one aligned grouping would have gained enough combined votes to 
win some seats in the legislature. To get around this problem, some countries which use 
List PR systems also allow small parties to group together for electoral purposes, thus 
forming a cartel—or apparentement or stembusaccoord—to contest the election. This 
means that the parties themselves remain as separate entities, and are listed separately 
on the ballot paper, but that the votes gained by each are counted as if they belonged 
to the entire cartel, thus increasing the chances that the combined vote total will be 
above the threshold and hence that they may be able to gain additional representation. 
This device is a feature of a number of List PR systems in continental Europe, in Latin 
America (where the umbrella parties are called lema) and in Israel. They are nevertheless 
a rarity within PR systems in Africa and Asia, and were abolished in Indonesia in 1999 
after some small parties discovered that, although their cartel gained representation 
overall, they as parties actually lost seats.
Mixed Systems
128. Mixed electoral systems attempt to combine the positive attributes of both 
plurality/majority (or ‘other’) and PR electoral systems. In a mixed system there are 
















are cast by the same voters and contribute to the election of representatives under both 
systems. One of those systems is a plurality/majority system (or occasionally an ‘other’ 
system), usually a single-member district system, and the other a List PR system. There 
are two forms of mixed system. When the results of the two types of election are linked, 
with seat allocations at the PR level being dependent on what happens in the plurality/
majority (or other) district seats and compensating for any disproportionality that arises 
there, the system is called a Mixed Member Proportional (MMP) system. Where the 
two sets of elections are detached and distinct and are not dependent on each other for 
seat allocations, the system is called a Parallel system. While an MMP system generally 
results in proportional outcomes, a Parallel system is likely to give results of which the 
proportionality falls somewhere between that of a plurality/majority and that of a PR 
system. 
Mixed Member Proportional (MMP)
129. Under MMP systems, the PR seats are awarded to compensate for any 
disproportionality produced by the district seat results. For example, if one party wins 
10 per cent of the vote nationally but no district seats, then it will be awarded enough 
seats from the PR lists to bring its representation up to 10 per cent of the seats in the 
legislature. Voters may get two separate choices, as in Germany and New Zealand. 
Alternatively, voters may make only one choice, with the party totals being derived 
from the totals for the individual district candidates. 
Table 4: Countries Using MMP Systems
Country No. of PR Seats No. of Plurality/Majority  Plurality/Majority  Total No. of Seats
  (or Other) Seats (or Other) System
Albania 40 (29%) 100 (71%) FPTP 140
Bolivia 62 (48%) 68 (52%) FPTP 130
Germany 299 (50%) 299 (50%) FPTP 598
Hungary 210 (54%) 176 (46%) TRS 386
Italy 155 (25%) 475 (75%) FPTP 630
Lesotho 40 (33%) 80 (67%) FPTP 120
Mexico 200 (40%) 300 (60%) FPTP 500
New Zealand 55 (46%) 65 (54%) FPTP 120
Venezuela 65 (39%) 100 (61%) FPTP 165
130. MMP is used in Albania, Bolivia, Germany, Hungary, Italy, Lesotho, Mexico, New 
Zealand and Venezuela. In all but one of these countries, the district seats are elected 
using FPTP. Hungary uses TRS and Italy’s method is considerably more complicated: 
one-quarter of the seats in the lower house are reserved to compensate for wasted votes 
in the single-member districts. 
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LESOTHO:




The result of the ordinary National Assembly elections in Lesotho in May 1998 was very 
clear. The governing Lesotho Congress for Democracy (LCD) won an overwhelming 
electoral victory, taking 79 of the 80 seats in the National Assembly. 
The only problem was that LCD had only received the support of slightly over 60 
per cent of the electorate. The result in terms of number of seats won was yet another 
example of how the FPTP electoral system can lead to remarkable discrepancies between 
the share of the vote and the share of the seats won by political parties. A discrepancy 
of this kind should not come as a surprise–it had happened before–but it was followed 
by the losing parties, and especially the main opposition party, the Basotho National 
Party (BNP), crying ‘Foul’. This was also nothing new, but it was a sad surprise that the 
accusations about the overall correctness of the 1998 election results (which were never 
seriously challenged), some time after they were published, incensed the public to such 
a degree that they started rioting in the streets of the capital, Maseru, setting fire to and 
demolishing public as well as private buildings. 
The government called on the Southern African Development Community (SADC) 
to intervene, and the SADC did so, relying mainly on the armed forces of South 
Africa. When order was restored, an agreement was reached on 2 October 1998 (later 
guaranteed by the SADC) which called for the establishment of an Interim Political 
Authority (IPA) on which the 12 parties which had put up candidates in the elections 
were given two seats each, no matter how small their electoral support. The IPA’s brief 
was to develop a new electoral system and suggest other political and administrative 
measures to strengthen Lesotho’s peaceful democratic development. However, all 
recommendations would be submitted to the government, which would then take them 
to Parliament to be enacted in the ordinary way. 
The ideas behind the establishment of the IPA were clearly inspired by the 
institutions of the negotiation process in South Africa during the early part of the 
transition process, but it was not taken into account that the two processes were so 
different that the institutional solutions also had to be different. The subsequent 
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political process in Lesotho was not an easy one, and it can be no surprise that the 
opposition’s overwhelming majority on the IPA—by 22 to 2 against the government of 
the day—was not conducive to a constructive climate of negotiation. 
The IPA representatives, none of whom had been able to ensure a seat for themselves 
in the National Assembly, were eager to suggest an electoral system which would 
keep the single-member constituencies and at the same time provide for a much more 
proportional outcome at the next elections than had been the case in 1998. The obvious 
solution was either an MMP or a Parallel System. A German expert on electoral systems 
was invited to give a presentation, after which the IPA majority opted for the MMP 
solution, with some seats allocated in single-member districts and others allocated 
from party lists on a compensatory basis. The LCD—in complete control of the 
legislature—decided to opt for the alternative, the Parallel System, which would give it, 
on top of its expected massive share of the single-member district seats, an additional 
number reflecting its share of the votes cast for the seats not allocated in the single-
member districts. 
It soon transpired that the IPA was not aware of all the practical details that 
should be taken into consideration when deciding to go for MMP, such as the seat 
allocation formula, the issue of a formal electoral threshold, overhang mandates, one 
or two ballots, and so on. The number of seats in the two categories was also an issue, 
even though most IPA members seemed to agree that keeping the 80 single-member 
districts was a good idea and that it was only natural to have 50 compensatory seats. 
The basis for the latter suggestion was a little awkward: previously Lesotho had had 
65 single-member districts. If it returned to that number and then added an identical 
number of compensatory seats (as in Germany), the National Assembly would have 
130 seats altogether. However, if the size of the Assembly was to be 130, as the number 
of single-member districts for the time being was 80, and as it was difficult to imagine 
this number being changed in the immediate future, the number of compensatory seats 
had to be 50. The government challenged this number, among other reasons because 
Lesotho is a small and poor country which should only have a reasonable number of 
parliamentary seats. 
The political conflict was easy to understand. The IPA, which was tasked with 
suggesting institutional solutions to the political impasse, was strongly in favour 
of MMP with 80 single-member districts and 50 compensatory seats, while the 
government—in complete control of the legislature, which had to pass all the IPA’s 
suggestions—argued that the best solution was a Parallel system with the same 80 
single-member districts and probably 40 seats to be allocated separately on the basis 
of (preferably) the same ballot as was used in the single-member districts, although a 
second ballot was also an option. 
The political compromise over the electoral system took some time to reach, mainly 
because of the level of distrust between the two sides and some hesitation about the very 
idea of compromise. It was eventually agreed that the electoral system should be MMP 
(which was the main opposition objective), while the number of seats should be 120 
(80 + 40), which was very important for the government side. While the government 
held all the cards through its huge parliamentary majority, it was clear that some 









of the revisions. The consequent constitutional amendment required strong support 
not only in the National Assembly but also in the Senate (made up mainly of chiefs), 
which was another reason why compromise was necessary. The reason for this was 
that, if the two houses of Parliament could not agree on the constitutional amendment, 
it had to be put to a popular referendum, and this was not really possible because of 
disagreement over the electoral register. Eventually, the constitutional amendment was 
formally adopted in May 2001. Only then could the necessary changes to the electoral 
law be considered. 
The 1998 internationally guaranteed agreement had provided for early elections, 
to take place in May 2000. This was completely unrealistic, not least because the 
government and the opposition (the IPA) were not really on speaking terms, and a new 
Independent Electoral Commission had only been appointed in April. Agreement was 
then reached on delaying the election by a year, but further delays in reaching agreement 
about the electoral system, concerns about an adequate voter registration system and so 
on meant that a new general election was only possible in May 2002. 
The election went reasonably well. The LCD, not entirely unexpectedly, won 55 
per cent of the party (PR) votes but 65 per cent of all the seats. The reason for this 
was that the party won 77 of the 78 single-member districts contested on election day 
(elections in the remaining two were postponed because of the death of candidates, but 
eventually the LCD also won them). The system does not have overhang mandates, so 
the opposition got all 40 compensatory seats. 
Seven of the eight opposition parties which won seats ended up being under-
represented in terms of share of votes compared to share of seats. This under-
representation was, however, very much smaller than it had been in 1998, and the 
National Assembly of Lesotho is now a fairly representative body in terms of political 
representativeness. Thus the main objectives of the efforts after the 1998 troubles have 
certainly been achieved. 
It is clear that the combination of (a) one party taking almost all the single-member 
districts, (b) only 33 per cent of the seats being compensatory seats, and (c) the absence 
of surplus seats may continue to cause some degree of disproportionality in future 
elections as well. However, this seems a small price to pay for the various improvements 
in the system achieved during the protracted political compromise-seeking process of 
1999–2001, when it was also a concern not to have too many members of Parliament 
in a small and poor country.
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In Venezuela there are 100 FPTP seats while the rest 
are National List PR seats and extra compensatory 
seats. In Mexico (see the case study) 200 List PR 
seats compensate for imbalances in the results 
of the 300 FPTP seats, which are usually high. 
Lesotho’s post-conflict electoral system contains 
80 FPTP seats and 40 compensatory ones. 
131. Although MMP is designed to produce 
proportional results, it is possible that the 
disproportionality in the single-member district 
results is so great that the list seats cannot fully compensate for it. This is more likely when 
the PR electoral districts are defined not at national level but at regional or provincial 
level. A party can then win more plurality/majority seats in a region or province than 
its party vote in the region would entitle it to. To deal with this, proportionality can be 
closely approached if the size of the legislature is slightly increased: the extra seats are 
called overhang mandates or Überhangsmandaten. This has occurred in most elections 
in Germany and is also possible in New Zealand. In Lesotho, by contrast, the size of 
the legislature is fixed, and the results of the first MMP election in 2002 were not fully 
proportional (see the case study). 
132. Advantages and Disadvantages. While MMP retains the proportionality benefits 
of PR systems, it also ensures that elected representatives are linked to geographical 
districts. However, where voters have two votes—one for the party and one for 
their local representative—it is not always understood that the vote for the local 
representative is less important than the party vote in determining the overall allocation 
of seats in the legislature. Furthermore, MMP can create two classes of legislators—one 
group primarily responsible and beholden to a constituency, and another from the 
national party list without geographical ties and beholden to the party. This may have 
implications for the cohesiveness of groups of elected party representatives. 
133. In translating votes into seats, MMP can be as proportional an electoral system 
as pure List PR, and therefore shares many of the previously cited advantages and 
disadvantages of PR. However, one reason why MMP is sometimes seen as less 
preferable than straight List PR is that it can give rise to what are called ‘strategic voting’ 
anomalies. In New Zealand in 1996, in the constituency of Wellington Central, some 
National Party strategists urged voters not to vote for the National Party candidate 
because they had calculated that under MMP his election would not give the National 
Party another seat but simply replace an MP who would be elected from their party list. 
It was therefore better for the National Party to see a candidate elected from another 
party, providing that candidate was in sympathy with the National Party’s ideas and 
ideology, than for votes to be ‘wasted’ in support of their own candidate. 
Mixed Member Proportional is a 
mixed system in which the choices 
expressed by the voters are used to 
elect representatives through two 
different systems—one List PR system 
and (usually) one plurality/majority 
system—where the List PR system 
compensates for the disproportionality 




















Jeffrey A. Weldon 
CASE STUDY: Mexico
Mexico has a presidential system with strong and independent legislative, executive and 
judicial branches. The doctrine of the separation of powers, which did not function 
in practice between 1929 and 1997, when the single official party, the Institutional 
Revolutionary Party (PRI), controlled both the executive and Congress, has been 
resurrected and is now the dominant feature of politics at the federal level. 
The president is elected by plurality vote. In the 1988 and 1994 elections, the 
winner won about half of the votes cast, but in the 2000 election the winner, Vicente 
Fox, won only 42.5 per cent of the votes. Proposals exist to amend the constitution to 
introduce a run-off election between the two front-runners if no candidate wins an 
absolute majority in the first round. Their success will depend primarily on the electoral 
prospects of the major parties, as well as considerations of the cost of a second round. 
The president is elected for a six-year term and can never be re-elected or 
reappointed. This prevents presidents from becoming entrenched in power, but it also 
diminishes their accountability because they never have to face the electorate again. 
Considering the ideological and symbolic roots behind the prohibition on presidential 
re-election (it was a focal point in the Mexican Revolution), it is unlikely that this 
clause will be repealed soon. 
The Mexican Congress is bicameral, the Chamber of Deputies elected for three-
year terms and the Senate elected for six years (synchronized with the presidential 
term). Both chambers are elected through mixed systems, using FPTP and List PR. 
The Chamber of Deputies has 500 members, 300 elected by FPTP in single-
member districts (SMDs) and 200 elected by List PR in five 40-member regional 
districts. The 300 FPTP seats are apportioned to the states in proportion to population, 
with the restriction that no state can have fewer than two seats. The Federal Electoral 
Institute (IFE), the independent electoral authority, uses the pure Sainte-Laguë 
Method to allocate seats among the states. The IFE then creates SMDs of roughly 
equal population within each of the states, generally favouring following municipal 
boundaries over achieving electoral districts with equal populations, and also divides 
the country into the five 40-member districts for the purpose of elections to the List PR 
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seats. Each party nominates a candidate for each SMD and presents a rank-ordered list 
of 40 candidates for each of the five regional districts. 
Parties may form total or partial coalitions for electoral purposes, running the same 
candidate in some districts or sharing PR lists. If they do they must submit agreements 
to the IFE specifying how the votes in the coalition are to be allocated. If parties form a 
coalition to elect the president, then they must form a coalition for all the Chamber of 
Deputies and Senate contests as well. In the 2000 election, two of the three presidential 
candidates were backed by coalitions. In the 2003 legislative elections, there was a 
partial coalition between the PRI and the Greens, which ran together in 97 single-
member districts and separately in 203, and had separate PR lists (the parties had 
agreed on how to divide the votes from the 97 districts for the purposes of assigning 
seats to the List PR candidates). 
Voters cast a single ballot for deputies. The sum of all of the votes from the district 
FPTP contests is then used to calculate the number of PR seats to be allocated to each 
party, using the Largest Remainder Method and the Hare Quota, and there is a 2 per 
cent threshold based on the total national vote included in the law. The number of PR 
seats assigned to a party is independent of the number of FPTP districts won, with two 
important exceptions: no party can ever win more than 300 seats, and no party’s share 
of the 500 seats can be more than 8 percentage points higher than its share of the valid 
vote. A party must therefore win at least 42.2 per cent of the valid vote plus at least 167 
districts to win 251 seats in the lower chamber. In 1997 and 2003, the PRI’s share of 
the seats was limited by the 8 per cent rule. In 2000, the 8 per cent rule did not affect 
either the PRI or the National Action Party (PAN). 
Seats are assigned to party list deputies in the five 40-member regional districts, also 
using the Hare Quota with largest remainders. The lists are rank-ordered and closed, 
so that the deputies higher on the list are elected first, and voters cannot modify the 
order of the list. 
The move towards pluralism and multiparty politics in Mexico has been a slow 
process of evolution. Since 1979 there have been extensive reforms to the electoral 
formulas used to elect the Chamber of Deputies. The formula used in the 1979, 1982 
and 1985 elections had 300 SMDs and 100 party list seats, which were restricted to 
parties that did not win more than 60 districts. The formula used in 1988 increased 
the number of party list seats to 200, but guaranteed that the party that won a plurality 
of districts would win a majority of seats, regardless of its share of the vote. A ceiling 
was established to the number of seats a single party could win, at 350 seats. The 1991 
reforms maintained the ceiling and the majority-assuring clause, but required that the 
winning party win at least 30 per cent of the vote. It also created bonus seats for the 
winning party, so that it would not have to function with only a narrow majority in the 
Chamber. In return, the government ceded some control over the electoral process to 
a partially autonomous electoral management body (the IFE) and to a federal electoral 
court. The 1994 reforms eliminated the majority-assuring clause and created a Parallel 
system, in which the elections to the List PR seats were completely decoupled from the 
elections to the plurality seats. No party could win more than 60 per cent of the seats 
(300 of 500) in most circumstances. However, this led to the most disproportional 








cent of the seats with about 50 per cent of the vote. So in 1996 the electoral law was 
adjusted again to set the limit to the number of seats a party could win at 300 and the 
maximum level of over-representation, as described above, at 8 percentage points. This 
electoral rule has been as stable as any since multiparty representation was established 
in 1964, having been used in the 1997, 2000, and 2003 elections. No party has won 
an absolute majority of seats under this rule. The 1996 reform also made the IFE fully 
autonomous and enhanced the powers of the federal electoral court. Currently there are 
proposals to make the Chamber of Deputies either more or less proportional, decreasing 
or increasing the proportion of list deputies, and decreasing or eliminating the margin 
of over-representation. However, since no two parties have similar goals, reforms are 
unlikely to come about. 
The Senate before 1994 had 64 members, two for each of the 31 states plus the 
Federal District. The senators were elected under various plurality rules. The result was 
that until 1988 all senators were members of the PRI. The PRI monopoly in the Senate 
allowed the government to make concessions to opposition, making the Chamber of 
Deputies more proportional. 
By 1994, there were calls for the Senate to be made more widely representative as 
well. It was expanded to 128 members, with at least a quarter of the seats guaranteed to 
the opposition. For the 1997 election, a mixed system was established. Each state elects 
three senators, and in addition 32 are elected by PR on a single national list. In each 
state, a party nominates a ranked slate of two Senate candidates. Both candidates of 
the party that wins the most votes are elected as senators, and the first listed candidate 
of the party that is placed second wins the third Senate seat. Voters cannot adjust 
the order of the candidates. Each party also nominates a closed, ranked list of 32 
candidates for the national PR list. All the votes for the Senate in each state are totalled 
at the national level. The formula used is a Largest Remainder Method using the Hare 
Quota and a 2 per cent threshold. Unlike the Chamber of Deputies, there is no linkage 
between the plurality and the PR seats; instead, the two systems run in parallel and the 
PR seats do not compensate for any disproportionality. This electoral formula would 
create a majority for the largest party if it wins around 40 per cent of the national vote, 
favourably distributed, and has a margin of three or four points over its nearest rival. 
Winning two-thirds of the seats in the Senate (important for constitutional reforms, 
electing Supreme Court justices, and internal procedural matters) requires two-thirds 
of the national vote. No party won an absolute majority of Senate seats in the 2000 
election. 
Several proposals have been submitted in Congress to eliminate the party list 
senators, with arguments that a national list is not appropriate for a chamber that 
represents the states. However, simply eliminating the PR list would benefit the PRI, 
which is placed either first or second in all but one of the states, and is thus likely to be 
opposed by other parties. Alternatives would have three or four senators per state, all 
elected by PR, most likely using the D’Hondt Formula. 
Re-election for consecutive terms is prohibited for all federal deputies and senators 
(and also for governors, state legislators, mayors, and municipal councillors). Legislators 
can be elected to the other chamber when their term expires, and they can be re-
elected to the same chamber after sitting out a term. The ‘no re-election’ reforms were 
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implemented in 1932 to resolve problems in the PRI by increasing loyalty to the central 
committee and reducing the power of local party bosses. At the time, the reform was 
sold as the natural conclusion of the ideology of no re-election from the Mexican 
Revolution. However, it has served to reduce the autonomy of legislators, because their 
career prospects after their term of office depended on the party machinery, and for 
many years increased the power of the president because of his control over his party’s 
machinery. Party discipline has thus been traditionally very high, approaching 100 per 
cent for the federal legislators of the PRI up to 2000. This has had profound effects 
on accountability and representation. Voters can neither reward good performance nor 
punish poor representation. 
All the parties use relatively closed procedures to select candidates—elite 
designation, closed conventions, or closed or highly controlled primaries. In general, 
nominating procedures have been opening up in recent years, but candidates are still 
highly dependent on parties. Additionally, parties control most campaign expenditures, 
even in district and state contests, and closed lists reduce the incentive for candidates 
to campaign. 
Mexico’s slow democratization has seen frequent electoral system change as a series of 
concessions by the dominant party to defuse dissent, which has resulted finally in a 
multiparty presidential system with very strong parties. Further change may now be 










Learning to Live with 
Proportional Representation
Nigel S. Roberts
CASE STUDY: New Zealand
New Zealand used to be regarded as a prime example of a country with an FPTP 
electoral system. However, after two referendums in the early 1990s, New Zealand 
adopted a mixed member proportional (MMP) voting system in a unicameral 
Parliament with 120 members. Until the end of 2004, three general elections had been 
held using the new system. 
Why did New Zealand change its electoral system? What led the country to do 
something that was extremely unusual for any long-established democracy, especially 
one with an Anglo-Saxon heritage? 
For a start, the FPTP system produced highly distorted results in 1978 and 1981. On 
both occasions the National Party retained office with an absolute majority of the seats 
in the House of Representatives despite winning fewer votes throughout the country as 
a whole than the opposition Labour Party. In addition, both elections saw the country’s 
then third party, Social Credit, win a sizeable share of the votes for very little return 
(16 per cent of the votes in 1978 and 21 per cent in 1981 won it only one seat and two 
seats, respectively, in a Parliament that then had 92 seats). The disquiet engendered 
by these results led the Labour government elected in mid-1984 to establish a Royal 
Commission on the Electoral System. Its 1986 report, Towards a Better Democracy, 
recommended the adoption of a voting system similar to Germany’s. The commission 
argued strongly that, on the basis of the ten criteria it had established for judging voting 
systems, MMP was ‘to be preferred to all other systems’. 
Neither of New Zealand’s major parties favoured the proposal and the matter might 
have died had the National Party’s 1990 election manifesto not promised a referendum 
on the topic. In an initial referendum, held in 1992, nearly 85 per cent of voters opted 
‘for a change to the voting system’; 14 months later, the new electoral system was 
adopted after a second referendum in which 54 per cent favoured MMP (while 46 per 
cent voted to retain FPTP). 
As in Germany, in parliamentary elections in New Zealand the electors have 
two votes—one for a political party (called the party vote in New Zealand) in a 
nationwide constituency, and one for a candidate in a single-member district. Whereas 
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representatives for single-member districts (called electorates in New Zealand) are 
elected by FPTP, the overall share of the seats in Parliament allocated to political parties 
stems directly from and is in proportion to the number of party votes they receive. If 
a party wins 25 per cent of the party votes, it will be entitled to (roughly) a quarter of 
all the seats in the 120-member Parliament, that is, about 30 seats. If a party that is 
entitled to a total of 30 seats has already won 23 electorate seats, then it will be given 
another seven seats drawn from the rank-ordered candidates on its party list who have 
not already been elected in a single-member district. Likewise, if a party entitled to 30 
seats has won only 11 single-member district seats, then it will acquire another 19 MPs 
from its party list.  
There are two thresholds for MMP in New Zealand. To win a share of the seats in 
Parliament based on the party votes, a party must either win at least 5 per cent of all 
the party votes cast in a general election or win at least one single-member district seat. 
In the 1996 general election, five parties crossed the 5 per cent threshold and one won 
a single-member district seat but did not clear the 5 per cent threshold. Three years 
later, five parties again cleared the 5 per cent threshold. Two other parties failed to do 
so but won single-member district seats, which qualified one of them for an additional 
four seats in Parliament (it had won 4.3 per cent of the party votes cast in the election). 
In the 2002 general election, six parties cleared the 5 per cent party vote hurdle, and 
a seventh party won a single-member district seat that enabled it to bring one other 
person into Parliament from the party’s list. 
These figures point to one major change caused by the introduction of MMP. 
Established, at least in part, to ensure ‘fairness between political parties’, the new 
voting system has seen the index of disproportionality plummet from an average of 11 
per cent for the 17 FPTP elections held between 1946 and 1993, to an average of 3 per 
cent for the first three MMP elections. Every FPTP election in New Zealand from 1935 
until 1993 saw one of the country’s two larger parties—Labour or National—gain an 
absolute majority in the House of Representatives. One consequence of MMP has been 
that, in the three elections to date, no single party has won more than half the seats in 
Parliament. In 1996, the largest party won 44 out of the 120 seats; in 1999 the largest 
party won 49 seats; and in 2002 the largest party won 52 seats. 
Not surprisingly, then, New Zealand has changed from being a country accustomed 
to single-party majority governments to being a country governed by coalitions. After 
the first MMP election, two parties formed a coalition government that commanded a 
small majority (61 out of 120 seats) in Parliament. Since that coalition disintegrated in 
August 1998, New Zealand has had minority coalition governments that have had to 
rely on either formal or informal supporting arrangements (negotiated with other parties 
or, on occasion, with individual MPs) to ensure that their legislative programmes have 
been able to win majorities in Parliament. One of the other criteria used by the Royal 
Commission on the Electoral System was ‘effective government’. The commission 
noted that electoral systems should ‘allow governments ... to meet their responsibilities. 
Governments should have the ability to act decisively when that is appropriate’. In this 
regard it should be stressed that MMP governments in New Zealand have had little 
trouble governing: all have had their budgets passed without any real difficulty, and 











same time, New Zealand parliaments have fulfilled another of the royal commission’s 
criteria by also becoming more effective. Governments can no longer rely on (indeed, 
they seldom have) majorities on parliamentary committees, and there is a far greater 
degree of consultation—of give and take—between government and opposition parties 
in MMP parliaments. 
The Royal Commission on the Electoral System also envisaged that under MMP 
the Parliament would represent the Maori (New Zealand’s indigenous Polynesian 
minority) and other special-interest groups such as women, Asians and Pacific Islanders 
more effectively. This has happened.  In the last FPTP Parliament, Maori accounted 
for 7 per cent of the MPs. They now constitute 16 per cent of the members of the 
legislature. The proportion of female MPs has risen from 21 per cent in 1993 to an 
average of 29 per cent in the first three MMP parliaments. During the period 1993–
2002, the proportion of Pacific Island MPs went up from 1 per cent to 3 per cent, and 
the number of Asian MPs rose from 0 to 2 per cent. 
Discarding a long-established voting system is never an easy process politically, nor is 
it likely to appeal to entrenched interests or to most incumbent politicians. Leading 
electoral systems scholars have warned that major electoral reforms should not be 
undertaken lightly. Nevertheless, there is growing evidence that the parliamentarians 
of New Zealand and the public alike are learning to live with (if not necessarily love) 
proportional representation. The reforms adopted in New Zealand in the early 1990s 
and instituted in 1996 seem likely to last for a considerable time.
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Parallel Systems
134. Parallel systems also use both PR and plurality/majority components, but 
unlike MMP systems the PR component of the system does not compensate for any 
disproportionality within the plurality/majority districts. (It is also possible for the non-
PR component of a Parallel system to come from the family of ‘other’ systems, as in 
Taiwan.) In a Parallel system, as in MMP, each voter may receive either one ballot 
paper which is used to cast a vote both for a candidate and for his or her party, as is 
done in South Korea (the Republic of Korea), or two separate ballot papers, one for 
the plurality/majority seat and one for the PR seats, as is done for example in Japan, 
Lithuania and Thailand (see the case studies on Japan and Thailand).
Parallel systems are currently used in 21 countries 
and have been a feature of electoral system 
design over the last decade and a half—perhaps 
because they appear to combine the benefits of 
PR lists with those of plurality/majority (or other) 
representation. Armenia, Guinea (Conakry), 
Japan, South Korea, Pakistan, the Philippines, 
Russia, the Seychelles, Thailand, Timor-Leste 
and Ukraine use FPTP single-member districts 
alongside a List PR component, while Azerbaijan, 
Georgia, Kazakhstan, Lithuania and Tajikistan use 
the Two-Round System for the single-member district component of their systems. 
Andorra, Senegal (see the case study) and Tunisia use the Party Block Vote to elect a 
number of their representatives. Monaco is the only country with a Parallel System 
to use BV, and similarly, Taiwan is unique in using SNTV alongside a PR system 
component. 
135. The balance between the number of proportional seats and the number of plurality/
majority seats varies greatly (see Table 5). Only in Andorra, Russia and Ukraine is there 
a 50 : 50 split. At one extreme, 81 per cent of South Korea’s 299 seats are elected by 
FPTP, with only 56 members coming from PR lists. At the opposite extreme, 75 of 
Timor-Leste’s seats are proportionally elected and only 13 are based on FPTP districts. 
However, in most cases the balance is much closer. For example, Japan elects just over 
60 per cent of its representatives from single-member districts, with the rest coming 
from PR lists. 
A Parallel System is a mixed system 
in which the choices expressed by the 
voters are used to elect representatives 
through two different systems—one 
List PR system and (usually) one 
plurality/majority system—but where 
no account is taken of the seats 
allocated under the first system in 








In 1997 Thailand adopted a new constitution which brought about sweeping changes 
to its political and electoral landscape. Reforms included the creation of an autonomous 
Electoral Commission to oversee and administer elections, new rules governing the 
relationship between the members of Parliament and the Cabinet, and the creation of 
an elected Senate—the first ever in Thailand. The constitution also replaced the Block 
Vote (BV) electoral system that had been in place for most of Thailand’s electoral 
history with a Parallel system made up of FPTP and List PR elements. 
Prior to the 1997 reforms Thailand used the BV system to elect the House of 
Representatives. The Senate was entirely appointed. The country’s electoral districts 
were broken down into one-, two- and three-seat districts, with most districts having 
more than one seat. Seats were allocated by province in proportion to population. 
Voters cast their votes for candidates rather than parties, and were allowed to vote for as 
many candidates as there were seats in a district. They could not cast all their votes for 
a single candidate but could split their votes between candidates from different parties. 
They could also partially abstain by not casting all their available votes. Parties were 
required to field a full team of candidates for any district they wished to contest (for 
example, three candidates in a three-seat district). Seats were awarded to the one, two 
or three candidates who got the most votes on the basis of the plurality rule. 
The BV system in Thailand had at least two major implications for the party 
system. These multi-seat districts had tended to produce multiple parties in each 
district, which in turn had contributed to the presence of a large number of parties in 
the House. The average effective number of national parties between 1975 and 1996 
was more than six. Not surprisingly, no party ever commanded a majority, making 
large, multiparty coalition governments necessary. These coalition governments were 
generally indecisive and short-lived. Reformers hoped that by changing the electoral 
system they could bring about a reduction in the number of parties and a reduction in 
government inaction and instability. 
Second, the system pitted candidates from the same party against one another in 
the same district. Although each party nominated a team of candidates, they often 
106
tended to campaign against each other rather than trying to get voters to support all 
of the party team with all of their votes. This intra-party competition undermined 
the value of party labels to candidates and voters and contributed to making the 
parties factionalized and incohesive. One reflection of this was the rampant party-
switching prior to every election, with attendant allegations of money politics. Intra-
party competition, the weakness of party labels and the relatively small districts also 
encouraged politicians to cultivate and respond to relatively narrow constituencies. 
During election campaigns vote-buying helped candidates build personal constituencies. 
In office politicians focused on providing ‘pork’ and particularistic goods and services 
to their constituencies, often to the neglect of broader policy concerns and thus to the 
coherence and consistency of government policy. The drafters of the 1997 constitution 
hoped that through electoral reform they could encourage the development of party 
cohesion and meaningful party labels, and bolster the incentives of candidates and 
politicians to respond to broad, national constituencies. 
In 1996 the House of Representatives, responding to long-simmering demands from 
within civil society for political reform, organized a Constitutional Drafting Assembly 
(CDA). A year later, after a widespread popular consultation and in the midst of a severe 
economic crisis that quickly escalated into a political crisis, the CDA submitted and the 
House approved a new constitution. The cornerstones of this new constitution were 
an elected Senate and an overhauled system for electing the House of Representatives. 
Gone is the Block Vote system for the House. Following a growing trend, the drafters 
of the constitution established a Parallel electoral system in Thailand. Four hundred 
single-member districts replaced Thailand’s multi-member districts. In these districts 
voters cast a single vote for their preferred candidate. The 1997 constitution also created 
a second tier of 100 seats elected from a single nationwide district by PR. A party must 
reach a threshold of at least 5 per cent of the party list votes in order to be eligible 
for seats in this tier. Each party is required to submit a list of candidates for voters to 
consider, and voters cast two votes, one for a district representative and one for a party 
list. Candidates must choose between running in a district and running on the party 
list. The two tiers are not linked: a party’s seats in one tier are not in any way dependent 
on the number of seats it has in the other tier. 
The 1997 constitution also provided for an elected Senate, the first in Thailand’s 
history. Two hundred senators are elected using the SNTV system. The electoral 
districts range from one to 18 seats in size. The Thai version of SNTV also has an 
added twist. Constitutional reformers wanted to create a Senate that would remain 
above the messy partisan fray. As a result, senators are constitutionally prohibited from 
belonging to a political party and are not allowed to campaign for election. 
What were the results of these constitutional reforms? As discussed above, one of the 
drafters’ chief goals was to reduce the number of parties in Thailand—hence the move 
to single-member districts and the 5 per cent electoral threshold in the party list tier. It 
appears that this goal has largely been achieved. In the 2001 election for the House of 
Representatives, the effective number of parties in the legislature fell dramatically from 
an average of 6.2 before 1997 to 3.1, reflecting both a decline in the number of parties 
contesting each single-member district and better coordination of parties between 
districts. For the first time since 1957 a single party, the newly formed Thai Rak Thai 
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party, nearly captured a majority of the seats. It later gained a majority after a smaller 
party disbanded and joined its ranks. 
The drafters also hoped that adding a national party list tier and doing away with 
intra-party competition would encourage voters and candidates to focus more on party 
policy positions regarding national issues. This in fact began to occur in the 2001 
election. For the first time in recent Thai electoral history, political parties, led chiefly 
by the Thai Rak Thai party, put significant effort into developing coordinated party-
centred electoral strategies. Parties began to differentiate themselves in terms of their 
policy platforms and in some cases made those differences an important campaign 
issue. 
However, there are reasons to be somewhat cautious in assessing the emerging 
changes in the Thai party system. First, the shift towards party-centred strategies 
was primarily confined to the campaign for party list seats, while contests in the 400 
single-member districts generally remained candidate-centred affairs. This is certainly 
no surprise given the electoral system: single-member districts still generate incentives 
to cultivate personal support networks (although it appears somewhat less than under 
the Block Vote system). Second, the new electoral system has brought about a dramatic 
reduction in the average number of votes needed to win a seat. This is the combined 
effect of adding more seats to the legislature and switching from Block Vote to single-
member districts. This weakens the incentives to abandon personal strategies: the 
smaller the number of votes required to be elected, the more likely it is that individual 
candidates will employ personal strategies. Finally, the presence of a non-partisan 
Senate, elected by SNTV, undermines somewhat the attempt to create a more party-
oriented electorate. 
Obviously, any assessment of the consequences of the 1997 reforms must still be 
tempered. With only limited data available, it is not possible to determine whether the 
outcomes of the 2001 and 2005 elections represent new trends or are a reflection of the 
‘one-off ’ personality of Prime Minister Thaksin Shinawatra, the leader of Thai Rak 
Thai. Nonetheless the 2001 and 2005 House elections already mark Thailand as an 
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SENEGAL: 
A Parallel System in Africa 
Richard Vengroff 
CASE STUDY: Senegal
Senegal is one of only a handful of countries in Africa that have undergone a genuine 
democratic transfer of power as a result of the defeat of a sitting president. At the 
presidential level the electoral system is a two-round majority run-off system very 
similar to that used for elections for the president of France. Parties have incentives 
to put up candidates in the first round, and voters can freely vote for the candidate 
they really prefer while saving their ‘strategic’ vote for the second round. In 2000 the 
opposition parties denied President Abdou Diouf a first-round victory and, by previous 
agreement, united behind the leading opposition candidate, Abdoulaye Wade, to defeat 
the long-reigning Socialist Party (Parti Socialiste, PS) leader in the second round. 
For the legislature, the electoral system was changed from a pure PR system by 
national list in 1978 to a mixed, Parallel system since 1983. Since then it has been 
modified numerous times. Most of the changes have been designed to provide for 
democratic legitimacy by ensuring that the system remains open to some opposition 
representation while maintaining the ruling party’s majority of seats. Like many 
mixed systems, Senegal’s relies on a national list for a part of the seats. Unlike most 
other Parallel systems, the plurality seats, rather than being decided in single-member 
electoral districts, are decided on the basis of Party Block Vote (PBV) in mostly multi-
member electoral districts. 
The PR seats (roughly half of the total) are allocated from the votes cast for the 
national list of each party, using a Largest Remainder Method with the Hare formula. 
The other seats are allocated by plurality vote in multi-member electoral districts in 
the 30 departments of the country, with between one and five seats each. The smaller 
parties and the opposition have always argued for a greater number of seats to be 
allocated from the national list, while the ruling party has always favoured a balance—
ensuring that its domination of the plurality seats plus a proportion of the Parallel seats 
would enable it to retain power. For the 1998 election the ruling PS once again altered 
the distribution of seats, adding 20 new plurality seats. The PS won 18 of these and was 
easily able to maintain control of the legislature, despite the fact that it had only won a 
bare majority of the vote nationally (50.3 per cent). 
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President Wade, when he was leader of the opposition, argued for greater 
proportionality in the system and less reliance on the PBV seats, which heavily favour 
the party in power. For the 2001 elections, Wade, who had bitterly attacked the 
machinations by the PS, was in a position to alter this inequitable formula. Once in 
control of the presidency and with power to modify the electoral system, Wade could 
install a system designed either to be more representative of the voters’ wishes or to 
maximize the opportunities for his coalition (the SOPI Coalition, led by the Democratic 
Party of Senegal (PDS)). Coupled with the greater resources now available to his party, 
including the full weight of the presidency, this made the highly inequitable system he 
had previously attacked seem suddenly attractive. 
The PS and the Alliance of Forces of Progress (AFP), the only other large parties, 
also felt that they could profit from an emphasis on the plurality PBV side of the seat 
distribution by potentially winning a plurality in several districts. They too chose to 
argue for increased weight for the plurality side of the election. The smaller parties 
pushed for pure proportionality based on a national list system or some compromise 
that would provide greater opportunities for a better seat-to-vote distribution. The 
ruling PDS opted for reducing the size of the National Assembly from 140 to 120 
and moving from a 70 : 70 plurality : proportional distribution to 65 plurality and 55 
national list PR seats. The PDS calculated that as the new party in power it could win 
a plurality in many departments, thus increasing its share of seats relative to its voter 
support. 
These calculations proved correct. Although the SOPI coalition received just under 
half of the votes (49.6 per cent), it won 89 of the 120 seats (74.2 per cent) in 2001. The 
former ruling party, the PS, finished second in terms of share of the vote, with 17.4 per 
cent, but garnered only ten seats, all in the proportional national list. In third place in 
the voting, the AFP of Moustapha Niasse (with 16.1 per cent of the vote), passed the 
PS in number of seats with 11, two of which it won on the plurality side by finishing 
first in one department. The Union for Democratic Renewal (URD), with 3.7 per cent 
of the vote, garnered three seats, one of which was a plurality seat in a single-member 
district in the small department which is the home of its leader. The African Party for 
Democracy and Socialism/Jef (AJ/PADS), with just over 4 per cent of the vote, won 
only two seats, both on the national list. Five additional parties were given one seat each 
on the national list by virtue of having the largest remainders, even though they did 
not achieve a full quota in votes. The remaining 15 parties which presented lists were 
excluded from the seat allocation. 
The disproportionality in the 2001 election greatly exceeded even the high rates 
Senegal had experienced under PS rule. In the 1993 elections, 70 seats were allocated 
by the proportional formula on a national list and 50 in department-level districts 
using PBV; in 1998, seats were allocated 70 : 70 between the two electoral formulae, 
and disproportionality rose slightly. It rose sharply in the 2001 elections, the results of 
which were less proportional than the results of most elections in FPTP systems. As 
a consequence the legitimacy of the legislature is compromised. The SOPI coalition, 
which came to power in 2001 on the basis of arguments for democratic reform, has 











In Senegal, the objective of the then hegemonic ruling party in opting for a Parallel 
system was to ensure fragmentation of the opposition by discouraging coordination 
among parties, minimizing strategic voting and thereby providing an advantage to 
the largest party. The party furthered this objective by employing a ballot that offers 
a single choice that covers both the proportional and the plurality vote. Since the 
allocation of the proportional seats depends on the total number of votes a party or 
coalition receives, Senegal’s opposition parties have an incentive to present candidates 
in as many plurality districts as possible. The fact that all votes cast at the district level 
are added together for the allocation of the proportional seats reduces any advantages of 
coordination between parties across constituencies, and provides incentives for sincere 
rather than strategic voting. Thus, the ruling party was able to ensure wins for itself in 
most plurality districts. 
A Parallel mixed system is also used at the local (rural council) and municipal 
levels. To ensure an overwhelming majority for the winning party on every council, 
half of the seats are allocated in a single bloc for the whole municipality using the Party 
Block Vote. The other half of the seats are allocated by List PR using the whole rural 
community or municipality as one district. 
Senegal illustrates the way in which short-term political advantage can be the overriding 
factor in debates about electoral system change. An opposition that clamoured for 
change became a government which defended a status quo which suddenly looked 
beneficial. The potential down side of this is that, if the electoral pendulum swings 
back to the PS, the heavier emphasis on the PBV part of the Parallel system is almost 
certain to ensure that this will be reflected in a more than proportional gain of seats 
for the opposition, leaving the forces in the SOPI coalition back where they were before 
2001. Alternatively, this approach can be seen as moving towards a two-large-party 
system, in which the two beneficiaries ensure that any potential third political force has 
a huge task to break in.
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Table 5: Countries Using Parallel Systems 
Country No. of PR Seats No. of Plurality/Majority  Plurality/Majority  Total no. of Seats
  (or Other) Seats (or Other) System
Andorra 14 (50%) 14 (50%) PBV 28
Armenia 56 (43%) 75 (57%) FPTP 131
Azerbaijan 25 (20%) 100 (80%) TRS 125
Georgia 150 (64%) 85 (36%) TRS 235
Guinea 76 (67%) 38 (33%) FPTP 114
Japan 180 (37.5%) 300 (62.5%) FPTP 480
Kazakhstan 10 (13%) 67 (87%) TRS 77
Korea, Republic of 56 (19%) 243 (81%) FPTP 299
Lithuania 70 (50%) 71 (50%) TRS 141
Monaco 8 (33%) 16 (67%) BV 24
Pakistan 70 (20%) 272 (80%) FPTP 342
Philippines 52 (20%) 208 (80%) FPTP 260
Russia 225 (50%) 225 (50%) FPTP 450
Senegal 55 (46%) 65 (54%) PBV 120
Seychelles 9 (36%) 25 (74%) FPTP 34
Taiwan 49 (22%) 176 (78%) SNTV 225
Tajikistan 22 (35%) 41 (65%) TRS 63
Thailand 100 (20%) 400 (80%) FPTP 500
Timor-Leste 75 (85%) 13 (15%) FPTP 88
Tunisia 52 (80%) 37 (20%) PBV 189
Ukraine 225 (50%) 225 (50%) FPTP 450
136. Advantages. In terms of disproportionality, Parallel systems usually give results 
which fall somewhere between pure plurality/majority and pure PR systems. One 
advantage is that, when there are enough PR seats, small minority parties which have 
been unsuccessful in the plurality/majority elections can still be rewarded for their 
votes by winning seats in the proportional allocation. In addition, a Parallel system 
should, in theory, fragment the party system less than a pure PR electoral system. 
137. Disadvantages. As with MMP, it is likely that two classes of representatives will 
be created. Also, Parallel systems do not guarantee overall proportionality, and some 
parties may still be shut out of representation despite winning substantial numbers of 
votes. Parallel systems are also relatively complex and can leave voters confused as to the 
nature and operation of the electoral system. 
Other Systems
138. In addition to the plurality/majority, proportional representation and mixed 
systems there are a number of other systems that do not fall neatly into any particular 
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category. Amongst these are the Single Non-Transferable Vote, the Limited Vote and 
the Borda Count. These systems tend to translate votes cast into seats in a way that 
falls somewhere between the proportionality of PR systems and the results of plurality/
majority systems. 
The Single Non-Transferable Vote (SNTV)
139. Under SNTV each voter casts one vote for a candidate but (unlike FPTP) there 
is more than one seat to be filled in each electoral district. Those candidates with the 
highest vote totals fill these positions. 
SNTV can face political parties with a challenge. 
In, for example, a four-member district, a candidate 
with just over 20 per cent of the vote is guaranteed 
election. A party with 50 per cent of the vote could 
thus expect to win two seats in a four-member 
district. If each candidate polls 25 per cent, this 
will happen. If, however, one candidate polls 40 
per cent and the other 10 per cent, the second 
candidate may not be elected. If the party puts up three candidates, the danger of ‘vote-
splitting’ makes it even less likely that the party will win two seats. 
Today, SNTV is used for elections to the legislative body in Afghanistan, Jordan, the 
Pitcairn Islands and Vanuatu, for second chamber elections in Indonesia and Thailand, 
and for 176 out of 225 seats in the Parallel system used for the Taiwanese legislature. 
However, its best-known application was for Japanese lower-house elections from 1948 
to 1993. 
140. Advantages 
a. The most important difference between SNTV and the plurality/majority systems 
described earlier is that SNTV is better able to facilitate the representation of minority 
parties and independents. The larger the district magnitude (the number of seats in 
the constituency), the more proportional the system can become. In Jordan, SNTV 
has enabled a number of popular non-party pro-monarchist candidates to be elected, 
which is deemed to be an advantage within that embryonic party system. 
b. SNTV can encourage parties to become highly organized and instruct their voters to 
allocate their votes to candidates in a way which maximizes a party’s likely seat-winning 
potential. While SNTV gives voters a choice among a party’s list of candidates, it is also 
argued that the system fragments the party system less than pure PR systems do. Over 
45 years of SNTV experience, Japan demonstrated quite a robust ‘one party dominant’ 
system. 
c. Finally, the system is praised for being easy to use and understand.
Under the Single Non-Transferable Vote 
system voters cast a single vote in a 
multi-member district. The candidates 
with the highest vote totals are declared 
elected. Voters vote for candidates 





















In 1993 the long-dominant Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) split and lost control of 
the main chamber of the Japanese Diet in the general election that followed. One of the 
achievements of the new coalition that formed in its place was reform of the electoral 
system, which had been widely viewed as a source of corruption and the basis of the 
LDP’s long-standing dominance. 
Under the old electoral system (SNTV), the 511 members of the House of 
Representatives (the lower house) were elected from 129 districts of between one and 
six seats each. This system had been in use since 1947 and had produced a distinctive 
approach to elections among the major parties, particularly the LDP. Under this 
system any party that hoped to win enough seats to obtain a majority or a significant 
minority of seats needed to put up multiple candidates in most districts. Thus, in order 
to maximize their representation, parties needed to find methods of ensuring that each 
candidate would poll the minimum number of votes required to be elected, rather than 
having each candidate follow his natural instincts by attempting to maximize his vote. 
A candidate who received more than his ‘fair share’ of the vote could actually hurt 
colleagues who received fewer votes: candidate A’s ‘unnecessary votes’ could be enough 
to prevent candidate B of the same party from gaining a seat. 
The LDP dealt with this problem through particularistic policies that targeted 
selected groups of voters and provided them with ‘pork’ and other benefits. As the 
first winning party under the SNTV system, the LDP controlled the spoils of office, 
making it difficult for the various opposition parties to mount an effective challenge. 
Not surprisingly, this system contributed to corruption. Furthermore, under such a 
personal and particularistic system, political choice and debate based on substantive 
policy issues were not given due importance. 
By the early 1990s citizens’ anger at the system had produced great pressure for 
electoral reform. The LDP’s inability to agree on and pass reform legislation contributed 
to a split in the party that gave power to the opposition (including the LDP defectors) 
in 1993. The concept of a US-style two-party system and frequent alternation of 
parties in government had grown in popularity among politicians, scholars and the 
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media, and had come to be seen as a ‘magic bullet’ that would solve the problems of the 
Japanese political system. As a result, many called for the establishment of a system of 
single-member districts (SMDs). However, members of the smaller parties in the new 
government feared that this would crowd them out of the system and thus opposed such 
a move. The resulting compromise created the two-tier system that is in use today. 
The reformed electoral system is a Parallel system consisting of two tiers—List PR 
and FPTP single-member districts. Each voter casts one vote in each tier. For the first 
election under this system, in 1996, there were 200 seats in the PR tier divided between 
11 regional districts, ranging in size from seven to 33 seats, and 300 SMDs in the 
second tier. Efforts at rationalization led the Diet to reduce the number of PR seats to 
180 prior to the second election in 2000. The 11 PR districts now range in size from 
six to 29 seats. 
In a Parallel system, there is no compensatory mechanism that adjusts the overall 
number of seats won by each party to better reflect the proportion of the vote actually 
received. The predominance of SMD seats over PR seats thus advantages larger parties 
that can win SMD seats. The two tiers of the Japanese electoral system are related in 
another, more unusual, way, however. Japan’s electoral laws allow candidates to mount 
dual candidacies by standing both on a PR list and for an SMD seat. 
While the PR tier is technically closed-list, there is also a provision that allows for 
some degree of voter influence over the ranking of candidates on the lists. Parties are 
allowed to present lists that give equal rankings to some or all of those candidates who 
are nominated both on a party list and for an SMD. After those who win in the SMDs 
are removed from consideration, the final ranking of the SMD losers on the PR list is 
determined by how well each polled in comparison to the winner in his or her district. 
This provision has a number of benefits for parties. First, it allows them to abdicate 
the politically challenging job of ranking candidates. Second, it encourages candidates 
who are ranked equally on the PR lists to campaign more vigorously to win votes in 
their districts. While parties do make much use of equal ranking, they also retain the 
option to give some candidates firm rankings. This is also useful, as a higher or ‘safe’ 
ranking on the PR list can be used as an incentive to convince a candidate to run in a 
single-member district in which there is little chance of winning. 
The first trial of the system came in 1996, and the results were largely seen as 
disappointing. In the years since the new electoral laws were passed, the LDP had 
re-established itself in power and the opposition parties had undergone a number of 
realignments. This instability led to the persistence of previous patterns, an overall 
win for the LDP, and little movement towards the hoped-for two-party system. The 
somewhat complicated nature of the system also produced dissatisfaction among the 
electorate, particularly regarding the phenomenon of losing SMD candidates being 
‘resurrected’ in the PR tier. The results were especially counter-intuitive in cases in 
which the first- and third- (and occasionally fourth-) placed candidates from a single-
member district won seats but the second-placed candidate (usually from the most 
competitive of the opposition parties) failed to win a place. It was also unclear that any 
significant decline in corruption and money politics had taken place. 
By the time of the second election under the new system, in 2000, there had been a 








the move towards a two-party system again made only slight progress as the non-
communist opposition was still splintered and the centrist Komeito party had switched 
sides and joined the LDP-led coalition. 
The third test of the new system took place in November 2003. In September, the 
small Liberal Party merged with the dominant opposition Democratic Party (DPJ). 
The merged party (which retained the DPJ name) gained an impressive 40 seats in 
an election that featured the use of party manifestos for the first time. The remaining 
opposition parties of significant size lost all but a few of their seats. On the government 
side, the LDP and the smaller of its two coalition parties also lost seats, leading to the 
smaller party being absorbed by the LDP. With most seats concentrated in the hands of 
the two leading parties, only Komeito remains as a significant small party. The LDP is 
still in coalition with Komeito, in part because it needs Komeito support in the upper 
house, but also because support from the well-organized Komeito played a large part in 
the victories of many of its SMD candidates. 
The results of the legislative election of 2003 support the idea that the effects 
of electoral system reform are not felt immediately and that entrenched habits and 
processes require time to change. These outcomes also suggest that the mixed-member 
system may not be likely to produce a complete consolidation into a US-style two-
party system, as the existence of the PR tier allows third parties to persist.
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141. Disadvantages 
a. Small parties whose votes are widely dispersed may not win any seats, and larger 
parties can receive a substantial seat bonus which turns a plurality of the vote nationally 
into an absolute majority in the legislature. Although the proportionality of the system 
can be increased by increasing the number of seats to be filled within the multi-member 
districts, this weakens the voter–MP relationship which is so prized by those who 
advocate defined geographical districts. Multi-member districts of up to 18 members in 
Thailand, for example, are at the very top end of what is manageable. 
b. As with any system where multiple candidates of the same party are competing for 
one vote, internal party fragmentation and discord may be accentuated. This can serve 
to promote clientelistic politics where politicians offer electoral bribes to groups of 
defined voters. 
c. Parties need to consider complex strategic questions of both nominations and vote 
management; putting up too many candidates can be as unproductive as putting up too 
few, and the need for a party to discipline its voters into spreading their votes equally 
across all a party’s candidates is paramount. 
d. As SNTV gives voters only one vote, the system contains few incentives for political 
parties to appeal to a broad spectrum of voters in an accommodatory manner. As long 
as they have a reasonable core vote, they can win seats without needing to appeal to 
‘outsiders’. 
e. SNTV usually gives rise to many wasted votes, especially if nomination requirements 
are inclusive, enabling many candidates to put themselves forward. 
The Limited Vote (LV) 
142. Like SNTV, the Limited Vote is a plurality/majority system used in multi-member 
districts. Unlike SNTV, electors have more than one vote—but fewer votes than there 
are candidates to be elected. Counting is identical to SNTV, with the candidates with 
the highest vote totals winning the seats. 
This system is used for various local-level elections, but its application at the national 
level is restricted to Gibraltar and to Spain, where it has been used to elect the Spanish 
upper house, the Senate, since 1977. In this case, with large multi-member districts, 
each voter has one vote less than the number of members to be elected. 
143. Advantages and Disadvantages. Like SNTV, 
LV is simple for voters and relatively easy to count. 
However, it tends to produce less proportional 
results than SNTV. Many of the arguments 
relating to internal party competition, party 
management issues and clientelistic politics apply 















Limited Vote is a candidate-centred 
electoral system used in multi-member 
districts in which electors have more 
than one vote, but fewer votes than 
there are candidates to be elected. The 
candidates with the highest vote totals 
win the seats. 
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Borda Count (BC)
144. A final—and unique—example of electoral 
system design is the modified Borda Count used 
in the tiny Pacific country of Nauru. The Borda 
Count is a preferential electoral system in which 
electors rank candidates as for the Alternative Vote. 
It can be used in both single- and multi-member 
districts. There is only one count, there are no 
eliminations and preferences are simply tallied as 
‘fractional votes’: in the modified Borda Count 
devised by Nauru, a first preference is worth one, a second preference is worth half, a 
third preference is worth one-third and so on. These are summed and the candidate(s) 
with the highest total(s) are declared the winners. 
Electoral System Tiers and Hybrid Systems
145. Many electoral systems, both plurality/majority and proportional, have a single 
tier of representation: each voter in the country votes once and there is one set of elected 
representatives. In one-tier List PR systems, the lists may be at national level, as in 
Namibia and the Netherlands, or at regional level, as in Finland and Switzerland. 
In mixed systems, there are usually two tiers of representatives, those elected under 
the plurality/majority system and those elected under the proportional system. In 
Hungary, however, there are three tiers: plurality/majority representatives of single-
member districts elected using TRS; and representatives at both regional and national 
levels elected using List PR. 
It is also possible for an electoral system to have two tiers without being mixed in 
character. Two-tier proportional systems may have both national and regional lists 
(as in South Africa) or regional lists only (as in Denmark). In the two-tier plurality/
majority system of the British Virgin Islands, there are representatives elected from 
single-member districts using FPTP and representatives elected from the Islands as a 
whole using Block Vote. 
Table 6: Variations on Proportional Representation 
 
 Voter Choice
Tiers Closed List Open List Free List
One: regional e. g. Spain, Macedonia e.g. Latvia, Indonesia Switzerland, Luxembourg
One: national e.g. Namibia, Moldova Netherlands -
Multiple e.g. South Africa, El Salvador e.g. Sweden, Iceland - 
Borda Count – A candidate-centred 
preferential system used in either 
single- or multi-member districts in 
which voters use numbers to mark 
their preferences on the ballot paper 
and each preference marked is then 
assigned a value using equal steps. 
These are summed and the candidate(s) 
with the highest total(s) is/are declared 
elected.
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146. Electoral systems with two or more tiers need to be distinguished from hybrid 
systems, in which one part of a country elects its representatives using one electoral 
system, and another distinct part of the country elects representatives using a different 
system. In Panama, about two-thirds of the representatives are elected from multi-
member districts using List PR, while the remaining third are elected from single-
member districts using FPTP. 
147. Table 7 summarizes advantages and disadvantages of the principal electoral systems. 
It is important to keep in mind that the advantages and disadvantages presented here can 
vary from case to case and depend on a large number of factors. For example, turnout 
can in fact be high under an FPTP system, and a List PR system can produce strong 
legislative support for a president. Also, what is seen as an advantage in one context or 
by one party can be viewed as something negative in another context or by another 
party. However, the table does give an overview of some of the likely implications of 
the choice of electoral system. It can also give an indication of the relationship between 
electoral system choice and political/institutional outcome, even allowing for the effects 
of differences of detail within each type of electoral system. 
Table 7: Five Electoral System Options: Advantages and Disadvantages 
 Advantages Disadvantages
List Proportional • Proportionality • Weak geographic representation
Representation  • Inclusiveness • Accountability issues
(List PR) • Minority representation • Weaker legislative support for president more 
 • Few wasted votes likely in presidential systems
 • Easier for women representatives  • Coalition or minority governments more likely in 
 to be elected parliamentary systems
 • No (or less) need to draw boundaries • Much power given to political parties
 • No need to hold by-elections • Can lead to inclusion of extremist parties 
 • Facilitates absentee voting in legislature
 • Restricts growth of single-party regions • Inability to throw a party out of power

















First Past  • Strong geographic representation  • Excludes minority parties
The Post (FPTP) • Makes accountability easier to enforce • Excludes minorities
 • Is simple to understand • Excludes women
 • Offers voters a clear choice  • Many wasted votes
 • Encourages a coherent opposition • Often need for by-elections
 • Excludes extremist parties • Requires boundary delimitation
 • Allows voters to choose between  • May lead to gerrymandering
 candidates • Difficult to arrange absentee voting
 • Strong legislative support for president 
 more likely in presidential systems
 • Majority governments more likely in 
 parliamentary systems 
Two-Round  • Gives voters a second chance to make  • Requires boundary delimitation
System (TRS) a choice • Requires a costly and often administra-
 • Less vote-splitting than many other  tively challenging second round 
 plurality/majority systems • Often need for by-elections
 • Simple to understand • Long time-period between election 
 • Strong geographic representation and declaration of results
  • Disproportionality
  • May fragment party systems
  • May be destabilizing for deeply divided societies
Parallel  • Inclusiveness • Complicated system
System • Representation of minorities • Requires boundary delimitation
 • Less party fragmentation than pure  • Often need for by-elections
 List PR • Can create two classes of representatives
 • May be easier to agree on than other  • Strategic voting
 alternatives • More difficult to arrange absentee voting than
 • Accountability with List PR
 • Few wasted votes • Does not guarantee overall proportionality
Mixed Member  • Proportionality • Complicated system
Proportional  • Inclusiveness • Requires boundary delimitation
(MMP) • Geographic representation • Often need for by-elections
 • Accountability • Can create two classes of representatives
 • Few wasted votes • Strategic voting
 • May be easier to agree on than  • More difficult to arrange absentee


















148. There are many ways to enhance the representation of women. As discussed in 
paragraph 107, proportional systems tend to result in the election of more women. 
Electoral systems which use reasonably large district magnitudes encourage parties 
to nominate women on the basis that balanced tickets will increase their electoral 
chances. Some List PR countries require that women make up a certain proportion of 
the candidates nominated by each party.
149. In addition to the choice of electoral system, there are also a number of other 
strategies that can be used to increase the number of women representatives. 
a. First, there are reserved seats, where a certain number of seats are set aside for women 
in the legislature. These seats are filled either by representatives from regions or by 
political parties in direct proportion to their overall share of the national vote. Reserved 
seats typically exist in plurality/majority electoral systems, and are often entrenched in 
a country’s constitution. This happens in a handful of countries, including Afghanistan 
(two women for each of the 32 provinces or roughly 25 per cent of seats), Uganda (one 
woman for each of the 56 districts, or roughly 18 per cent of seats) and Rwanda (24 
women are elected by a women’s-only ballot, accounting for 30 per cent of the seats). 
In India, seats on local authorities in some states are divided into three groups: at each 
election, only women may be nominated for one group of seats, thereby guaranteeing 
a minimum of one-third women elected, with the side effect of a two-term limit for 
elected men. 
b. Second, the electoral law can require political parties to field a certain number of 
women candidates for election. This is most often done in PR electoral systems, for 
example in Namibia (30 per cent of candidates at the local level) and Peru (30 per cent 
of candidates).  It is also required in the List PR component of Bolivia’s MMP system 
(30 per cent of candidates). However, the laws do not always guarantee that the target 
will be met unless there are strict placement mandate and enforcement mechanisms 
guaranteeing that women are placed in electable positions on party lists. This is the case 
in Argentina (30 per cent in winnable positions), Belgium (the top two candidates must 
be one of each sex) and Costa Rica (40 per cent of winnable positions). 
c. Third, political parties may adopt their own internal quotas for women as legislative 
candidates. This is the most common mechanism used to promote the participation 
of women in political life, and has been used with varying degrees of success all over 
the world: by the ANC in South Africa, the Peronist Party (PJ) and the Radical Civic 
Union (UCR) in Argentina, CONDEPA (the Conscience of the Fatherland) in Bolivia, 
the Party of the Democratic Revolution (PRD) in Mexico, and the Labour parties in 
Australia and the UK, and throughout Scandinavia. The use of women-only candidate 
short-lists by the Labour Party at the 1997 UK elections almost doubled the number of 
female MPs, from 60 to 119. 
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In 2004, 14 countries had quotas entrenched in the constitution (including most 
recently Afghanistan), 32 countries had quotas provided for by legislation, and at least 
125 parties in 61 countries had adopted their own voluntary party quotas. In terms of 
electoral system type, 17 countries with plurality/majority systems have quotas, and 
there are 15 in mixed electoral systems and 45 in PR systems. Two of the ‘others’—
Afghanistan and Jordan—have quotas.
150. Systems that guarantee women representation in the legislature vary where both 
their success and their consequences are concerned. For example, reserved seats may 
help guarantee that women make it into elected positions of office, but some women 
have argued that quotas end up being a way to appease, and ultimately sideline, women. 
Being elected to a legislature does not necessarily mean being given substantive decision-
making power, and in some countries women legislators, particularly those elected from 
reserved or special seats, are marginalized from real decision-making responsibility. Yet 
in other countries women have used the position afforded to them by quotas to make 
significant contributions to policy making and influence ‘traditional’ policy making. 
For further details and data see the IDEA/Stockholm University Global Database of 
Electoral Quotas for Women at www.quotaproject.org. 
Representation of Minorities
151. There are also many ways to enhance the representation of minorities and 
communal groups. Again, electoral systems which use reasonably large district 
magnitudes encourage parties to nominate candidates from minorities on the basis 
that balanced tickets will increase their electoral chances. A very low threshold, or 
the complete elimination of a formal threshold, in PR systems can also facilitate the 
representation of hitherto under-represented or unrepresented groups. In plurality/
majority systems in particular, seats are sometimes set aside in the legislature for 
minorities and communal groups. 
152. Reserved seats can be used to ensure the representation of specific minority groups 
in the legislature. Seats are reserved for identifiable ethnic or religious minorities in 
countries as diverse as Colombia (‘black communities’), Croatia (the Hungarian, 
Italian, Czech, Slovak, Ruthenian, Ukrainian, German and Austrian minorities), India 
(the scheduled tribes and castes), Jordan (Christians and Circassians), Niger (Tuareg), 
New Zealand (Maori), Pakistan (non-Muslim minorities), Palestine (Christians and 
Samaritans), Samoa (non-indigenous minorities), Slovenia (Hungarians and Italians) 
and Taiwan (the aboriginal community). 
Representatives from these reserved seats are usually elected in much the same manner 
as other representatives, but are sometimes elected only by members of the particular 
minority community designated in the electoral law. This requires a communal roll 
(see paragraphs 155–157). While it is often deemed to be a normative good to represent 
small communities of interest, it has been argued that it is a better strategy to design 
structures which give rise to a representative legislature without overt manipulation of 
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the electoral law or legal obligation, and that quota seats may breed resentment on the 
part of majority populations and shore up mistrust between various cultural groups. 
153. Instead of formally reserved seats, regions can be over-represented to facilitate the 
increased representation of geographically concentrated groups. In the UK, Scotland 
and Wales have more MPs in the British House of Commons than they would be 
entitled to if population size alone were the only criterion. The same is true in the 
mountainous regions of Nepal. Another possibility is the ‘best loser’ system currently 
used in Mauritius, whereby some of the highest-polling losing candidates from a 
particular ethnic group are awarded seats in the legislature in order to balance overall 
ethnic representation. 
154. Electoral boundaries can also be manipulated to promote the representation of 
particular groups. The Voting Rights Act in the United States has in the past allowed 
the government to draw weirdly shaped districts with the sole purpose of creating 
majority Black, Latino or Asian-American districts; this might be called ‘affirmative 
gerrymandering’. However, the manipulation of any electoral system to promote or 
protect minority representation is rarely uncontroversial. 
Communal Representation
155. A number of ethnically heterogeneous societies have taken the concept of reserved 
seats to its logical extension. Not only are seats divided on a communal basis, but 
the entire system of representation in the legislature is similarly based on communal 
considerations. There is a separate electoral register for each defined community, which 
elects only members of its ‘own group’ to the legislature. 
In Lebanon, multi-member districts are defined, in each of which an allocation of seats 
between confessional groups is determined. Representatives are elected by Block Vote 
from communal rolls separately to the seats allocated for each confessional group. In 
Fiji, electors are able to vote both for their own communal candidates and for candidates 
in ‘open’ districts. 
156. Most communal roll arrangements were abandoned after it became clear that 
communal electorates, while guaranteeing group representation, often had the perverse 
effect of undermining the path of accommodation between different groups, since 
there were no incentives for political intermixing between communities. The tasks of 
defining a member of a particular group and distributing seats fairly between them were 
also full of pitfalls. In India, for example, the separate districts which had existed under 
colonial rule for Muslims, Christians, Sikhs and others were abolished at independence, 
although some reserved seats remain in order to represent the scheduled tribes and 
castes (see the case study). Similar communal roll systems used at various times in 
Pakistan, Cyprus and Zimbabwe have also been abandoned. Despite a controversial 
history of use, Fiji continues to elect part of its legislature from separate communal rolls 
















157. While some communal roll arrangements give the task of determining who falls 
into which category to some form of registration body, others give this choice to the 
individual. The predominant example of a communal roll system still in place among 
contemporary democracies is the optional separate roll for Maori voters in New 
Zealand. Maori electors can choose to be on either the national electoral roll or a 
specific Maori roll, which now elects seven Maori representatives to the legislature. The 
results of New Zealand’s first PR elections since 1996 could, however, be said to have 
weakened the rationale for the communal system: twice as many Maori representatives 
have been elected from the general rolls as from the specific Maori roll. 
The Timing of Elections
158. Elections, whether they be for national, executive, legislative, state-wide or local 
bodies, may not necessarily be held on a single day (or specific days) but can instead be 
staggered. The reasons for separating elections over a significant period of time can be 
both practical and political. Staggering of elections usually occurs when there are major 
logistical preparations involved (e.g. elections to the lower house of India, the Lok 
Sabha) or when security concerns require it. Administrative and security considerations 
mean that it is far easier for the Indian Electoral Commission to sequence the holding 
of legislative votes across both time and states. Legislative elections from state to state 
can be weeks apart. The difficulties facing staggered elections include ballot security. 
In order for areas voting later not to be influenced by areas voting earlier, ballot papers 
need to be held at a secure centralized point until all voting has taken place. 
159. More common is the staggering over time of presidential, legislative and federal 
state elections. There is evidence to suggest that holding presidential and legislative 
elections on the same day can advantage the president’s party, and can make executive-
legislative fragmentation less likely and thus make government more coherent—
especially in embryonic democracies. However, if there is a desire to accentuate a 
separation of powers or there are logistical capabilities to consider then it may be 
necessary to separate presidential and legislative elections. 
Remote Voting 
160. Remote voting is used in many countries, both old and new democracies, around 
the world, to broaden participation. Remote voting may take place in person somewhere 
other than an allotted polling station or at another time, or votes may be sent by post 
or cast by an appointed proxy. When the requirements to qualify as a remote voter 
are minimal, remote voting can make up a significant proportion of the total vote. In 
Finland it has been as high as 37 per cent of all votes cast and in the 2003 legislative 
elections in the Marshall Islands it was 58 per cent. In Sweden, where it is commonly 
about 30 per cent, voters can also change their pre-cast vote if they subsequently travel 
to their allocated polling station on election day. However, its use may have implications 
for electoral system design, with issues of election integrity being salient. 
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161. Remote voting is easiest to administer under a nationwide List PR system with 
only one list per party, and most complicated under a system using single-member 
districts. Particularly if out-of-country voting is to be implemented, the practicalities of 
getting the right ballot paper to each elector need to be considered carefully. Requiring 
a country’s embassies to issue ballot papers may not sit easily with a system with a 
significant number of electoral districts, because of the logistic challenge of ensuring 
that each embassy receives the right selection of ballot papers and gives the right ballot 
paper to each elector. If ballot papers are to be despatched by post, there will be an 
impact on the election timetable. 
162. Once cast, out-of-country votes can be included in the absentee voter’s home 
district (as in New Zealand); counted within single (or multiple) out-of-country 
districts (as in Croatia); attached to one or more particular districts (as in Indonesia); 
or merely added to the national vote totals when seats are allocated under a nationally-
based List PR system (as in the Netherlands). 
Turnout Issues
163. There is an established relationship between the level of turnout in elections and 
the electoral system chosen. PR systems are in general linked with higher turnout. In 
plurality/majority systems, turnout tends to be higher when national election results 
are expected to be close than when one party looks certain to win, and also higher in 
individual districts where results are expected to be closer. 
164. As a measure to improve electoral legitimacy, some countries, notably several of 
the post-communist former republics of the USSR, introduced mandatory minimum 
turnout levels: if the turnout in an electoral district did not reach, for example, 50 per 
cent, the election would not be valid. However, the use of mandatory turnout levels 
can create administrative nightmares if repeated elections consistently fail to achieve 
the required turnout levels, leaving electoral districts in limbo. Ukraine, for example, 
abolished mandatory turnout provisions for the 1998 elections after the experience of 
repeated by-elections failing to reach the required turnout. 
165. Several countries address the issue of participation by using compulsory voting, 
including Australia, Belgium, Greece and many countries in Latin America. Many 
other countries, however, reject compulsory voting on principle. While it is probably 
equally compatible with any electoral system, its use can be considered simultaneously 
















Additional Issues Relevant to Post-conflict 
and Transitional Elections
166. In post-conflict and transitional situations, there is often little time for debate and 
reflection. The political momentum generated by a peace agreement or by the fall of an 
authoritarian regime can lead to pressures for elections to take place quickly. While a 
general discussion of the political desirability and constraints surrounding transitional 
elections is outside the scope of this Handbook, there are some particular issues and 
pressures which relate to electoral system design. 
167. The time needed to set up the infrastructure for different electoral systems varies. 
For example, electoral registration and boundary delimitation are both time-consuming 
exercises which can lead to legitimacy problems. At one extreme, if all voters vote in 
person and voters are marked at the polling station, List PR with one national district 
may be feasible without either. At the other extreme, a plurality/majority system with 
single-member districts may require both if no acceptable framework is in place. In any 
event, the system adopted for a first transitional election may not be the most suitable 
in the longer term—although a process of continual change in which voters and parties 
are never able to adapt to the effects of the system may also be undesirable. 
168. Those negotiating a new institutional framework or electoral law may wish to be 
as inclusive as possible and therefore be impelled to make entry to elections easy both 
by setting relaxed criteria for nomination and by adopting an electoral system in which 
any threshold—either formal or effective—is low. Conversely, there are often concerns 
about the fragmentation of the party system driven by the politics of personality 
and ethnicity, and the negotiators and designers may thus want to set the bar for 
representation higher. The flowering of a multiplicity of parties is, however, a feature of 
elections in countries emerging from authoritarianism, and unsuccessful parties usually 
disappear of their own accord. 
169. Arguments are sometimes offered suggesting that, when building democracy 
in a fragile or divided political environment, it may be politically desirable to start 
with local elections and build over time to provincial and national elections as the 
infrastructure and political situation allow—as has been proposed in Sudan. If such a 
strategy is chosen, it is important that the system is both designed to meet the political 
requirements of the local elections and feasible to organize given the timetable. 
170. Provisions for voting by refugees and displaced persons may be particularly 
significant in post-conflict elections. The influence and importance of out-of-country 
voting is well illustrated by Bosnia and Herzegovina. 314,000 voters, out of a total 
of some 2 million, were registered to vote outside the country’s borders in 1998, over 
half of them in Croatia and the former Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (now Serbia 






4. Electoral Systems, 
Institutional Frameworks 
and Governance
171. Electoral systems have long been considered to have specific effects on 
issues of governance, policy making and political stability. Different electoral systems 
have marked implications for governance in parliamentary systems. In particular, 
there is an inbuilt tension between electoral systems which maximize the potential 
for one-party government (e.g. plurality/majority systems) and those which make 
multiparty coalitions more likely (e.g. proportional systems). Both constellations 
have clear policy impacts: single-party government makes decisive policy making and 
clarity of responsibility much easier, while coalitions are more likely to produce more 
representative policies and more inclusive decision making. Similarly, major shifts in 
government policy are easier to achieve under single-party government, while coalitions 
are more likely to see issues discussed and debated before any changes are made. 
172. Almost all countries which have a presidential or semi-presidential constitution 
elect the president directly. In addition, some republics which have parliamentary 
constitutions nevertheless elect their head of state directly. 
In presidential systems, the extent to which an elected president can claim a popular 
mandate and legitimacy depends significantly on the means by which he or she is 
elected. Presidents who have clear majority support are likely to have much greater 
legitimacy and be in a stronger position to push their own policy agenda than those 
elected on a small plurality of the vote. This has an important impact on relations 
between the president and the legislature. A president elected by a clear absolute 
majority of the population can command a great deal of legitimacy in any conflict with 
the legislature. By contrast, Salvador Allende’s election in Chile in 1970 on 36 per cent 
of the vote, and opposed by a right-wing Congress, helped create the conditions for the 
1973 military coup. 
173. The relationship between the legislature and the executive differs between 
parliamentary, semi-presidential and presidential systems. In a presidential or semi-
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presidential system, the president’s position does not depend on maintaining the 
confidence of the legislature: such a president cannot be removed from office on purely 
policy grounds. However, experience in Latin America in particular indicates that a 
directly elected president without a substantial block of support in the legislature will 
find successful government difficult. 
In presidential and semi-presidential democracies, the electoral systems for the 
presidency and the legislature therefore need to be considered together, although the 
different roles of the president and the legislature bring different factors into play in 
making the two choices of system. The synchronization or otherwise of the elections 
and the provisions which may encourage or discourage fragmentation of parties and 
the relationship between parties and elected members should be considered at the same 
time. 
Electing a President
174. In principle, any of the single-member district systems can be used for the direct 
election of a president. When a president is to be elected as the executive head of 
state, there is often a strong normative and practical preference for systems which 
ensure a victory by an absolute majority. The majority of all countries that have direct 
presidential elections use a Two-Round system. 
175. The separation of the two rounds leads to efforts by the leading candidates to attract 
second-round support and endorsement from those eliminated after the first round. 
Such agreements are sometimes driven primarily by the desire for victory. They are thus 
perhaps less likely to reflect compatibility of policies and programmes than are pre-poll 
preference-swapping agreements reached between candidates in preferential systems 
with a single polling day. In addition, presidential elections held under TRS increase 
the cost of elections and the resources needed to run them, and the drop-off in turnout 
between the first and second rounds of voting can often be severe and damaging. For 
this reason, other options such as the Alternative Vote and the Supplementary Vote are 
increasingly being examined. 
First Past The Post
176. The most straightforward way of electing a president is to simply award the 
office to the candidate who wins a plurality of the votes, even if this is less than an 
absolute majority. This is the case for presidential elections in Bosnia and Herzegovina, 
Cameroon, the Comoros Islands, Equatorial Guinea, Guyana, Honduras, Iceland, 
Kiribati, South Korea, Malawi, Mexico, Palestine, Panama, Paraguay, the Philippines, 
Rwanda, Singapore, Taiwan, Tunisia, Venezuela and Zambia. Clearly, such a system 
is simple, cheap and efficient, but in a strongly competitive multi-candidate contest it 
leaves open the possibility that the president will be elected with so few votes that he 
or she is not seen as the choice of a substantial majority of the electorate—and indeed 
may specifically be opposed by a substantial majority: the majority voted against him 
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Kenyan FPTP presidential ballot paper
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or her. Examples include Venezuela in 1993, when Rafael Caldera won the presidency 
with 30.5 per cent of the popular vote, and the May 1992 election in the Philippines, 
when Fidel Ramos was elected from a seven-candidate field with only 24 per cent of the 
popular vote. Taiwan experienced a major political shift in 2000 when the challenger 
Chen Shuibian won the presidency with just 39 per cent of the vote, less than 3 per cent 
ahead of the next candidate. 
177. The United States is unique in conducting its national presidential election by 
FPTP at federal state level. The FPTP winner in each federal state gains all the votes 
of that state in an electoral college, with two exceptions, Maine and Nebraska, where 
the votes of the state are allocated two to the FPTP winner state-wide, and one to the 
FPTP winner of each individual congressional district in the state. The electoral college 
then elects the president by absolute majority. This can lead to a situation in which 
the winning candidate polls fewer votes than the runner-up—as in 2000 when the 
Republican candidate George W. Bush won despite polling some half a million fewer 
votes than the Democrat candidate, Al Gore. 
Two-Round Systems
178. As in legislative elections, one way to avoid candidates being elected with only 
a small proportion of the popular vote is to hold a second ballot if no one candidate 
wins an absolute majority on the first round. This can either be between the top 
two candidates (majority run-off) or between more than two candidates (majority-
plurality), as described above (see paragraph 96). France, most Latin American 
countries, all the five post-Soviet Central Asian republics, and many countries in 
francophone Africa use TRS to elect their presidents. Elsewhere in Africa the system is 
used by Angola, Cape Verde, Gambia, Ghana, Guinea-Bissau, Kenya, Mozambique, 
Namibia, Nigeria, São Tomé and Principe, the Seychelles, Sierra Leone, Sudan, 
Tanzania, Uganda and Zimbabwe; in Europe, apart from France, it is used by Armenia, 
Azerbaijan, Austria, Belarus, Bulgaria, Croatia, Cyprus, Finland, Georgia, Lithuania, 
Macedonia, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Russia, Slovakia, Slovenia and Ukraine; and it 
is found in Afghanistan, Haiti, Indonesia, Iran, Timor-Leste and Yemen. 
179. There are a number of adaptations to straight majority run-off and majority-
plurality rules. In Costa Rica a candidate can win on the first round with only 40 
per cent of the vote; conversely, in Sierra Leone a second round is only avoided if 
one candidate gets 55 per cent in the first. In Argentina, a successful candidate must 
poll 45 per cent, or 40 per cent plus a lead of more than 10 per cent over the second-
placed candidate. A similar 40 per cent threshold with a 10 per cent margin exists in 
Ecuador. 
180. A number of countries also have minimum turnout rates for their presidential 
elections, typically 50 per cent, as is the case in Russia and many of the former Soviet 
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181. Apart from those countries where parties could create winning pre-election 
alliances so that presidential candidates could be elected in the first round (e.g. in 
Brazil in 1994 and Chile in 1989 and 1994), the experience of TRS has appeared 
problematic in Latin America. For example, in the 1990 elections in Peru, Alberto 
Fujimori obtained 56 per cent of the votes in the second round, but his party won only 
14 of 60 seats in the Senate and 33 seats of 180 in the Chamber of Deputies. In Brazil 
in 1989, Fernando Collor de Melo was elected in the second round with just under half 
of the votes, but his party won, in non-concurrent legislative elections, only three of 
the 75 Senate seats and only 40 of 503 seats in the Chamber of Deputies. No president 
in Ecuador has had majority support in the legislature since TRS was introduced for 
presidential elections in 1978. 
The problems of governance which have resulted demonstrate the importance of 
considering interlinked institutional provisions together. Although TRS produced 
presidents who had the second-round support of a majority of the electorate, it existed 
alongside systems for election to the legislature which did not guarantee those presidents 
significant legislative support. In Brazil in particular it encouraged party fragmentation. 
While the successful candidates gathered the support of other parties between the first 
and second rounds, there was little to enable them to keep that support in place after 
the elections. 
Preferential Voting
182. One way of getting around the disadvantages of TRS is to merge the first and 
second round into one election. There are several ways of doing this. AV is one obvious 
solution; it is used to elect the president of the Republic of Ireland. A lower-placed 
candidate who picks up many second-preference votes can overtake higher-placed 
candidates. The most recent example of a president winning through the transfer 
of preferences in this manner was the 1990 election of Mary Robinson to the Irish 
presidency. 
183. A second possibility is the preferential system used for presidential elections in Sri 
Lanka and for London mayoral elections, known as the Supplementary Vote. Voters are 
asked to mark not only their first-choice candidate but also their second (and, in Sri 
Lanka, their third) choices. The way in which this is done differs: in Sri Lanka, voters 
are asked to place the numbers ‘1’, ‘2’ and ‘3’ next to the names of the candidates, in 
the same manner as under AV and STV. In London, no numbers are required; the 
ballot paper contains two columns, for a first-choice vote and a second-choice vote, 
respectively. Voters are asked to mark their first-choice and second-choice candidates 
accordingly. This means that voters do not have to write in any numbers themselves.
 
184. Counting is the same in both cases: if a candidate gains an absolute majority of 
first-preference votes, he or she is immediately declared elected. However, if no candidate 
gains an absolute majority, all candidates other than the top two are eliminated and 
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the other of the two leading candidates, according to the preference ordering marked. 
Whoever achieves the highest number of votes at the end of this process is declared 
elected. This system thus achieves in one election what TRS achieves in two, with 
significant cost savings and greater administrative efficiency. 
185. The disadvantages of the Supplementary Vote system include its additional 
complexity and the fact that voters are effectively required to guess who the top two 
candidates will be in order to make full use of their vote. 
186. Despite these differences, both AV and the Supplementary Vote have the same core 
aim: to make sure that whoever wins the election will have the support of an absolute 
majority of the electorate. The use of preference votes to express a second choice means 
that a second round of voting is not required, and this results in significant cost savings 
as well as benefits in administrative, logistics and security terms. 
Distribution Requirements
187. Three countries—Indonesia, Kenya and Nigeria—combine their presidential 
elections with a so-called ‘distribution requirement’, which requires candidates to 
gain a regional spread of votes, in addition to an absolute majority, before they can be 
declared duly elected. In Indonesia, which held its first direct presidential elections in 
2004, a successful presidential and vice-presidential candidate team needed to gain an 
absolute majority of the national vote and at least 20 per cent of the vote in over half 
of all provinces to avoid a second round of voting. This requirement was inspired by 
Nigeria, another large and regionally diverse country, where presidential candidates 
need not only to win an absolute majority of the vote nationally but also to secure at 
least one-third of the vote in at least two-thirds of the country’s provinces. 
188. Distribution requirements do have the benefit of encouraging presidential 
candidates to make appeals outside their own regional or ethnic base, and if appropriately 
applied can work very well. However, the specification of two requirements for victory 
always carries the possibility that no candidate will fulfil both. It is important that 
designers note this possibility and include provisions to resolve it, because a system 
which produces no winner and no method of finding a winner could create a vacuum 
of power fraught with the dangers of instability. 
The second round in Indonesia merely requires a simple majority for the winner to be 
declared elected, but Nigeria retains the distribution requirement for the second round 
too, which creates the possibility of a third round. If this were to take place in practice 
it could have implications both for the length of the election period and for the financial 
and administrative resources required. 
Distribution requirements introduce strategic imperatives for candidates. In Kenya, to 
be elected president a candidate has to receive a plurality overall and at least 25 per cent 




















a divided opposition allowed Daniel Arap Moi to remain president with less than an 
absolute majority of the vote. 
Electing an Upper House
189. Not all legislatures consist only of one chamber; particularly in larger countries, 
many are bicameral. Most second chambers (often called upper houses or senates) exist 
for one or both of two reasons. The first is to provide a different type of representation 
or represent different interests, most often the regions or provinces of a country. The 
second is to act as a ‘house of review’, to provide a brake or delay against impetuous 
decisions in a lower chamber. The powers of upper houses are often less than those of 
lower chambers, especially when they are chambers of review. Around the world, about 
two-thirds of all countries have unicameral legislatures, while the remaining one-third 
have some kind of second chamber. 
190. The structures of these vary widely, but in general the most common use of second 
chambers is in federal systems to represent the constituent units of the federation. 
For example, the states in the USA and Australia, the Länder in Germany and the 
provinces in South Africa are all separately represented in an upper house. Typically, 
this involves a weighting in favour of the smaller states or provinces, as there tends to be 
an assumption of equality of representation between them. In addition, many second 
chambers feature staggered elections: half the chamber is elected every three years in 
Australia and Japan; one-third of the chamber is elected every second year in the USA 
and India, and so on. 
191. Some countries whose upper houses are ‘houses of review’ place special restrictions 
on them. In Thailand, for example, the Senate is now elected, but senators are prohibited 
from belonging to a political party or campaigning for election. 
192. A less common type of alternative representation is the deliberate use of the second 
chamber to represent particular ethnic, linguistic, religious or cultural groups. A second 
chamber may also deliberately contain representatives of civil society. In Malawi, for 
instance, the constitution provides for 32 of the 80 senators to be chosen by elected 
senators from a list of candidates nominated by social ‘interest groups’. These groups 
are identified as women’s organizations, the disabled, health and education groups, 
the business and farming sectors, the trade unions, eminent members of society and 
religious leaders. The much-maligned British House of Lords is occasionally defended 
on the grounds that it contains individuals with specific policy expertise who can check 
government legislation drawn up by generalist politicians. Similarly, second chambers 
in countries like Fiji and Botswana are used to represent traditional chiefs, although 
these are appointed in the first case and elected in the second. 
193. Because of these variations, many second chambers are partly elected, indirectly 
elected or unelected. Of those that are elected, most jurisdictions have chosen to reflect 
the different roles of the two houses by using different electoral systems for the upper 
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house and the lower house. In Australia, for example, the lower house is elected by a 
majoritarian system (AV) while the upper house, which represents the various states, 
is elected using a proportional system (STV). This has meant that minority interests 
which would normally not be able to win election to the lower house still have a 
chance of gaining election, in the context of state representation, in the upper house. 
In Indonesia, the lower house is elected by List PR, while the upper house uses SNTV 
to elect four representatives from each province. In Colombia, while both houses are 
elected by PR, the Senate is elected from one nationwide district, thus making it more 
likely that small parties and minority interests will be represented in that chamber. 
Different Tiers of Governance
194. As noted above, the requirements for designing an electoral system vary depending 
on the type of body to be elected and its function and powers. When a body is designed 
to serve supranational, provincial or local interests, the considerations involved in the 
choice of system are different from those involved when designing national legislative 
bodies. 
Electing Supranational Bodies 
195. Supranational bodies with significant decision-making power encompassing a 
number of countries, such as the European Parliament, are as yet a rarity but may 
become more commonplace with the globalization of politics and the aggregation of 
interests at a regional level. The EU has adopted, and now made effective, a requirement 
for all member states to adopt a proportional system for elections to the European 
Parliament: 23 member states use List PR, and two (the Republic of Ireland and Malta) 
use STV. Seats are allocated to member states not purely in proportion to population 
but by a tiered system which gives equal numbers of representatives to countries of 
approximately equal size but also over-represents smaller countries. 
196. The designers of such systems give greater priority to choosing systems which 
produce regional and partisan balance than to localized geographical representation. 
The European Parliament has 732 MEPs (Members of the European Parliament) 
representing over 500 million people, which makes small district connections between 
voter and representative impossible. 
197. While the European Parliament is a supranational body, it has not yet achieved a 
separate electoral identity in the minds of voters, even though citizens of one member 
state are also allowed to be a candidate in another member state. Elections to it are seen 
for the most part as contests between the national political parties in each member 
state. It is probably generally true that existing national political parties will play a 
major role in the development of supranational electoral systems and that dominant 
regional traditions at national level (in the case of the European Parliament, PR) may 




















THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT: 
Elections to 
a Supranational Body 
Andrew Ellis and Stina Larserud 
CASE STUDY: The European Parliament
In June 2004 the citizens of 25 European countries went to the polls to elect their 
representatives to the European Parliament. Many were doing so for the first time, 
while others were in countries with experience of up to five previous elections to the 
Parliament. In 2004, all were conducting their elections under a proportional electoral 
system. 
The first piece of legislation covering elections to the European Parliament came in 
1976, when the Act Concerning the Election of the Representatives of the Assembly 
by Direct Universal Suffrage was agreed. As the name implies, this act determined 
the principles for direct elections of the representatives from each member state. In the 
early days of the EU, the members of the European Parliament were nominated by the 
legislature in each member state, with no direct input from the electorate. The passing 
of the 1976 act meant that from then on the members would be elected by direct 
universal suffrage in each member state; and in 1979 the first European Parliament 
elections were held in the then nine member states—Belgium, Denmark, France, the 
Federal Republic of Germany, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, the Republic of 
Ireland and the United Kingdom—resulting in a total of 410 elected members. 
The act of 1976 determined many things regarding the elections, such as the 
length of the parliamentary term and the eligibility of candidates, but did not in itself 
determine the actual electoral system to be used in these elections. It did, however, 
give the European Parliament the task of drawing up a proposal for a uniform electoral 
procedure. Until such a procedure came into force, the act left the electoral procedures 
to the national provisions of the member states. 
As most member states at the time were using a PR system of one form or another 
to elect their legislatures, either alone or as one component of the electoral system, the 
choice of which electoral system to use for the European Parliament was a simple one. 
Belgium, Denmark, the Federal Republic of Germany, Italy, Luxembourg and the 
Netherlands were already familiar with the List PR system in one form or another, and 
all their representatives were therefore elected under a List PR system (except for the 
one representative of Greenland, included within the representation of Denmark, who 
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was elected by FPTP until Greenland left the European Community in 1985). The 
Republic of Ireland chose to elect its representatives using its preferential STV system. 
There were only two exceptions: the UK with its FPTP electoral system and France 
with its Two-Round system for national elections were both unfamiliar with the PR 
system. 
The UK simply copied the electoral system used for the elections to the House of 
Commons and applied it to the European Parliament elections as well. This system 
suited the two largest parties, Labour and the Conservatives, very well, and made it 
difficult for any third party to enter the arena. Resistance against a representative 
holding a dual mandate also contributed to the adoption of FPTP for European 
Parliament elections in the UK. If serving in both the European Parliament and the 
British Parliament simultaneously were to be prohibited, as some British politicians 
wanted, and some form of PR were also to be adopted, party lists would be likely to 
be made up of unknown candidates not elected to any other national or local body, 
which would carry the risk of undermining the perceived importance of the elections. 
A candidate-centred, single-member district system, where candidates would be closer 
to their electorate, was thought to be a better solution. 
None of this thinking applied to Northern Ireland. Concern to ensure the 
representation of majority and minority communities, combined with the fact that 
the parties of England, Scotland and Wales do not normally contest elections there, 
resulted in the use of STV for Northern Ireland’s three seats. An attempt was made to 
challenge in the courts the use of FPTP for European Parliament elections in England, 
Scotland and Wales on the basis of the requirement contained in the act for a uniform 
electoral procedure to be proposed, but this was unsuccessful. The system used in 
England, Scotland and Wales only changed in 1999 when the European Parliamentary 
Elections Act was passed, as the UK anticipated the changes that would be forced on 
it as the process which led to the 2002 Council decision (see below) got under way. 
From 1999 onwards, the UK joined the other member states in the use of a PR system, 
choosing List PR with closed lists and regional electoral districts. 
In France—despite its using TRS for the elections to the national legislature—a 
closed List PR system with one national district was adopted as early as 1977, before the 
first European Parliament elections in 1979. The reasons for this were many. One of 
the main advantages of a plurality/majority system—the formation of stable majority 
governments—was clearly not relevant for these elections, and the proportional 
representation of all political parties was seen as a much more important criterion 
for the design of the electoral system. The nationwide district in combination with 
a 5 per cent threshold was thought of as providing a balance between a high level of 
proportionality on the one hand, and the desire to exclude parties with little support 
on the other. The ability to fill vacant seats between elections with the next person on 
the list, thus eliminating the need to hold by-elections, was another advantage that led 
to the adoption of the List PR system. After five elections, the wish to strengthen the 
relationship between voters and representatives, and the desire for greater geographical 
representation (a disproportionate number of those elected had been residents of Paris), 
led to the nationwide district being abandoned before the election in 2004. It was 

















to the European Parliament. 
The next piece of important legislation on the European Parliament elections was 
concluded in 2002 with the Council Decision 8964/02 amending the Act Concerning 
the Election of the Representatives of the Assembly by Direct Universal Suffrage—an 
amendment to the 1976 act. Twenty-six years after the establishment of provisions for 
direct elections, this decision specified a common electoral system family for European 
Parliament elections for all member states. Article 1 reads: ‘In each Member State, 
members of the European Parliament shall be elected on the basis of proportional 
representation, using the list system or the single transferable vote.’ For the 2004 
elections, all 25 member states thus used a PR electoral system. 
While all these systems belong to the same family, they also differ in some respects. 
Twenty-three countries (Austria, Belgium, Cyprus, the Czech Republic, Denmark, 
Estonia, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Italy, Latvia, Lithuania, 
Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Poland, Portugal, Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden 
and the UK) use List PR, while Malta and the Republic of Ireland use the Single 
Transferable Vote. This difference may be expected, since the List PR system makes 
up at least a part of the electoral system for the national legislatures of 21 of the 23 
countries (France and the UK being the exceptions), while the Republic of Ireland and 
Malta both use STV for their national elections. 
In the 23 countries using List PR, some used closed lists, while others have chosen 
open lists—a choice which in most cases mirrors that made for national elections, 
although Greece is one exception. Equally, some member states, especially the smaller 
ones, elect their members from one national district, while others have set up a number 
of districts at regional level. 
The threshold for gaining representation in the different member states also varies. 
The 2002 decision allows for the individual countries to determine the threshold, but 
sets the ceiling for any formal threshold at 5 per cent. Some countries, for example 
Cyprus, Hungary and Sweden, use formal thresholds, again for the most part mirroring 
their use at national level (although Belgium, which uses a formal threshold for national 
elections, does not do so for European Parliament elections). Not only the formal 
thresholds, but also the actual level of support needed to gain representation—natural 
thresholds—vary significantly between member states. The reason for the variations 
in thresholds is found in the combination of the number of representatives to be 
elected from each country and the level at which the electoral districts are defined 
(more specifically, the number of representatives to be elected from each district). Italy, 
with one nationwide district and 78 representatives to elect, has a very low effective 
threshold of under 1 per cent, while the four electoral districts and 13 representatives 
of the Republic of Ireland mean that a successful candidate under STV will need to 
win a much higher proportion of the vote. In 2004, the winning candidates in Ireland 
received between 12.9 and 25.9 per cent of the first-preference votes in their district. 
While a common electoral system family is now specified for European Parliament 
elections, there is little sign of any momentum for further integration. Although party 
groups are formed within the European Parliament, there is no sign that national 
parties are willing to relinquish any significant leading role to pan-European parties. 
There is thus every likelihood that decisions about electoral system details will remain 
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in the hands of national politicians, influenced by their own interests and their existing 
national traditions. 
Debate seems more likely to centre on the low voter turnout in European Parliament 
elections, which remains a major concern of the EU member states. Despite the use of 
a PR system in all countries—an electoral system family which is usually linked to a 
higher voter turnout than other systems—turnout is still strikingly low. At the 2004 
elections, the 15 countries that were members before enlargement in 2004 had an 
average turnout of 52.9 per cent, and the 10 new member states an even lower figure of 
40.2 per cent. It appears that as long as the electorate sees European Parliament elections 
as being secondary, with little clarity as to what changes result when representation 
changes at elections, interest and turnout will remain low. The electoral systems used 
are not seen as a controversial element, and there is very little serious debate about their 
amendment. It is therefore likely that the electoral systems will remain fairly constant 

















Electing Federal/State Assemblies 
and Autonomous Jurisdictions
198. The legislatures of regions or states within a federation may use the same electoral 
system as the national legislature (symmetry), as happens in South Africa’s closed-list 
PR system, or they may use different systems (asymmetry), as in the UK, where the 
Scottish Parliament and the National Assembly for Wales are elected by MMP and 
the national legislature is elected by FPTP. The system for a state legislature may give 
primacy to the inclusion of minority groups within its borders or balance between 
urban and rural interests. The more autonomy a region has, the less the pressure for its 
electoral arrangements to mirror those of other states or provinces. The very fact of its 
being an autonomous jurisdiction implies that its attributes and needs are quite distinct 
from those of other areas. 
Electing Local Authorities
199. Any of the electoral systems outlined in this Handbook can be used at the local 
or municipal government level, but often there are a number of special considerations 
arising from the particular role of local government. In particular, because local 
government is more about the ‘nuts and bolts’ issues of everyday life, geographical 
representation is more often given primacy. The use of local elections as a step towards 
democratization is an example of this (see the case study on China). 
200. Single-member districts can be used to give every neighbourhood a say in local 
affairs, especially where political parties are weak or non-existent. Where these districts 
are small, they are usually highly homogeneous. This is sometimes seen to be a good 
thing, but if diversity within a local government district is required the ‘spokes of a 
wheel’ principle of districting can be applied. Here, district boundaries are not circles 
drawn around identifiable neighbourhoods but are segments of a circle centring on the 
city centre and ending in the suburbs. This means that one district includes both the 
urban and the suburban voters, and makes for a mix of economic class and ethnicity. 
201. In contrast, the municipalities in some countries which use PR systems for local 
government have one single-list PR district which can proportionally reflect all the 
different political opinions in the municipality. In order to achieve this, however, 
specific space may need to be made for representatives of local associations who are not 
driven by party-political ideology to nominate lists, and perhaps also for independents 
to be nominated as single-person lists. 
202. It is also true that the choice of local electoral system may be made as part of a 
compromise involving the system for the national legislature. For example, in some 
newly democratizing countries such as Congo (Brazzaville) and Mali, tradition and 
the French influence have resulted in a Two-Round System for the national legislature, 
while a desire to be inclusive and more fully reflect regional and ethnic loyalties resulted 
in the choice of PR for municipal elections. 
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CHINA: 
Village Committee Elections: 
First Steps on a Long March?
Dong Lisheng and Jørgen Elklit 
CASE STUDY: China
With the ‘household contract responsibility system’ introduced in the Chinese 
countryside in the late 1970s, farmers began to produce for their families. As production 
was decentralized, the collective-oriented organization of the People’s Communes 
became outdated. 
The earliest villagers’ committees (VCs) emerged in the Guangxi Autonomous 
Region in 1980–1. Formed without the knowledge of the local authorities, these 
organizations were created by village elders, former cadres and community-minded 
villagers. The intention was to address a decline in social order and a broader political 
crisis as production brigades and teams stopped functioning at the grass-roots level. 
Within months, local officials had reported this development to the central government. 
The National People’s Congress (NPC) leaders encouraged experiments with this new 
form of organization.
In 1982, VCs were written into the constitution as elected mass organizations of 
self-government (article 111). In contrast to the relationship between the commune 
and production brigade or production team, the newly restored township—the 
lowest level of government—does not lead the VC but only exercises guidance over it. 
Another difference is the introduction of direct election by all eligible voters. In 1987, 
the Provisional Organic Law of Villagers’ Committees was passed, setting out general 
principles for direct elections to VCs and defining the tasks and responsibilities of the 
VCs. Implementation of the law, including the enactment of detailed regulations, was 
left to the provincial and lower-level authorities. The quality of elections and overall 
implementation varied considerably, and after ten years perhaps only 25 per cent of 
the more than 658,000 villages (the latest figure, for the end of 2002) in China had 
experienced direct elections in full accordance with the law. 
In 1998, the NPC made the Organic Law permanent. The law has clarified and 
improved some aspects of the prescribed election procedures and strengthened the 
rules on transparency and popular control of VCs. The permanent law is seen by 
many as a political and legal consolidation of the village election process, but its full 
implementation remains a challenge—perhaps even more so after the introduction of 
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more demanding standards, for instance, in relation to secret polling booths and the 
direct nomination of candidates. The quality of elections across the country still varies 
considerably. 
The VC members are elected for three years, with no limit on the number of terms 
for which a person can be re-elected. The VCs usually consist of between three and 
seven members, one of whom is chair and one or two vice-chairs. Although there 
is variation from province to province, VCs generally oversee all the administrative 
matters of a village, including budget management, public utilities, dispute resolution, 
public safety, social order and security, health issues and local business management. A 
large village can consist of more than 10,000 people, while small ones might only have 
several hundred. The ‘average village’ has 1,000–2,000 inhabitants. 
VCs report to the Village Assembly or the Village Representative Assembly. As the 
former meet only once or twice a year, the latter, composed of 25–50 people from the 
village and selected by Villagers’ Small Groups, play a greater role in decision making 
and in the supervision of the VCs. A Village Election Committee administers village 
elections. 
Village elections have now been held in all 31 provinces, autonomous regions and 
municipalities. By 2003, the provinces of Fujian and Liaoning, two front-runners in 
this regard, had completed eight and seven elections, respectively, and 19 provinces had 
held between four and six elections. At least one province held its first village elections 
as late as 2000. There is no single election day for all VC elections across the country. 
During a province’s designated election year, the counties and townships within the 
province together decide the election days for the villages within their jurisdictions. 
Each election adheres to the same basic framework. The first step in the process 
is the registration of voters, which is handled by the Village Election Committee. A 
list of registered voters must be prepared and publicly displayed 20 days prior to the 
election. Voters are allowed to challenge the registration lists. Except for those who 
have been deprived of political rights, all those aged 18 or above enjoy the right to vote 
and to be elected without regard to ethnicity, race, sex, profession, family background, 
religious belief, level of education, property or period of residence in the community. 
One important challenge is the large number of voters whose residence registrations are 
in their ‘home village’, but who live and work a long distance away, often in a major 
urban area. It is difficult or impossible for most such voters to get back to their village 
on election day. At the same time, they cannot attend the elections in the cities in which 
they work and reside. Therefore they cannot actually exercise their right to vote.
Following voter registration, candidates are nominated directly by villagers. In most 
provinces, the requirement is to have only one more candidate than there are seats to 
be filled as chair, deputy chair, and ordinary members. In recent years, nominations 
in some provinces have been organized through villagers attending either a meeting 
of the Village Assembly or a meeting of the Villagers’ Small Group, while the latest 
development in other provinces is to have no pre-election nomination. In these areas, 
voters receive either a blank piece of paper or a blank ballot paper with only the 
different positions indicated above the relevant columns. If the election fails to produce 
a new committee or to fill all positions it de facto becomes a first-round election, and a 
run-off election follows. 
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The final election must be direct. The use of secret ballots and polling booths (or 
rooms) is mandatory in most provinces. There are three voting styles: (a) mass voting, 
where all voters go to a central voting place in the morning, vote, and remain there 
until the end of the count; (b) individual voting throughout the course of the day of the 
election; and (c) proxy or absentee voting, or ‘roving boxes’. Most of the provinces use 
mass voting. The ballot papers used contain names of candidates listed under the post 
for which they are standing; and the voting is done by the voter marking the names of 
the candidates he or she wishes to elect. The voter can mark as many candidates as there 
are posts (one chair, one or two vice-chairs, and a number of committee members) in 
the village. For an election to be considered valid an absolute majority of eligible voters 
must cast their ballots and winning candidates are required to get 50 per cent of the 
vote plus one. When no candidate receives a majority, a run-off election is held within 
three days. In run-off elections, candidates are only required to receive 33 per cent of 
all votes cast. Winners take up their positions immediately. 
Village elections are important in that the election law mandates the basic norms 
of a democratic process—secret ballot, direct election and multiple candidates (even 
though their numbers are very restricted). Other elections in China have yet to 
implement these norms. The progress made in relation to VC elections has raised 
expectations as to whether and when direct elections will work their way up from the 
village to the township, county, and even higher levels of government. Each round of 
VC elections also strengthens local capacity to administer electoral processes. 
An assessment of the significance of China’s village elections has much to do with 
the question whether such ‘limited democracy’ can lead to genuine democracy. There 
are different ways of assessing how democratic elections are. The three universal criteria 
of free, fair and meaningful elections are appropriate terms of reference. China does 
not meet any recognized standards of free and fair elections in choosing its national 
parliament and local councils, and in many cases elected village leaders do not exercise 
as much authority as the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) secretaries do. However, just 
because the village elections are not fully free or fair, and some VCs do not command 
complete authority, it cannot be concluded that they are completely unfree, unfair, 
or meaningless. Elections should not be evaluated against some absolute standard but 
rather viewed as positioned on a democratic continuum. 
The VC elections have produced a ripple effect as village CCP branch elections 
in some cases have invited ordinary villagers to cast a vote of confidence, and some 
experiments with elections of township government leaders have taken place. China’s 
democratization now appears to require that the top leadership’s political decisions 
find an echo at the grass roots. After two decades of continuously improved direct 
elections at the village level, elections at higher levels of government appear technically 











Chinese village election ballot paper
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203. The debate between parliamentarism and presidentialism in national constitutions 
has a counterpart in discussion of the structure of local government. Directly elected 
governors and mayors who head executive authorities that are separate from the elected 
local legislative body are becoming more popular worldwide, at the expense of elected 
authorities with collective committee structures directly responsible for services. The 
range of systems for electing governors and mayors is in principle the same as that for 
the direct election of presidents, and parallels may also be drawn when considering the 
issues surrounding the relationship between the electoral system and the legislative–
executive relationship at local level. 
Electoral Systems and Political Parties
204. Different kinds of electoral system are likely to encourage different kinds of 
party organization and party system. While it is important for party systems to 
be as representative as possible, most experts favour systems which encourage the 
development of parties based on broad political values and ideologies and specific 
policy programmes, rather than narrow ethnic, racial or regional concerns. As well as 
reducing the threat of societal conflict, parties which are based on these broad ‘cross-
cutting cleavages’ are more likely to reflect national opinion than those that are based 
predominantly on sectarian or regional concerns. 
205. Highly centralized political systems using closed-list PR are the most likely to 
encourage strong party organizations; conversely, decentralized, district-based systems 
like FPTP may have the opposite effect. But there are many other electoral variables 
that can be used to influence the development of party systems. For example, new 
democracies like Russia and Indonesia have attempted to shape the development of 
their nascent party systems by providing institutional incentives for the formation of 
national rather than regional political parties (see the case study on Indonesia). Other 
countries such as Ecuador and Papua New Guinea have used party registration and 
funding requirements to achieve similar objectives. Access to public and/or private 
funding is a key issue that cuts across electoral system design, and is often the single 
biggest constraint on the emergence of viable new parties. 
Just as electoral system choice will affect the way in which the political party system 
develops, the political party system in place affects electoral system choice. Existing 
parties are unlikely to support changes that are likely to seriously disadvantage them, 
or changes that open the possibility of new, rival parties gaining entry to the political 
party system, unless there is a strong political imperative. The range of options for 
electoral system change may thus be constrained in practice. 
206. Different kinds of electoral system also result in different relationships between 
individual candidates and their supporters. In general, systems which make use of 
single-member electoral districts, such as most plurality/majority systems, are seen 
as encouraging individual candidates to see themselves as the delegates of particular 




















systems which use large multi-member districts, such as most PR systems, are more likely 
to deliver representatives whose primary loyalty lies with their party on national issues. 
Both approaches have their merits, which is one of the reasons for the rise in popularity 
of mixed systems that combine both local and national-level representatives. 
207. The question of accountability is often raised in discussions of political parties 
and electoral systems, especially in relation to individual elected members. The 
relationships between electors, elected members and political parties are affected not 
only by the electoral system but also by other provisions of the political legislative 
framework such as term limits, provisions regulating the relationship between parties 
and their members who are also elected representatives, or provisions barring elected 
members from changing parties without resigning from the legislature. 
208. The freedom for voters to choose between candidates as opposed to parties 
is another aspect of accountability. Many countries in recent years have therefore 
introduced a greater element of candidate-centred voting into their electoral systems, 
for example, by introducing open lists in PR elections. 
Direct Democracy Options
209. This Handbook covers issues of electoral system design for the election of 
representatives at all levels. When considering the question of accountability, however, 
a broader framework may be necessary which also takes into account the role of 
institutions of direct democracy. The use of referendums is becoming more common 
worldwide. Switzerland has a long history of use of the citizens’ initiative, a procedure 
which enables legislative proposals to be submitted by groups of citizens to popular vote. 
While Venezuela is the only country which provides for a recall vote against a directly 
elected president, such votes can be demanded against legislators and/or regional and 
local office holders in some presidential systems and many US states. 





5. Cost and Administrative 
Implications of Electoral 
Systems
210. In any country, the logistics capacity and the availability of skilled human 
resources may constrain the available options for electoral system choice, as may the 
amount of money available.  Even when donor funding is available, issues of the long- 
term sustainability of electoral system choice are important.
This does not, however, mean that the most straightforward and least expensive system 
is always the best choice.  It may well be a false economy, as a dysfunctional electoral 
system can have a negative impact on a country’s entire political system and on its 
democratic stability.
Any choice of electoral system has a wide range of administrative consequences, 
including those addressed in the following paragraphs.
211. The Drawing of Electoral Boundaries. Any single-member district system requires 
the time-consuming and expensive process of drawing boundaries for relatively small 
constituencies. The way in which they are demarcated will depend on issues such as 
population size, cohesiveness, ‘community of interest’ and contiguity. Furthermore, this 
is rarely a one-off task, as boundaries have to be adjusted regularly to take population 
changes into account. FPTP, AV and TRS systems produce the most administrative 
headaches on this score. The BV, PBV, SNTV, LV and STV systems also require 
electoral districts to be demarcated but are somewhat easier to manage because they use 
multi-member districts, which will be fewer in number and larger. Drawing districts 
for an element of a mixed system poses similar challenges. 
212. When multi-member districts are used, it is possible to avoid the need to adjust 
boundaries by changing the number of representatives elected in each electoral 
district—a method of particular value when established units such as provinces 
are used as electoral districts. List PR systems are often the cheapest and easiest to 
administer because they use either one single national constituency, which means that 
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no boundaries need be drawn at all, or very large multi-member districts which dovetail 
with pre-existing state or provincial boundaries. Recent UN-sponsored elections in 
Sierra Leone in 1996, Liberia in 1997 and Kosovo in 2001 were all conducted under 
a national List PR system, partly because the displacement of people and the lack of 
accurate census data meant that electoral authorities did not have the population data 
necessary to draw smaller districts. 
213. The Registration of Voters. Voter registration is the most complex and controversial, 
and often least successful, part of electoral administration. By its nature it involves 
collecting in a standardized format specific information from a vast number of voters, 
and then arranging and distributing these data in a form that can be used at election 
time—moreover, in such a way as to ensure that only eligible electors engage in the 
voting process and to guard against multiple voting, personation and the like. The 
political sensitivity of these matters and the laborious nature of the task itself mean that 
voter registration is often one of the most expensive and time-consuming parts of the 
entire electoral process. 
214. Voter registration requirements are influenced by the design of the electoral 
system. A system which uses single-member districts usually requires that each voter 
must be registered within the boundaries of a specified district. This means that FPTP, 
AV, TRS and BC (when using single-member districts) are the most expensive and 
administratively time-consuming systems in terms of voter registration, alongside 
Parallel and MMP systems which contain single-member districts. The fewer, multi-
member districts of the BV, PBV, SNTV and STV systems make the process a little 
easier, while large-district List PR systems are the least complicated. Arrangements for 
registration for out-of-country voting may be particularly difficult.
The simplicity of List PR in this context has been a contributing factor in its adoption 
in some major transitional elections, such as South Africa’s first democratic elections in 
1994. It should be emphasized, however, that variations in electoral systems have only a 
minor impact on the often extremely high cost of voter registration. 
215. The Design and Production of Ballot Papers. Ballot papers should be as friendly 
as possible to all voters in order to maximize participation and reduce the number of 
spoilt or ‘invalid’ votes. This often entails the use of symbols for parties and candidates, 
photographs, and colours; a number of interesting ballot paper examples are illustrated 
in this Handbook. FPTP and AV ballot papers are often easiest to print and, in most 
cases, have a relatively small number of names. TRS ballot papers are similarly easy, 
but in many cases new ballot papers have to be printed for the second round of voting, 
thus effectively doubling the production cost; and consideration also has to be given 
to allowing sufficient time to print the papers for the second ballot. Parallel and MMP 
systems often require the printing of at least two ballot papers for a single polling day, 
and use two (or more) very different electoral systems, with logistical implications 
for the training of election officials and the way in which people vote. SNTV, BV, 
BC and STV ballot papers are more complex than FPTP ballot papers because they 
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will have more candidates, and therefore more symbols and photographs (if these are 
used). Lastly, List PR ballot papers can span the continuum of complexity. They can 
be very simple, as in a closed-list system, or quite complex in a free-list system such as 
Switzerland’s. 
216. Voter Education. Clearly the nature of, and the need for, voter education will vary 
dramatically from society to society, but when it comes to educating voters on how 
to fill out their ballot papers, there are identifiable differences between the different 
systems. The principles behind voting under preferential systems such as AV, STV 
or Borda Count are quite complex, and if they are being used for the first time voter 
education needs to address this issue, particularly if the voter is obliged to number 
all candidates in order of preference, as is the case in Australia. The increasing use of 
mixed systems, many of which give voters two ballot papers, also creates an additional 
level of complexity for voters. By contrast, the principles behind single-vote systems 
such as FPTP, PBV or SNTV are very easy to understand. The remaining systems fall 
somewhere in between these two extremes (see Table 8). 
217. Number of Polling Days. FPTP, AV, BV, SNTV, List PR, Borda Count and STV all 
generally require just one election on one day, as do Parallel and MMP systems. Two-
Round systems are more costly and difficult to administer because they often require 
the whole electoral process to be re-run a week or a fortnight after the first round. 
218. By-elections. If a seat becomes vacant between elections, List PR systems often 
simply fill it with the next candidate on the list of the party of the former representative, 
thus eliminating the need to hold another election. However, plurality/majority systems 
often have provisions for filling vacant seats through a by-election. When other systems 
are in use, either approach may be possible: under STV, the Republic of Ireland holds 
by-elections for vacant seats in the legislature, but Australia does not do so for Senate 
vacancies. It is also possible to avoid by-elections by electing substitutes at the same 
time as the ordinary representatives, as is done for example in Bolivia. 
By-elections are smaller and therefore less costly than normal elections, but in some 
countries they will nevertheless put a significant burden on the budget, and seats are 
sometimes left vacant for long periods because of a lack of capacity to arrange by-
elections. This is an especially salient problem in some countries in Southern Africa 
where the HIV/AIDS epidemic often leads to a large number of vacant seats between 
elections. 
In some circumstances, by-elections can have a wider political impact than 
merely replacing individual members, and are seen to act as a mid-term test of the 
performance of the government. In addition, if the number of vacancies to be filled 
during a parliamentary term is large this can lead to a change in the composition of the 




















219. The Count. FPTP, SNTV and simple closed-list PR systems are easiest to count, as 
only one vote total figure for each party or candidate is required to work out the results. 
The BV and LV systems require the polling officials to count a number of votes on a 
single ballot paper, and Parallel and MMP systems often require the counting of two 
ballot papers. AV, BC and STV, as preferential systems requiring numbers to be marked 
on the ballot, are more complex to count. 
Table 8: Potential Cost and Administrative Implications of 12 Electoral Systems
 Drawing  Voter Ballot Voter Number of By-elections The Count
 Electoral  Registration Paper Design Education Polling Days
 Boundaries  and 
    Production
FPTP 	 	 	 	 	 	
BV 	   	 	 	
TRS 	 	 	 	 	 	
AV 	 	 	 	 	 	
PBV 	 	 	 	 	 	
List PR 	 	  	 	 	
STV   	 	 	 	
Parallel 	 	    	
MMP 	 	 	 	 	 	
BC 	 	 	 	 	 	 		
SNTV    	 	 	
LV    	 	 	
Key:  = Low cost and complexity;  = Medium cost and complexity; 
 = High cost and complexity.
220. Sustainability. The stresses which any electoral system places on a country’s 
administrative capacity will be determined primarily by history, context, experience and 
resources, but Table 7 does offer some clues to the potential costs of various systems. A 
cursory glance shows that List PR systems, especially national closed-list systems, score 
well when it comes to being cheap to run and requiring few administrative resources. 
So does PBV. Next come SNTV and LV systems, followed by BV and FPTP; and a 
little further down by the AV, STV, Parallel, Borda Count and MMP systems. The 
system which is most likely to put pressure on any country’s administrative capacity is 





6. Advice for Electoral 
System Designers
221. One of the clearest conclusions to be drawn from the comparative 
study of electoral systems is simply the range and utility of the options available. 
Often, designers and drafters of constitutional, political and electoral frameworks 
simply choose the electoral system they know best—often, in new democracies, the 
system of the former colonial power if there was one—rather than fully investigating 
the alternatives. Sometimes the elements of a peace settlement or external pressures 
constrain the options available. 
The major purpose of this Handbook is to provide some of the knowledge for informed 
decisions to be made. The Handbook does not necessarily advocate wholesale changes 
to existing electoral systems; in fact, the comparative experience of electoral reform to 
date suggests that moderate reform, building on those parts of an existing system which 
work well, is often a better option than jumping to a completely new and unfamiliar 
system. 
222. There is much to be learned from the experience of others. For example, a country 
with an FPTP system which wishes to move to a more proportional system while still 
retaining the geographical link to constituents might want to consider the experience 
of New Zealand, which adopted an MMP system in 1993, or Lesotho, which did so in 
2002. A similar country which wants to keep single-member districts but encourage 
inter-group accommodation and compromise could evaluate the experience of AV in 
the Oceania region (Fiji or Papua New Guinea in particular). Any deeply divided 
country that wishes to make the transition to democracy would be well advised to 
consider both the multi-ethnic power-sharing government the List PR electoral system 
in South Africa has facilitated and the more troubled history of the Northern Ireland 
Assembly elected by STV. Lastly, a country which simply wishes to reduce the cost 
and instability created by a TRS system for electing a president could examine the AV 
option used by the Republic of Ireland. In all these cases, the choice of electoral system 
has had a clear impact on the politics of that country. 
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223. The following guidelines summarize the advice contained in this Handbook. 
Keep It Simple and Clear
224. Effective and sustainable electoral system designs are more likely to be easily 
understood by the voter and the politician. Too much complexity can lead to 
misunderstandings, unintended consequences, and voter mistrust of the results. 
Don’t be Afraid to Innovate
225. Many of the successful electoral systems used in the world today themselves 
represent innovative approaches to specific problems, and have been proved to work 
well. There is much to learn from the experience of others—both neighbouring 
countries and seemingly quite different cases. 
Pay Attention to Contextual and Temporal Factors
226. Electoral systems do not work in a vacuum. Their success depends on a happy 
marriage of political institutions and cultural traditions. The first point of departure 
for any would-be electoral system designer should be to ask: What is the political and 
social context I am working within? The second might be: Am I designing a permanent 
system or one which needs to get us through a transitional period? 
Don’t Underestimate the Electorate
227. While simplicity is important, it is equally dangerous to underestimate the voters’ 
ability to comprehend and successfully use a wide variety of different electoral systems. 
Complex preferential systems, for example, have been used successfully in developing 
countries in the Asia–Pacific region, while the experience of many recent elections 
in new democracies has underlined the important distinction between ‘functional’ 
literacy and ‘political’ literacy. Even in very poor countries, voters often have, and wish 
to express, relatively sophisticated orderings of political preferences and choices. 
Err on the Side of Inclusion
228. Wherever possible, whether in divided or relatively homogeneous societies, the 
electoral system should err on the side of including all significant interests in the 
legislature. Regardless of whether minorities are based on ideological, ethnic, racial, 
linguistic, regional or religious identities, the exclusion of significant shades of opinion 
from legislatures, particularly in the developing world, has often been catastrophically 
counterproductive. 
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Process is a Key Factor in Choice
229. The way in which a particular electoral system is chosen is also extremely 
important in ensuring its overall legitimacy. A process in which most or all groups are 
included, including the electorate at large, is likely to result in significantly broader 
acceptance of the end result than a decision perceived as being motivated by partisan 
self-interest alone. Although partisan considerations are unavoidable when discussing 
the choice of electoral systems, broad cross-party and public support for any institution 
is crucial to its being accepted and respected. The reform of the New Zealand electoral 
system from FPTP to MMP, for example, involved two referendums which served to 
legitimize the final outcome. By contrast, the French Socialist government’s decision 
in 1986 to switch from the existing Two-Round System to PR was widely perceived 
as being motivated by partisan considerations, and was quickly reversed as soon the 
government lost power in 1988. 
Build Legitimacy and Acceptance Among All Key Actors
230. All groupings which wish to play a part in the democratic process should feel 
that the electoral system to be used is fair and gives them the same chance of electoral 
success as anyone else. The paramount aim should be that those who ‘lose’ the election 
cannot translate their disappointment into a rejection of the system itself or use the 
electoral system as an excuse to destabilize the path of democratic consolidation. In 
1990 in Nicaragua, the Sandinistas were voted out of the government but accepted the 
defeat, in part because they accepted the fairness of the electoral system. Cambodia, 
Mozambique and South Africa were able to end their bloody civil wars through 
institutional arrangements which were broadly acceptable to all sides. 
Try to Maximize Voter Influence
231. Voters should feel that elections provide them with a measure of influence over 
governments and government policy. Choice can be maximized in a number of 
different ways. Voters may be able to choose between parties, between candidates of 
different parties, and between candidates of the same party. They may also be able to 
vote under different systems when it comes to presidential, upper house, lower house, 
regional and local government elections. They should also feel confident that their vote 
has a genuine impact on the formation of the government, not just on the composition 
of the legislature. 
But Balance That Against Encouraging Coherent Political Parties
232. The desire to maximize voter influence should be balanced against the need to 
encourage coherent and viable political parties. Maximum voter choice on the ballot 
paper may produce such a fragmented legislature that no one ends up with the result 
they were hoping for. There is widespread agreement among political scientists that 
broadly-based, coherent political parties are among the most important factors in 













Long-Term Stability and Short-Term Advantage 
Are Not Always Compatible
233. When political actors negotiate over a new electoral system they often push 
proposals which they believe will advantage their party in the coming elections. 
However, this can often be an unwise strategy, particularly in developing nations, as 
one party’s short-term success or dominance may lead to long-term political breakdown 
and social unrest. For example, in negotiations prior to the transitional 1994 election, 
South Africa’s ANC could reasonably have argued for the retention of the existing 
FPTP electoral system, which would probably have given it, as by far the largest party, a 
seat bonus over and above its share of the national vote. That it argued for a form of PR, 
and thus won fewer seats than it could have under FPTP, was a testament to the fact 
that it saw long-term stability as more desirable than short-term electoral gratification. 
234. Similarly, electoral systems need to be responsive enough to react effectively to 
changing political circumstances and the growth of new political movements. Even in 
established democracies, support for the major parties is rarely stable, while politics in 
new democracies is almost always highly dynamic and a party which benefits from the 
electoral arrangements at one election may not necessarily benefit at the next. 
Don’t Think of the Electoral System as a Panacea for All Ills
235. While it is true that if one wants to change the nature of political competition the 
electoral system may be the most effective instrument for doing so, electoral systems 
can never be the panacea for all the political ills of a country. The overall effects of 
other variables, particularly a country’s political culture, usually have a much greater 
impact on its democratic prospects than institutional factors such as electoral systems. 
Moreover, the positive effects of a well-crafted electoral system can be all too easily 
submerged by an inappropriate constitutional dispensation, the dominance of forces of 
discord internally, or the weight of external threats to the sovereignty of the country. 
But Conversely Don’t Underestimate its Influence 
236. Throughout the world the social constraints on democracy are considerable, but 
they still leave room for conscious political strategies which may further or hamper 
successful democratization. Electoral systems are not a panacea, but they are central to 
the structuring of stability in any polity. Skilful electoral system engineering may not 
prevent or eradicate deep enmities, but appropriate institutions can nudge the political 
system in the direction of reduced conflict and greater government accountability. In 
other words, while most of the changes that can be achieved by tailoring electoral 
systems are necessarily at the margins, it is often these marginal impacts that make the 
difference between democracy being consolidated or being undermined. 
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Be Mindful of the Electorate’s Willingness to Embrace Change
237. Electoral system change might seem a good idea to political insiders who 
understand the flaws of the existing system, but unless proposals for reform are 
presented in an appropriate way the public may well reject tinkering with the system, 
perceiving reform to be nothing more than a case of politicians altering the rules for 
their own benefit. Most damaging are situations when the change is seen to be a blatant 
manoeuvre for political gain (as was the case in Chile in 1989, in Jordan in 1993, and 
in Kyrgyzstan on several occasions since 1995 (see the case study)), or when the system 
alters so frequently that the voters do not quite know where they are (as some observers 
have argued is the case in Bolivia). 
And Don’t Assume that Defects can Easily be Fixed Later
238. All electoral systems create winners and losers, and therefore vested interests. 
When a system is already in place, these are part of the political environment. At a time 
of change, however, it may be unwise to assume that it will be easy to gain acceptance 
later to fix problems which arise. If a review of the system is intended, it may be sensible 
for it to be incorporated into the legal instruments containing the system change. 
Avoid Being a Slave to Past Systems
239. Nevertheless, all too often electoral systems that are inappropriate to a new 
democracy’s needs have been inherited or carried over from colonial times without 
any thought as to how they will work within the new political realities. Almost all the 
former British colonies in Asia, Africa and the Pacific, for example, adopted FPTP 
systems. In many of these new democracies, particularly those facing ethnic divisions, 
this system proved utterly inappropriate to their needs. Similarly, it has been argued 
that many of the former French colonies in West Africa which retained the TRS system 
(such as Mali) suffered damaging polarization as a result; and many post-communist 
regimes retain minimum turnout or majority requirements inherited from the Soviet 
era. One of the fascinating things about the map which comes with this Handbook is 
that in many ways it mirrors a map of the world’s colonies 100 years ago, with many 
former British colonies using FPTP, those countries under French influence using TRS, 
and the former Belgian and Dutch colonies often opting for a version of the List PR 
systems used in continental Europe—although it is true to say that over time this is 
changing. 
Assess the Likely Impact of Any New System on Societal Conflict
240. As noted at the very start of this Handbook, electoral systems can be seen not 
only as mechanisms for choosing legislatures and presidents but also as a tool of 
conflict management within a society. Some systems, in some circumstances, will 
encourage parties to make inclusive appeals for support outside their own core support 













inappropriate electoral systems serves actually to exacerbate negative tendencies which 
already exist, for example, by encouraging parties to see elections as ‘zero-sum’ contests 
and thus to act in a hostile and exclusionary manner to anyone outside their home 
group. When designing any political institution, the bottom line is that, even if it does 
not help to reduce tensions within society, it should, at the very least, not make matters 
worse. 
Try and Imagine Unusual or Unlikely Contingencies
241. Too often, electoral systems are designed to avoid the mistakes of the past, 
especially the immediate past. Care should be taken in doing so not to overreact and 
create a system that goes too far in terms of correcting previous problems. Furthermore, 
electoral system designers would do well to pose themselves some unusual questions to 
avoid embarrassment in the long run. What if nobody wins under the system proposed? 
Is it possible that one party could win all the seats? What if you have to award more 
seats than you have places in the legislature? What do you do if candidates tie? Might 
the system mean that, in some districts, it is better for a party supporter not to vote for 
their preferred party or candidate?
A Design Checklist 
 Is the system clear and comprehensible?
 Has context been taken into account?
 Is the system appropriate for the time?
 Are the mechanisms for future reform clear? 
 Does the system avoid underestimating the electorate? 
 Is the system as inclusive as possible?
 Was the design process perceived to be legitimate? 
 Will the election results be seen as legitimate? 
 Are unusual contingencies taken into account? 
 Is the system financially and administratively sustainable? 
 Will the voters feel powerful? 
 Is a competitive party system encouraged?
 Does the system fit into a holistic constitutional framework? 
 Will the system help to alleviate conflict rather than exacerbate it?
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The Electoral Systems of 213 
Independent Countries and 
Related Territories (2004) 
Annex A
1 Territories are included where they have no direct representation in a legislature of the country with which they are associated.
2 For countries with bicameral legislatures, system for the lower house.
3 A qualified majority of two-thirds is required for a candidate to be elected in the first round.
AFGHANISTAN SNTV Other 249 249 1 TRS
ALBANIA MMP (FPTP&List PR) Mixed 140  O  140 2 -
ALGERIA List PR PR 389  P 389 1 TRS
ANDORRA Parallel (List PR &PBV) Mixed 28 28 2 -
ANGOLA List PR PR 220 220 2 TRS
ANGUILLA FPTP Plurality/Majority 7 11 1 -
ANTIGUA AND BARBUDA FPTP Plurality/Majority 17 17 1 -
ARGENTINA List PR PR 257 257 1 TRS L
ARMENIA Parallel (FPTP&List PR) Mixed 131 131 2 TRS
ARUBA List PR PR 21 21 1 -
AUSTRALIA AV Plurality/Majority 150 150 1 -
AUSTRIA List PR PR 183 183 3 TRS
AZERBAIJAN Parallel (TRS&List PR) Mixed 125 125 2 TRS 3 
BAHAMAS FPTP Plurality/Majority 40 40 1 -
BAHRAIN TRS Plurality/Majority 40 40 1 -
BANGLADESH FPTP Plurality/Majority 300 300 1 -
BARBADOS FPTP Plurality/Majority 30 30 1 -
BELARUS TRS Plurality/Majority 110 110 1 TRS
BELGIUM List PR PR 150 150 1 -
BELIZE FPTP Plurality/Majority 29 29 1 -






















4  If no candidate receives an absolute majority of the vote in the first round, the top two candidates are put to the National Assembly for a vote.
5 The UN name is Myanmar.
6  Forty representatives have been appointed for a transitional period.
7  PBV in the multi-member districts if a list gains an absolute majority of the votes, otherwise List PR.
8  PBV in the multi-member districts if a list gains an absolute majority of the votes, otherwise List PR.
9 The federal presidency rotates between the three main islands. A first round of elections is held on the island which currently holds 
 the presidency and the three top candidates move on to a second round in which the voters on all three islands are entitled to vote.
BENIN List PR PR 83 83 1 TRS
BERMUDA FPTP Plurality/Majority 36 36 1 -
BHUTAN ’N’ - - - - -
BOLIVIA MMP (FPTP&List PR) Mixed 130 130 2  TRS 4
BOSNIA AND  List PR PR 42 42 1 FPTP
HERZEGOVINA   
BOTSWANA FPTP Plurality/Majority 57 62 1 -
BRAZIL List PR PR 513 513 1 TRS
BRITISH VIRGIN ISLANDS FPTP and BV Plurality/Majority 13 13 2 -
BRUNEI  DARUSSALAM ’N’ - - - - -
BULGARIA List PR PR 240 240 1 TRS
BURKINA FASO List PR PR 111 111 2 TRS
BURMA 5  FPTP Plurality/Majority 485 485 1 -
BURUNDI List PR PR 81 1796  1 -
CAMBODIA List PR PR 123 P 123 1 -
CAMEROON PBV/List PR&FPTP 7  Plurality/Majority 180 180 ’H’ FPTP
CANADA FPTP Plurality/Majority 301 301 1 -
CAPE VERDE List PR PR 72 72 1 TRS
CAYMAN ISLANDS BV Plurality/Majority 15 18 1 -
CENTRAL AFRICAN TRS Plurality/Majority 105 105 1 TRS
REPUBLIC
CHAD  PBV/List PR&TRS 8 Plurality/Majority 155 P  155 ’H’ TRS
CHILE List PR PR 120 120 1 TRS
CHINA ’N’ - - - - -
COLOMBIA List PR PR 166 P  166 1 TRS
COMOROS TRS Plurality/Majority 18 33 1  FPTP 9 
CONGO, REPUBLIC OF THE  TRS Plurality/Majority 137 137 1 TRS
(BRAZZAVILLE)
CONGO, DEMOCRATIC  ’T’ - - - - -
REPUBLIC OF (KINSHASA)
COOK ISLANDS FPTP Plurality/Majority 24 24 1 -
COSTA RICA List PR PR       57 57 1 TRS L
CÔTE D’IVOIRE FPTP and PBV Plurality/Majority 225 225 ’H’ TRS






















10 Block Vote in two rounds if necessary.
11  The president is elected for a five-year term by the legislature and confirmed in a referendum by the people.
CROATIA List PR PR 151 151 1 TRS
CUBA TRS Plurality/Majority 609 609 1 -
CYPRUS List PR PR 56 56 1 TRS
CYPRUS (NORTH) List PR PR 50 50 1 TRS
CZECH REPUBLIC List PR PR 200 200 1 -
DENMARK List PR PR 179 179 2 -
DJIBOUTI PBV Plurality/Majority 65 65 1 TRS
DOMINICA FPTP Plurality/Majority 21 30 1 -
DOMINICAN REPUBLIC List PR PR 150 P 150 2 TRS
ECUADOR List PR PR 100 P 100 1 TRS L
EGYPT TRS 10 Plurality/Majority 444 454 1 -11 
EL SALVADOR List PR PR 84 84 2 TRS
EQUATORIAL GUINEA List PR PR 100 100 1 FPTP
ERITREA ’T’ - - - - -
ESTONIA List PR PR 101 101 2 -
ETHIOPIA FPTP Plurality/Majority 547 P 547 1 -
FALKLAND ISLANDS BV Plurality/Majority 8 8 1 -
FIJI AV Plurality/Majority 71 71 1 -
FINLAND List PR PR 200 200 1 TRS
FRANCE TRS Plurality/Majority 577 577 1 TRS
GABON TRS Plurality/Majority 120 120 1 TRS
GAMBIA FPTP Plurality/Majority 48 53 1 TRS
GEORGIA Parallel (List PR&TRSL)  Mixed 235 235 2 TRS
GERMANY MMP (List PR&FPTP) Mixed 598 O  598 2 -
GHANA FPTP Plurality/Majority 200 200 1 TRS
GIBRALTAR LV Other 15 17 1 -
GREECE List PR PR 300 300 2 -
GRENADA FPTP Plurality/Majority 15 15 1 -
GUATEMALA List PR PR 158 P 158 2 TRS
GUERNSEY BV Plurality/Majority 45 47 1 -
GUINEA (CONAKRY) Parallel (List PR&FPTP) Mixed 114 114 2 TRS
GUINEA-BISSAU List PR PR 102 102 1 TRS
GUYANA List PR PR 53 65 1 FPTP
HAITI TRS Plurality/Majority 83 83 1 TRS
HOLY SEE (VATICAN CITY) ’N’ - - - - -














































HONDURAS List PR PR 128 128 1 FPTP
HUNGARY MMP (List PR&TRS) Mixed 386 386 3 -
ICELAND List PR PR 63 63 2 FPTP
INDIA FPTP Plurality/Majority 543 545 1 -
INDONESIA List PR PR 550 550 1 TRS 12  
IRAN, ISLAMIC  TRS L Plurality/Majority 290 290 1 TRS
REPUBLIC OF 
IRAQ List PR PR 275 275 1 -
IRELAND, REPUBLIC OF STV PR 166 166 1 AV
ISRAEL List PR PR 120 120 1 -
ITALY MMP (FPTP&List PR)  Mixed 630 630 2 -
JAMAICA FPTP Plurality/Majority 60 60 1 -
JAPAN Parallel (FPTP&List PR) Mixed 480 480 2 -
JERSEY BV & FPTP Plurality/Majority 53 53 3 -
JORDAN SNTV Other 104 13  110 1 -
KAZAKHSTAN Parallel (TRS&List PR) Mixed 77 77 2 TRS
KENYA FPTP Plurality/Majority 210 222 1 TRS 14  
KIRIBATI TRS 15  Plurality/Majority 40 42 1 FPTP
KOREA, DEMOCRATIC  TRS Plurality/Majority 687 687 1 -
PEOPLE’S REPUBLIC OF
KOREA, REPUBLIC OF Parallel (FPTP&List PR) Mixed 299 299 2 FPTP
KUWAIT BV Plurality/Majority 50 65 1 -
KYRGYZSTAN TRS Plurality/Majority 75 75 1 TRS
LAO PEOPLE’S  BV Plurality/Majority 109 109 1 -
DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC
LATVIA List PR PR 100 100 1 -
LEBANON BV Plurality/Majority 128 128 1 -
LESOTHO MMP (FPTP&List PR) Mixed 120 120 2 -
LIBERIA ’T’ - - - - -
LIBYAN ARAB  ’N’ - - - - -
JAMAHIRIYA
LIECHTENSTEIN List PR PR 25 25 1 -
LITHUANIA Parallel (TRS&List PR) Mixed 141 141 2 TRS
12 50% +1 of all votes plus a minimum of 20% in half of all provinces is required for a candidate to be elected in the first round.
13 If at least six women are elected there are 110 directly elected representatives,  otherwise up to six women are indirectly elected 
 by an electoral panel.
14 A minimum of 25% in five of eight regions is required for a candidate to be elected in the first round.
15 Ordinary TRS in single-member districts and Block Vote with second round if necessary in a few multi-member districts.






















16  The president is elected for a five-year term by Parliament and confirmed in a referendum by the people.
17   PBV system with provisions for second round if necessary.
18  Eight seats are reserved for the highest-polling unsuccessful candidates or ‘best losers’ from those predefined communities which are 
 under-represented after the allocation of the first 62 seats.
19   Block vote with second round if at least 6% support for candidates is not reached.
20   There are provisions for repeated rounds if no candidate receives an absolute majority of the votes.
21 Eight representatives are elected in single-member national minority districts.
LUXEMBOURG List PR PR 60 60 1 -
MACEDONIA, THE  List PR PR 120 120 1 TRS
FORMER YUGOSLAV 
REPUBLIC OF
MADAGASCAR FPTP&List PR Plurality/Majority 160 P 160 ’H’ TRS
MALAWI FPTP Plurality/Majority 193 193 1 FPTP
MALAYSIA FPTP Plurality/Majority 219 219 1 -
MALDIVES BV Plurality/Majority 42 50 1 - 16
MALI  TRS 17 Plurality/Majority 147 P 147 1 TRS
MALTA STV PR 65 65 1 -
MAN, ISLE OF BV & FPTP Plurality/Majority 24 24 ’H’ -
MARSHALL ISLANDS FPTP & BV Plurality/Majority 33 33 ’H’ -
MAURITANIA TRS Plurality/Majority 81 P 81 1 TRS
MAURITIUS  BV  18 Plurality/Majority 70 70 1 -
MEXICO MMP (FPTP&List PR) Mixed 500 500 2 FPTP
MICRONESIA,  FPTP Plurality/Majority 14 14 2 -
FEDERATED STATES OF
MOLDOVA, REPUBLIC OF List PR PR 101 101 1 -
MONACO Parallel (List PR&BV) Mixed 24 24 2 -
MONGOLIA TRS L Plurality/Majority 76 76 1 TRS
MONTSERRAT  TRS 19 Plurality/Majority 9 11 1 -
MOROCCO List PR PR 325 325 2 -
MOZAMBIQUE List PR PR 250 250 1 TRS
NAMIBIA List PR PR 72 78 1 TRS 20  
NAURU Modified BC Other 18 18 1 -
NEPAL FPTP Plurality/Majority 205 205 1 -
NETHERLANDS List PR PR 150 150 1 -
NETHERLANDS ANTILLES List PR PR 22 22 1 -
NEW ZEALAND MMP (FPTP&List PR) Mixed 120 O 120 2 -
NICARAGUA List PR PR 90 92 2 TRS L
NIGER List PR&FPTP 21 PR 83 83 ’H’ TRS














































22  An absolute majority or at least 25% in two-thirds of the states is required for a candidate to be elected in the first round.
23 The first round acts as a primary election from which the top two candidates move on to a second round regardless of level of support.
24 Number of seats varies between 208 and 260 depending on outcome of election. A sectoral interest group or marginalized group which polls 
 over 2% receives a maximum of three additional seats. Established political parties cannot benefit from this provision.  
 Not all additional list seats are necessarily filled.
25 Support from 50% of the electorate is required for a candidate to be elected in the first round.
26  At the time of writing no federal electoral law was in place although elections are held in the constituent republics.
27   A qualified majority of 55% is required for a candidate to be elected in the first round. 
NIGERIA FPTP Plurality/Majority 360 360 1 TRS 22 
NIUE FPTP & BV Plurality/Majority 20 20 2 -
NORWAY List PR PR 165 165 1 -
OMAN FPTP Plurality/Majority 83 83 1 -
PAKISTAN Parallel (FPTP&List PR) Mixed 342 342 2 -
PALAU FPTP Plurality/Majority 16 16 1 TRS 23  
PALESTINE BV Plurality/Majority 89 89 1 FPTP
PANAMA List PR & FPTP PR 78 P 78 ’H’ FPTP
PAPUA NEW GUINEA AV  Plurality/Majority 109 109 2 -
PARAGUAY List PR PR 80 80 1 FPTP
PERU List PR PR 120 120 1 TRS
PHILIPPINES Parallel (FPTP&List PR)24  Mixed  24 260  260 2 FPTP
PITCAIRN ISLANDS SNTV Other 4 8 1 -
POLAND List PR PR 460 460 1 TRS
PORTUGAL List PR PR 230 230 1 TRS
QATAR ’N’ - - - - -
ROMANIA List PR PR 345 P 345 1 TRS 25 
RUSSIAN FEDERATION Parallel (List PR&FPTP) Mixed 450 450 2 TRS
RWANDA List PR PR 53 80 1 FPTP
SAINT HELENA BV & FPTP Plurality/Majority 12 14 ’H’ -
SAINT KITTS AND NEVIS FPTP Plurality/Majority 10 15 1 -
SAINT LUCIA FPTP Plurality/Majority 17 17 1 -
SAINT VINCENT AND  FPTP Plurality/Majority 15 21 1 -
THE GRENADINES
SAMOA FPTP & BV Plurality/Majority 49 49 ’H’ -
SAN MARINO List PR PR 60  60 1 -
SAO TOME  AND PRINCIPE List PR PR 55 55 1 TRS
SAUDI ARABIA ’N’ - - - - -
SENEGAL Parallel (PBV&List PR) Mixed 120 120 2 TRS
SERBIA & MONTENEGRO  T’ 26 - 126 126 - -
SEYCHELLES Parallel (FPTP&List PR) Mixed 34 34 2 TRS
SIERRA LEONE List PR PR 112 124 1 TRS 27






















SINGAPORE PBV & FPTP Plurality/Majority 84 28  94  ’H’ FPTP
SLOVAKIA List PR PR 150 150 1 TRS
SLOVENIA List PR PR 90 90 2 TRS
SOLOMON ISLANDS FPTP Plurality/Majority 50 50 1 -
SOMALIA ’T’ - - - - -
SOUTH AFRICA List PR PR 400 400 2 -
SPAIN List PR PR 350 350 1 -
SRI LANKA List PR PR 225 225 2 SV
SUDAN FPTP Plurality/Majority 270 360 1 TRS
SURINAME List PR PR 51 51 1 -
SWAZILAND FPTP Plurality/Majority 55 65 1 -
SWEDEN List PR PR 349 349 2 -
SWITZERLAND List PR PR 200 200 1 -
SYRIAN ARAB REPUBLIC BV Plurality/Majority 250 250 1  - 29  
TAIWAN Parallel (SNTV&List PR) Mixed 225 225 2 FPTP
TAJIKISTAN Parallel (TRS&List PR) Mixed 63 63 1 TRS
TANZANIA,  FPTP Plurality/Majority 231 295 1 TRS
UNITED REPUBLIC OF
THAILAND Parallel (FPTP&List PR) Mixed 500 500 2 -
TIMOR-LESTE Parallel (List PR&FPTP) Mixed 88 88 2 TRS
TOGO TRS Plurality/Majority 81 81 1 TRS
TOKELAU ’T’ - - - - -
TONGA BV Plurality/Majority 9 30 1 -
TRINIDAD AND TOBAGO FPTP Plurality/Majority 36 36 1 -
TUNISIA Parallel (PBV&List PR) Mixed 189 P 189 2 FPTP
TURKEY List PR PR 550 550 1 -
TURKMENISTAN TRS Plurality/Majority 50 50 1 TRS
TURKS & CAICOS ISLANDS FPTP Plurality/Majority 13 18 1 -
TUVALU BV Plurality/Majority 15 15 1 -
UGANDA FPTP Plurality/Majority 214 295 1 TRS
UKRAINE Parallel (List PR&FPTP) Mixed 450 450 2 TRS
UNITED ARAB EMIRATES ’N’ - - - - -
UNITED KINGDOM OF  FPTP Plurality/Majority 659 659 1 -
GREAT BRITAIN AND 
NORTHERN IRELAND
28  The number of appointed opposition members may vary from election to election from none to three depending on the number of 
 seats won by opposition parties. The president may also appoint a maximum of nine additional representatives.
29  The president is elected for a five-year term by Parliament and confirmed in a referendum by the people.














































UNITED STATES  FPTP Plurality/Majority 435 435 1 FPTP 30  
OF AMERICA
URUGUAY List PR PR 99 99 1 TRS
UZBEKISTAN TRS Plurality/Majority 250 250 1 TRS
VANUATU SNTV Other 52 52 1 -
VENEZUELA MMP (FPTP&List PR) Mixed 165 P 165 3 FPTP
VIET NAM  TRS 31  Plurality/Majority 498 498 1 -
YEMEN FPTP Plurality/Majority 301 301 1 TRS
ZAMBIA FPTP Plurality/Majority 150 158 1 FPTP
ZIMBABWE FPTP Plurality/Majority 120 150 1 TRS
Key:
 D: Distribution requirements apply.
 H: Hybrid system. Electoral system family classification by the system under which the largest 
  number of seats in the legislature is elected.
 L:  Lower level of support than 50% +1 required for a candidate to be elected in first round.
 N: No provisions for direct elections.
 O: Actual size of legislature may vary between elections because of provisions for overhang mandates.
 P: Legislature size varies based on population size.
 SV: Supplementary Vote.
 T:  Country or territory in transition: new electoral system not decided at time of publication.
30 President is elected by an absolute majority of an electoral college. The members of the electoral college are elected on the state level, 
 and the candidate with the plurality of the vote in a given state normally receives all of that state’s electoral votes.
31 Block Vote in two rounds if necessary. 





















FPTP – First Past the Post
TRS – Two Round System
AV – Alternative Vote
BV – Block Vote
PBV – Party Block Vote
Parallel – Parallel System
MMP – Mixed Member Proportional
List PR – List Proportional Representation
STV – Single Transferable Vote
SNTV – Single Non-Transferable Vote
LV – Limited Vote
Modified BC – Modified Borda Count
174
Absentee voting – Another term for remote voting. 
Additional Member System – Another term for a Mixed Member Proportional system. 
Alternative Vote (AV) – A candidate-centred, preferential plurality/majority system used 
in single-member districts in which voters use numbers to mark their preferences on the 
ballot paper. A candidate who receives an absolute majority (50 per cent plus 1) of valid 
first-preference votes is declared elected. If no candidate achieves an absolute majority 
of first preferences, the least successful candidates are eliminated and their votes 
reallocated until one candidate has an absolute majority of valid votes remaining. 
Apparentement – A term of French origin for a provision which can be included in 
List Proportional Representation (List PR) systems which enables two or more parties or 
groupings which fight separate campaigns to reach agreement that their votes will be 
combined for the purpose of seat allocation. See also Lema and Stembusaccoord. 
Average district magnitude – For a country, local authority or supranational institution, 
the number of representatives to be elected divided by the number of electoral districts. 
See also District magnitude.
Ballotage – Another term for a two-round system, used primarily in Latin America.
Ballot structure – The way in which electoral choices are presented on the ballot paper, 
in particular whether the ballot is candidate-centred or party-centred. 
Bicameral legislature – A legislature made up of two houses, usually known as an upper 




Block Vote (BV) – A plurality/majority system used in multi-member districts in which 
electors have as many votes as there are candidates to be elected. Voting is candidate-
centred. The candidates with the highest vote totals win the seats. 
Borda Count (BC) – A candidate-centred preferential system used in either single- or 
multi-member districts in which voters use numbers to mark their preferences on the 
ballot paper and each preference marked is then assigned a value using equal steps. For 
example, in a ten-candidate field a first preference is worth one, a second preference 
is worth 0.9 and so on, with a tenth preference worth 0.1. These are summed and the 
candidate(s) with the highest total(s) is/are declared elected. See also Modified Borda 
Count. 
Boundary delimitation – The process by which a country, local authority area or area 
of a supranational institution is divided into electoral districts. 
Candidate-centred ballot – A form of ballot in which an elector chooses between 
candidates rather than between parties and political groupings. 
Circonscription – The term most frequently used for electoral district in francophone 
countries. See Electoral district.
Closed list – A form of List PR in which electors are restricted to voting only for a party 
or political grouping, and cannot express a preference for any candidate within a party 
list. See also Open list and Free list.
Communal roll – A register of electors for which the qualification for registration is a 
determinable criterion such as religion, ethnicity, language or gender. All electors who 
meet the criterion may be entered in the communal roll automatically, or each such 
elector may be able to choose whether or not to be entered. This register is used for the 
election of representatives of the group defined by the criterion from electoral districts 
specified for that purpose. 
Compensatory seats – The List PR seats in a Mixed Member Proportional system which 
are awarded to parties or groupings to correct disproportionality in their representation 
in the results of the elections held under the first part of the MMP system, normally 
under a plurality/majority system. 
Constituency – A synonym for electoral district used predominantly in some anglophone 
countries. See Electoral district.
Contiguous district – An electoral district that can be enclosed in a single continuous 
boundary line.
Cross-cutting cleavages – Political allegiances of voters which cut across ethnic, 
religious and class divisions in a society. 
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Cumulation – The capacity within some electoral systems for voters to cast more than 
one vote for a favoured candidate. 
Democratic consolidation – The process by which a country’s political institutions 
and democratic procedures become legitimized, stable and broadly accepted by both 
political actors and the wider population.
D’Hondt Formula – One of the options for the series of divisors used to distribute seats 
in List PR systems which adopt the Highest Average Method. The votes of a party or 
grouping are divided successively by 1, 2, 3... as seats are allocated to it. Of the available 
formulas, D’Hondt tends to be the most favourable to larger parties. See also Sainte-
Laguë Formula.
Distribution requirements – The requirement that to win election a candidate must 
win not merely a specified proportion of the vote nationally but also a specified degree 
of support in a number of different states or regions. 
District – Used in this Handbook to mean electoral district.
District magnitude – For an electoral district, the number of representatives to be 
elected from it. See also Average district magnitude. 
Droop Quota – A variant of quota used in proportional representation systems which use 
the Largest Remainder Method, defined as the total valid vote divided by the number 
of seats to be filled in the electoral district plus one. Also known as Hagenbach-Bischoff 
Quota. See Quota (a). See also Hare Quota and Imperiali Quota.
Elector – A person who is both qualified and registered to vote at an election. 
Electoral district – One of the geographic areas into which a country, local authority or 
supranational institution may be divided for electoral purposes. See also Circonscription, 
Constituency, Electorate (b) and Riding. An electoral district may elect one or more 
representatives to an elected body. See Single-member district and Multi-member 
district.
Electoral formula – That part of the electoral system dealing specifically with the 
translation of votes into seats.
Electoral law – One or more pieces of legislation governing all aspects of the process 
for electing the political institutions defined in a country’s constitution or institutional 
framework. 
Electoral management body (EMB) – The organization tasked under electoral law 
with the responsibility for the conduct of elections. The EMB in most countries 
consists either of an independent commission appointed for the purpose or of part of a 
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specified government department. 
Electoral regulations – Rules subsidiary to legislation made, often by the electoral 
management body, under powers contained in the electoral law which govern aspects of 
the organization and administration of an election. 
Electoral system – That part of the electoral law and regulations which determines how 
parties and candidates are elected to a body as representatives. Its three most significant 
components are the electoral formula, the ballot structure and the district magnitude.
Electorate – May have one of two distinct meanings:
a. The total number of electors registered to vote in an electoral district.
b. A synonym for electoral district used predominantly in some anglophone countries. 
See Electoral district.
External voting – A mechanism by which voters who are permanently or temporarily 
absent from a country are enabled to cast a vote, also called out-of-country voting.
First Past The Post (FPTP) – The simplest form of plurality/majority electoral system, 
using single-member districts and candidate-centred voting. The winning candidate is 
the one who gains more votes than any other candidate, even if this is not an absolute 
majority of valid votes. 
Free list – A form of List PR in which voters may vote for a party or grouping and in 
addition for one or more candidates, whether or not those candidates are nominated by 
that party or grouping. Also known as panachage. See also Closed list and Open list.
Gerrymandering – The deliberate manipulation of electoral district boundaries so as to 
advantage or disadvantage a particular political interest. 
Hagenbach-Bischoff Quota – Another term for the Droop Quota. 
Hare Quota – A variant of quota used in proportional representation systems which use 
the Largest Remainder Method, defined as the total valid vote divided by the number of 
seats to be filled in the electoral district. See Quota (a). Also known as Hare-Niemeyer. 
See also Droop Quota and Imperiali Quota. 
Heterogeneous district – An electoral district in which, either by design or as a result of 
the operation of other criteria for boundary delimitation, the electorate manifests social, 
ethnic, religious or linguistic diversity.
Highest Average Method – A principle for converting votes into seats in List PR 
systems. One seat is allocated in a district at each of a series of counts to the party or 







party that wins it is reduced by division. The most common series of divisors used are 
D’Hondt and Sainte-Laguë. The Highest Average Method tends to be more favourable 
to larger parties than its alternative, the Largest Remainder Method.
Homogeneous district – An electoral district in which, either by design or as a result 
of the operation of other criteria for boundary delimitation, the electorate manifests 
substantial social, ethnic, religious or linguistic uniformity. 
Hybrid System – The result of dividing a country into two or more non-overlapping 
areas, in each of which a different electoral system is used. 
Imperiali Quota – A variant of quota used in proportional representation systems which 
use the Largest Remainder Method, defined as the total valid vote divided by the number 
of seats to be filled in the electoral district plus two. See also Droop Quota and Hare 
Quota.
Index of disproportionality – A figure which is designed to measure the degree of 
deviation from proportionality in the allocation of seats to parties or groupings which 
participated in an election. It is most commonly defined as the square root of the sum 
of the squares of the differences for each party or grouping between the percentage of 
votes received and the percentage of seats gained. 
Invalid votes – Votes which cannot be counted in favour of any participant in an 
election due to accidental or deliberate errors of marking by the voter. 
Largest Remainder Method – A principle for converting votes into seats in List PR 
systems. After parties and groupings have been allocated seats in an electoral district 
because they have received full quotas (a) of votes, some seats will be unfilled, and some 
votes remain—for each party, less than a full quota (a). The remaining seats are then 
awarded to parties and groupings in order of the number of left-over votes they possess. 
The Largest Remainder Method tends to be more favourable to smaller parties than the 
alternative approach, the Highest Average Method. 
Lema – A term used in Latin America for an umbrella list including two or more sub-
lists which receive votes separately but whose votes are counted together for the purposes 
of seat allocation in some List PR systems. See also Apparentement and Stembusaccoord.
Limited Vote (LV) – An electoral system used in multi-member districts in which electors 
have more than one vote, but fewer votes than there are candidates to be elected. The 
candidates with the highest vote totals win the seats, in the same way as in a Block Vote 
system and in SNTV. 
List Proportional Representation (List PR) – A system in which each participant 
party or grouping presents a list of candidates for an electoral district, voters vote for a 
party, and parties receive seats in proportion to their overall share of the vote. Winning 
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candidates are taken from the lists. See Closed list, Open list and Free list.
Lower house – One of the two chambers in a bicameral legislature, usually seen as 
comprising ‘the representatives of the people’. It is the more powerful chamber when 
the powers of the two chambers are unequal. 
Majoritarian – Designed to produce an absolute majority (50 per cent plus 1) of votes. 
Malapportionment – The uneven distribution of voters between electoral districts. 
Manufactured majority – An election result, more commonly found where a plurality/
majority system is used, in which a single party or coalition wins less than 50 per cent 
of the valid votes but an absolute majority of the seats in an elected body. 
Member state – A country which is a member of a supranational institution, for example 
the European Union. 
Mixed Member Proportional (MMP) – A mixed system in which all the voters 
use the first electoral system, usually a plurality/majority system, to elect some of the 
representatives to an elected body. The remaining seats are then allocated to parties and 
groupings using the second electoral system, normally List PR, so as to compensate for 
disproportionality in their representation in the results from the first electoral system.
Mixed system – A system in which the choices expressed by voters are used to elect 
representatives through two different systems, one proportional representation system 
and one plurality/majority system. There are two kinds of mixed system: Parallel systems 
and Mixed Member Proportional systems.
Modified Borda Count – A candidate-centred, preferential system used in either single- 
or multi-member districts in which voters use numbers to mark their preferences on the 
ballot paper and each preference marked is then assigned a value calculated by using 
the series of divisors 1, 2, 3 ... . For example, in a ten-candidate field a first preference is 
worth one, a second preference is worth 0.5, a third preference 0.3333, and so on. These 
are summed and the candidate(s) with the highest total(s) is/are declared elected. See 
also Borda Count.
Multi-member district – A district from which more than one representative is elected 
to a legislature or elected body. See also Single-member district.
Multiple-tier system – An electoral system in which two or more sets of representatives 
are elected to the same chamber by the entire electorate of a country. The multiple tiers 
may be electoral districts defined at different levels within a country, for example, single-
member districts and regions, or regions and the country as a whole. Systems in which 
two distinct sets of representatives are elected from the same level are also multiple-tier 







One Person One Vote One Value (OPOVOV) – A principle of representation in which 
each elected representative represents the same number of electors, and under which 
malapportionment is minimized.
Open list – A form of List PR in which voters can express a preference both for a party 
or grouping and for one, or sometimes more, candidates within that party or grouping. 
See also Closed list and Free list.
Out-of-country voting – A mechanism by which voters who are permanently or 
temporarily absent from a country are enabled to cast a vote. See External voting. See 
also Remote voting. 
Overhang mandate – See Überhangsmandat. 
Panachage – The term used in francophone countries for the version of List PR in which 
voters may vote for a party or grouping and in addition for one or more candidates, 
whether or not those candidates are nominated by that party or grouping. See also Free 
list.  
Parallel System – A mixed system in which the choices expressed by the voters are used 
to elect representatives through two different systems, usually one plurality/majority 
system and one proportional representation system, but where no account is taken of the 
seats allocated under the first system in calculating the results in the second system. See 
also Mixed-Member Proportional. 
Party Block Vote (PBV) – A plurality/majority system using multi-member districts in 
which voters cast a single party-centred vote for a party of choice, and do not choose 
between candidates. The party with most votes will win every seat in the electoral 
district. 
Party-centred ballot – A form of ballot in which a voter chooses between parties or 
groupings, rather than individual candidates.
Party magnitude – For an electoral district, the average number of representatives 
elected by each party and grouping. For a country, the average of the party magnitudes 
for all electoral districts. 
Personation – The fraudulent casting of the vote of a registered elector by another 
person. 
Plurality/majority systems – Plurality/majority systems are based on the principle that 
a candidate(s) or party with a plurality of votes (i.e. more than any other) or a majority 
of votes (i.e. 50 per cent plus one—an absolute majority) is/are declared the winner(s). 
Such a system may use single-member districts—for example, First Past The Post, 
Alternative Vote or the Two-Round System—or multi-member districts—for example, 
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the Block Vote and Party Block Vote. 
Preferential voting systems – Electoral systems in which voters rank parties or 
candidates on the ballot paper in order of their choice. The Alternative Vote, the Borda 
Count, the Single Transferable Vote and the Supplementary Vote are all examples of 
preferential voting systems. 
Proportional Representation (PR) – An electoral system family based on the principle of 
the conscious translation of the overall votes of a party or grouping into a corresponding 
proportion of seats in an elected body. For example, a party which wins 30 per cent of 
the votes will receive approximately 30 per cent of the seats. All PR systems require the 
use of multi-member districts. There are two major types of PR system, List PR and the 
Single Transferable Vote (STV).
Quota – May have one of two distinct meanings: 
a. The number of votes which guarantees a party or candidate to win one seat in 
a particular electoral district in a proportional representation system. There are three 
variants in common use, the Hare, Droop (or Hagenbach-Bischoff ) and Imperiali 
quotas. 
b. A number of seats in an elected body or a proportion of candidates nominated 
by a party or grouping which are required by law to be filled by representatives of 
a particular kind; most commonly used to ensure the nomination and election of a 
minimum number of women. 
Regional fiefdom – A situation in which one party wins all, or nearly all, of the seats in 
a particular geographic region of a country. 
Remote voting – A mechanism by which voters are enabled to cast a vote which does 
not involve their attendance at a polling station on the day or days fixed for voting. See 
also Out-of-country voting.
Reserved seats – Seats in which a determinable criterion such as religion, ethnicity, 
language or gender is a requirement for nomination or election. 
Riding – A synonym for electoral district used in some countries. See Electoral 
district.
Sainte-Laguë Formula – one of the options for the series of divisors used to distribute 
seats in List PR systems which adopt the Highest Average Method. The votes of a party 
or grouping are divided successively by 1, 3, 5... as seats are allocated to it. See also 
D’Hondt Formula. 
Single-member district – An electoral district from which only one member is elected 







Single Non-Transferable Vote (SNTV) – An electoral system in which voters cast 
a single candidate-centred vote for one candidate in a multi-member district. The 
candidates with the highest vote totals are declared elected. 
Single Transferable Vote (STV) – A preferential candidate-centred proportional 
representation system used in multi-member districts. Candidates that surpass a specified 
quota (see Quota (a)) of first-preference votes are immediately elected. In successive 
counts, votes are redistributed from least successful candidates, who are eliminated, 
and votes surplus to the quota are redistributed from successful candidates, until 
sufficient candidates are declared elected. 
Spoilt votes – See Invalid votes. 
State – Used in this Handbook to denote a sub-national unit of a country, often in the 
context of a federal constitution. 
Stembusaccoord – A term of Dutch origin for a provision which can be included in List 
PR systems which enables two or more parties or groupings which are fighting separate 
campaigns to reach agreement that their votes will be combined for the purpose of seat 
allocation. See also Apparentement and Lema.
Supplementary Vote – A candidate-centred, preferential plurality/majority system, 
similar to the Alternative Vote. If no candidate achieves an absolute majority of first 
preferences, all candidates except the two leading candidates are eliminated and their 
votes reallocated according to the second, third and so on preferences expressed. The 
candidate with the highest number of votes is declared elected. 
Supranational institution – an organization created by a number of countries by treaty 
where power is held by independent appointed officials or by representatives elected by 
the legislatures or people of the member states. 
Threshold – The minimum level of support which a party needs to gain representation 
in the legislature. A threshold may be a formal threshold, which is a figure laid down in 
the constitution or the law, usually in the form of a percentage of the valid votes cast, 
or an effective or natural threshold, which is a mathematical property of the electoral 
system in use. 
Two-Round System (TRS) – A plurality/majority system in which a second election is 
held if no candidate achieves a given level of votes, most commonly an absolute majority 
(50 per cent plus one), in the first election round. 
A Two-Round System may take a majority-plurality form, in which it is possible for more 
than two candidates to contest the second round. An example is the French system, in 
which any candidate who has received the votes of over 12.5 per cent of the registered 
electorate in the first round can stand in the second round. The candidate who wins 
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the highest number of votes in the second round is then declared elected, regardless of 
whether they have won an absolute majority. Alternatively, a Two-Round System may 
take a majority run-off form, in which only the top two candidates in the first round 
contest the second round. 
Überhangsmandat – An additional seat in a legislature which results in an MMP 
system when a party or grouping wins more seats in a region under the first, usually 
plurality/majority, electoral system than the number to which it would be entitled in 
total on the basis of its proportion of the vote. Also known as excess mandate or overhang 
mandate. 
Upper house – One of the two chambers in a bicameral legislature, often seen either as 
containing ‘the representatives of regions/federal states’ or as ‘a chamber of review’. The 
less powerful chamber when the powers of the two chambers are unequal. 
Wasted votes – Valid votes which do not ultimately count towards the election of any 
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Electoral Systems’ Impact 




Here is a hypothetical election (of 25,000 votes contested by two political parties) run 
under two different sets of electoral rules: a plurality/majority FPTP system with five 
single-member districts, and a List PR system with one large district. 
 Electoral Districts Seats Won
 1 2 3 4 5 Total % FPTP List PR
Party A 3 000 2 600 2 551 2 551 100 10 802 43 4 2
Party B 2 000 2 400 2 449 2 449 4 900 14 198 57 1 3
Total 5 000 5 000 5 000 5 000 5 000 25 000 100 5 5
Key: FPTP = First Past The Post; List PR = List Proportional Representation system using the 
Largest Remainder Method of seat allocation with a Hare Quota. 
Party A receives far fewer votes than Party B (43 per cent as opposed to 57 per cent), 
but under an FPTP system it wins four of the five seats available. Conversely, under a 
List PR system Party B wins three seats against two seats for Party A. This example may 
appear extreme but similar results occur quite regularly in plurality/majority elections.
Example 2
In the second example the two hypothetical electoral systems remain the same but 
there are now five parties contesting the election and the distribution of the votes is 
changed. 
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 Electoral Districts Seats Won
 1 2 3 4 5 Total % FPTP List PR
Party A 2 000 2 000 2 000 200 50 6 250 25 3 1
Party B 500 500 500 3 750 500 5 750 23 1 1
Party C 500 250 750 1 000 3 000 5 500 22 1 1
Party D 1 000 500 1 700 25 1 025 4 250 17 0 1
Party E 1 000 1 750 50 25 425 3 250 13 0 1
Total 5 000 5 000 5 000 5 000 5 000 25 000 100 5 5
Key: FPTP = First Past The Post; List PR = List Proportional Representation system using the 
Largest Remainder Method of seat allocation with a Hare Quota. 
Under the List PR system every party wins a single seat despite the fact that Party A 
wins almost twice as many votes as Party E. Under an FPTP system the largest party 
(A) would have picked up a majority of the five seats with the next two highest-polling 
parties (B and C) winning a single seat each. The choice of electoral system thus has a 
dramatic effect on the composition of the legislature and, by extension, the government 
in a parliamentary system. 
Example 3
In the third example there are again two parties competing; but there are now 50,000 
votes and ten seats to be allocated. The two electoral systems are a Parallel (five List 
PR seats and five FPTP seats) system, and an MMP (five List PR seats and five FPTP 
seats) system. 
 Electoral Districts Seats Won
 1 2 3 4 5 National  Total % Parallel MMP
      District 
      5 Seats    
Party A 2 600 2 600 2 600 2 600 3 100 13 500 27 000 54 Party A total: 8 Party A total: 5
         (FPTP: 5 and (FPTP: 5 and
         List PR: 3) List PR: 0)
Party B 2 400 2 400 2 400 2 400 1 900 11 500 23 000 46 Party B total: 2 Party B total: 5
         (FPTP: 0 and (FPTP: 0 and
         List PR: 2) List PR: 5)
Total 5 000 5 000 5 000 5 000 5 000 25 000 50 000 100 10 10
Key: Parallel = Parallel system with the elements List PR and FPTP; MMP = Mixed Member 
Proportional system with the elements List PR and FPTP. (The List PR systems use the Largest 
Remainder Method of seat allocation with a Hare Quota.) 
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Under the Parallel system Party A wins eight seats and Party B gets the remaining two 
seats. All five of the FPTP seats and three of the five List PR seats go to Party A, which 
thus wins a total of 80 per cent of the seats with 54 per cent of the vote. Under the 
MMP system, with the List PR element compensating for the disproportionality under 
the FPTP element, the same vote distribution gives both parties five seats each. In this 
example, under MMP, Party A wins all five of the FPTP seats and hence all the five List 
PR seats are allocated to Party B. 
The result of the MMP system is a much more proportional 50 : 50 per cent seat 
distribution with a 54 : 46 per cent vote distribution compared to the outcome of the 
election under the Parallel system. This clearly shows the difference between the List 
PR element simply running parallel to the plurality/majority system on the one hand, 




These two figures are designed to illustrate the principle that there is no independent 
approach to boundary delimitation. Like many other facets of electoral system design, 
apparently technical methods and decisions inevitably have political consequences, and 
those with political interests can be expected to argue for solutions which are politically 
beneficial to them. 
The figures show the results of two different approaches to boundary delimitation in 
an area which contains a town and surrounding countryside. The total population 
qualifies the area for two seats in the legislature. Forty per cent of the population live in 
the town, and 60 per cent in the countryside. (These numbers may equally refer to the 
total electorate, which is also used as the basis of seat entitlement in some countries.) 
For the sake of simplicity, it is assumed that everyone in the town votes for the Workers’ 
Party, and everyone in the countryside votes for the Farmers’ Party. The real world is 
obviously more complex, but this does not change the principles of the mathematics. 
In Model 1, the Doughnut principle, the town is retained as a single community in 
one relatively homogeneous SMD, to which a small amount of adjacent countryside is 
added to equalize the electorates of the two districts. Most of the countryside makes up 
a homogeneous second SMD. The result is victory in the town district for the Workers’ 
Party, and victory in the countryside district for the Farmers’ Party.
In Model 2, the Burger principle, the area is divided along the river which runs through 
the centre of it. Two heterogeneous SMDs are created, one containing the northern 
half of the town and the surrounding northern countryside, the other the southern half 
of the town and the surrounding southern countryside. In both districts, the Farmers’ 
Party gains victory by 60 per cent to 40 per cent and is given both seats.
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Unsurprisingly, the Workers’ Party will attempt to persuade the delimitation authority 
of the technical virtues of homogeneity and the unity of the town, while at the same 
time the Farmers’ Party will be arguing the case for heterogeneity and the undesirability 
of a seat with a hole in it!
Town and Country: Two Seats
Model 1: Doughnut
Everyone in town votes Workers’ Party
Everyone outside votes Farmers’ Party
 District A: Workers 80%
  Farmers 20%
 District B: Farmers 100%
 
 Result: Workers 1 seat
  Farmers 1 seat
Town and Country : Two Seats 
Model 2: Burger
Everyone in town votes Workers’ Party
Everyone outside votes Farmers’ Party
 District A: Workers 40%
  Farmers 60%
 District B: Workers 40%
  Farmers 60%
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 see also under names of countries using
Diouf, President Abdou 109
‘direct democracy’ 7, 150
displaced persons 126
distribution requirements 137–38, 176
district 176 see also electoral districts
Djibouti: 
 elections:
   1997 47
  2003 27
 electoral system, data on 168
 PBV system 27, 47
 Union for the Majority Coalition 47
Dominica: electoral system, data on 168
Dominican Republic: electoral system, 
 data on 168




 elections, 1990 84
 List PR system 84
Eastern Europe: 
 List PR system 33
 Parallel system 33
Ecuador: 
 electoral system, data on 168
 political parties 149
 presidential elections 133, 135
 TRS 133
Egypt: 
 electoral system, data on 168
 TRS 52
El Salvador: electoral system, data on 168
elections: 
 accessibility 10
 administrative aspects 5, 14
 ballot security 124
 cost 14, 130, 137
 electoral management body 22
 future government and 10
 meaningfulness 10
 mock 22
 one person, one vote 14
 participation increase 10
 post-conflict 126
 power of body being elected 10
 staggering 124
 sustainability 14
 timing of 124
 transitional 126
 turnout 119, 125
 see also ballots
‘elector’ 176
electoral boundaries: 
 drawing 153–54, 175, 191–92
 manipulating 123
 time needed to establish 126
electoral districts: 
 average district magnitude 174
 boundaries, electoral system design and 5, 
    9, 153





   average 174
  changing 21
  definition 5, 176
  minorities and 122
 multi-member 179
 single-member 154, 181
electoral formula: seats and 5, 176
electoral law: definition 176
electoral management body (EMB) definition 
 176
electoral registration: 
 electoral system design and 5
 up-to-date 10
electoral regulations 177





 acceptance of 163
 defects, fixing later 163
 design components 25
 gradualness and 159
 impact assessment 23
 implementation advice 22
 others’ experience, learning from 159
 past systems and 163
 political gain and 163
 political parties and 149
 problems 23
 proposals for 163
 recent changes 24
 reformers 21, 22
 resistance to 21
 response to 23
 technical simulations 22
 trends in 23
 understanding 21–22
 who designs 15–16
electoral systems: 
 accountability 150
 adaptation necessary 21
 administrative implications 153–56
 categories of 3, 27
 choice:
  accidental nature 1
  administrative aspects 14
  background to 1–2
  constraints on 2
  cost and 14
  effects of 1, 5, 6–7
  importance of 1, 5–9
  international standards and 14
  long-term/short-term compatibility 162
  partisan advantage and 1, 2
  political life, effect on 1, 2
  as political process 2
  process 161
 citizens’ assemblies on 16
 classification of 1–4, 28
 complexity of 14
 conflict management and 6, 163–64
 contextual factors 160
 cost 153–56, 156
 definition 177
 design:
  advice about 159–64
  checklist 164
  criteria for 5, 9–15
 efficient government and 11
 ethnic minorities and 15
 evaluation of 2
 exclusion 160
 fairness 11
 families of 3, 4, 27
 frequency of use 29–33, 30, 31, 32
 funding 153
 governance and 12, 129–50
 hybrid 178
 inclusion, importance of 160
 influence of, underestimating 162
 infrastructure, time needed to set up 126
 innovation 160
 institutions’ legitimacy and 10
 interest in increased 22
 legislative/executive relationship and 8
 legitimacy, building 161
 manipulation of 5
 mechanical effects 6–7
 nature of 5
 opposition and 13
 origins of 15
 as panacea 162
 political discrimination and 11–12
 as political institutions 2–3
 political institutions’ framework and 7–9
 political parties and 6, 149–50
 polling days, number of 155
 priorities, establishing 15
 proportionality and 27
 psychological effects 6–7, 23
 regional diffusion 49
 regions over-represented 123
 responsiveness of 162
 simplicity 160
 socio-political context 7
 stable government and 11–12
 sustainability 155
 temporal factors 160
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 turnout 119, 125
 unlikely problems and 164
 vote counting 155
 voter education 155
 voter registration and 154
 votes to seats, impact on 188–90 
    see also votes-to-seats relationahip
 voting behaviour and 11
 see also following entry and under names of 
    individual electoral systems
electoral system reform: 
 democracy, transition to and 20
 governance, crisis of 20
 legislation and 5
 mechanisms for 20–21
 partisan advantage and 20
 political context 20
 political crisis and 1
 political elites and 20
 political reform and 1
 proportionality, trend to 23
 worldwide III, 23
electorate: definition 177
Equatorial Guinea: 
 electoral system, data on 168
 presidential elections 130
Eritrea: electoral system, data on 168
established democracies: 
 electoral systems 33
 reform 2
 PR systems 57, 58
Estonia: 
 electoral system, data on 168
 List PR system 142
 STV sytem 71, 76
Ethiopia: electoral system, data on 168
Europe: 
 FPTP system 33
 List PR system 33, 90, 163
 PR systems 57
European Parliament: 
 Act Concerning the Election of the 
    Representatives of the Assembly by Direct 
    Universal Suffrage 140, 142
 Council Decision 8964/02 142
 elections 139
  1979 140, 141
  2004 140, 141, 143
 List PR system 139
 MEPs, number of 139
 national politicians and 142, 143
 party groups 142
 political parties and 139
 PR system and 139
 threshold 142
 turnout 143




 BV system 44
 electoral system, data on 168
federal systems 7, 8:
 presidential systems and 9
federal/state assemblies 144
Fiji: 
 AV system 23, 33, 49, 159
 ballot paper 48
 commission on electoral system 16
 communal roll system 124
 communities 123
 electoral system, data on 168
 electoral system reform 23
 inter-ethnic moderation 23
Finland: 
 electoral system, data on 168
 List PR system 84, 90, 118, 142
 remote voting 124
 TRS 133
First Past the Post (FPTP): 
 advantages 36–37, 120
 ballot papers 38, 131, 132, 154
 broadly based political parties and 36
 candidate-centred voting 35, 37
 coalition governments 36
 countries using 35–36
 definition 28, 177
 disadvantages 37, 43–44, 120





 divided societies 36
 electoral boundaries and 43–44, 153
 extremist parties and 36
 family of 3
 frequency of use 29, 30, 31, 33
 geography and 36
 independent candidates 37
 individual candidates 37
 List PR element added 21
 minority parties and 37, 43
 multi-member districts 28
 opposition and 36
 political parties and 6–7, 37, 43, 149
 presidential elections 130–33
 regional fiefdoms 43
 seat bonus 36
 simplicity 36, 37
 single-member districts 28, 35
 single-party governments and 36
 smaller parties and 37
 third parties and 36
 turnout 119
 unfairness 37, 43, 92
 vote-splitting 43
 votes to seats, impact on 188, 189, 190
 votes/seats discrepancy 37, 43, 92
 women and 37
Fox, President Vincente 96
France: 
 colonies 52, 163
 electoral system, data on 168
 geography 141
 List PR system 141, 142, 161
 MEPs 140, 141–42
 TRS 52, 109, 133, 141, 161
 voters/representatives relationship 141
free list systems 60, 84, 155, 177
Frei, President Eduardo 78, 80
Fujimori, President Alberto 135
G
Gabon: 
 electoral system, data on 168
 TRS 52
Gambia: 




 electoral system, data on 168
 Parallel electoral system 104
 TRS 52, 104, 133
Germany: 
 electoral system, data on 168
 extremist groups 84
 Free Democratic Party 59
 List PR system140
 MEPs 140
 MMP system 33, 91, 91, 95, 100
 thresholds 83
 Upper House 138
 Weimar 59




 electoral system, data on 168
 TRS 133
Gibraltar: 
 electoral system, data on 168





 opposition and 13
Greece: 
 electoral system, data on 168
 List PR system 142
 voting compulsory 125
Greenland: 
 FPTP system 140–41
 leaves EU 141
Grenada: electoral system, data on 168
Guatemala: electoral system, data on 168
Guernsey: 
 BV system 44
 electoral system, data on 168
Guinea (Conakry): 
 electoral system, data on 168
209
 Parallel electoral system 104
Guinea-Bissau: 
 electoral system, data on 168
 TRS 133
Guyana: 
 electoral system, data on 168
 List PR system and 7




 electoral system, data on 168
  TRS 52, 133
Handbook: 
 aims of 2, 3, 4
 electoral system designers and 4–5
 focus of 4
 legislatures and 4
 options discussed 3
 using 3–5
Hare Quota 66, 67, 68, 97, 109
Hare, Thomas 71
Highest Average Method 177–78
Holy See (Vatican City): electoral system, data 
 on 168
Honduras: 
 electoral system, data on 169
 presidential elections 130
Hungary: 
 electoral system, data on 169
 List PR system142
 MEPs 142
 mixed system 118





 electoral system, data on 169
 presidential elections 130
Imperiali Quota 178
independent candidates 9
index of disproportionality 178
India: 
 ballot paper 38
 Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) 40, 41, 42
 Congress Party 39, 40, 40, 41, 42
 Constituent Assembly 39
 Constitution 39, 41
 democracy defended 41
 Election Commission 42, 124
 elections:
  1955 66
  1977 41
  1989 42
  1996 42
  1999 42
  2004 42
  frequency 39
 electoral system, data on 169
 Emergency 41
 FPTP system 7, 12, 31, 33, 35, 39–42
 Janata Dal Party 42
 Lok Sabha (lower house) 39, 41, 124
 minorities and 41, 122
 National Commission to Review the Working 
    of the Constitution 42
 National Congress Party 42
 political parties 7
 population 31, 39
 PR system 66
 Rajya Sabha (upper house) 39, 138




 Constituent Assembly 66
 constitution 66, 67–68
 corruption 66
 distribution requirement 137–38
 Election Commission 67, 68
 elections:
  1999 67–68, 69
  2004 68, 69
 electoral districts 57 
 electoral systems 66–70:
   data on 169






 Java 67, 69
 Largest Remainder method 66, 67
 legislature 66, 67, 139
 List PR system 31, 61, 66, 67, 68, 90, 139
 National Assembly 68, 139
 OPOVOV 69
 out-of-country voting 125
 Outer Island regions 66, 68, 69
 plurality SMD system 68
 political parties 149
 presidential elections 69, 133, 137
 regional chamber 68, 69
 regional parties prohibited 68
 seat allocation 67
 SNTV system 69, 113, 139
 TRS 69, 133
 women 68, 69
Inter-Parliamentary Union 37
International Covenant on Civil and Political
 Rights, 1966 14
Iran: 
 electoral system, data on 169
 TRS 52, 133
Iraq: electoral system, data on 169
Ireland, Republic of: 
 AV system 49, 72, 135, 159
 British and 72
 by-elections 155
 candidate ranking 72, 73
 characteristics of 74
 constitution 72
 Dáil 72
 economic growth 73
 electoral reform considered 72, 74
 electoral system, data on 169
 Fianna Fáil 72, 73
 FPTP system and 72
 geography and 72
 independents 73
 MEPs 141, 142
 political parties 73
 presidential elections 49, 72, 135
 referendums 72
 seat bonus 73
 small parties 73
 STV system 33, 71, 72–74, 76, 77, 139, 
    141, 142
Israel: 
 coalition governments 59
 electoral system, data on 169
 List PR system 90
 as one electoral district 57, 71, 82
 threshold 60
Italy: 
 coalition governments 59
 corruption 20
 electoral system, data on 169
 electoral system reform 23
 List PR system140
 MEPs 140, 142
 MMP system 23, 33, 91, 91
 referendum 23
J
Jamaica: electoral system, data on 169
Japan: 
 candidate ranking 115
 corruption 20, 114, 115
 Democratic Party 116
 Diet 114, 115
 dual candidacies 115
 elections:
  1996 115
  2000 115
  2003 116
 electoral districts 115
 electoral system, data on 169
 electoral system reform 114–16
 FPTP system 115
 House of Representatives 114
 Komeito party 116
 Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) 114, 115, 116
 List PR system 115
 opposition 116
 Parallel electoral system 31, 104, 115–16
 political parties 115
 SNTV system 113, 114
 two-party system 114–15, 116
 Upper House 138
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Jersey: electoral system, data on 169
Jordan: 
 Block Vote system 44
 electoral system, data on 169
 electoral system reform 163




 electoral system, data on 169
 Parallel electoral system 104
 TRS 52, 104
Kenya: 
 African National Union 44
 ballot paper 132
 distribution requirement 137–38
 electoral system, data on 169
 FPTP system 43–44
 presidential elections 133, 137
 TRS 133
Kiribati: 
 BV system 52
 electoral system, data on 169
 presidential elections 130
Korea, North: electoral system, data on 169
Korea, South: 
 electoral system, data on 169
 Parallel electoral system 104
 presidential elections 130
Kosovo: 
 election, 2001 154
 List PR system 90
Kulov, Feliks 55
Kuwait: 
 BV system 44
 electoral system, data on 169
Kyrgyzstan: 
 Assembly of People’s Representatives 55
 constitution 55
 Constitutional Court 55
 elections:
  1995 55
  2000 55
 elections, rule changes 54, 55, 56
 Electoral Commission 56
 electoral manipulation 54–56
 electoral system, data on 169
 electoral system reform 163
 judiciary 56
 Language Commission 55
 Legislative Assembly 55
 List PR system 55
 local assembly elections 56
 minorities 56
 opposition 56
 parliamentary elections 55
 political parties 56
 presidential elections 54, 55, 56
 referendum 55
 regional elections 56
 Russians in 55, 56
 SNTV system 56




 BV system 44
 electoral system, data on 169
Largest Remainder method 60, 62, 66, 67, 97, 
 98, 109, 178
Latin America: 
 List PR system 8, 31
 PR systems 57
 presidential systems 8, 130
 TRS 133, 135
 voting compulsory 125
Latvia: 
 electoral system, data on 169
 List PR system 142
Lavín, Joaquín 80
Lebanon: 
 BV system 44, 123
 electoral system, data on 169
legislatures: 
 bicameral 138, 174
 working majority in 11
Lesotho: 





 compensatory seats 93, 94, 95
 Congress for Democracy 12
 constitution 94
 elections, 1998 11–12, 37
 electoral districts 93, 94
 electoral register 94
 electoral system, data on 169
 electoral system reform 12, 21, 93–94, 159
 FPTP system 12
 Independent Electoral Commission 94
 Interim Political Authority (IPA) 92–93, 94
 legislature 95
 Lesotho Congress for Democracy (LCD) 92, 
 93
 MMP system 33, 91, 92–94, 95
 National Assembly 92, 93, 94
 opposition 93, 94
 Parallel System 93
 referendum 94
 seats, number of 93
Liberia: 
 election, 1997 154
 electoral system, data on 169
Libya: electoral system, data on 169
Liechtenstein: electoral system, data on 169
Lijphart, Arend 30
Limited Vote system (LV): 
 advantages 117
 category of 3
 definition 29, 178
 disadvantages 117
 electoral boundaries and 153
 frequency of use 30, 31, 32, 33
 vote counting 117
List Proportional Representation system 
 (List PR): 
 administrative ease 153–54
 advantages 60–61, 119
 apparentement 90, 174
 ballot papers 60, 65, 85, 155
 closed lists 12, 60, 67, 71, 84, 85, 149, 155, 
    175
 cost 153, 156
 definition 178–79
 disadvantages 61, 71, 119
 discussion of 60–61, 71
 electoral boundaries 154
 family of 3
 free lists 60, 84, 155, 177
 frequency of use 30, 31, 32, 33, 57
 leaderships’ power and 71
 lema 178
 MEPs 141, 142
 multi-member districts 60
 nationwide electoral districts 57, 71, 125, 154
 open lists 60, 71, 84, 85, 90, 150, 180
 political parties and 71
 presidents and 119
 seat allocation 60
 seat vacancies between elections 155
 single-member districts 61
 stembusaccoord 90
 thresholds 60
 vote pooling 60
 voter registration 154
 votes to seats, impact on 188, 189, 190
 women 61, 90, 121
 working of 60
Lithuania: 
 electoral system, data on 169
 List PR system 142
 Parallel electoral system 104
 TRS 104, 133
local authorities, electing 144, 148
local government: election of 8
lower house 179
Lula da Silva, Luiz Inácio 86
Luxembourg: 
 electoral system, data on 170




 electoral system, data on 170
 TRS 133
Madagascar: 
 electoral system, data on 170
 mixed system 23
majoritarian: definition 179
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malapportionment 28, 43, 87, 179
Malawi: 
 Alliance for Democracy 27
 Congress Party 27
 election, 2004 27
 electoral system, data on 170
 FPTP system 43
 ‘interest groups’ 138
 presidential elections 130
 United Democratic Front 27
 Upper House 138
Malaysia: 
 Barisan government 36
 electoral system, data on 170
 FPTP system 35, 36
Maldives: 
 BV system 44
 electoral system, data on 170
Mali: 
 electoral system, data on 170
 local elections 144
 PBV system 52
 TRS 163
Malta: 
 electoral system, data on 170
 STV system 33, 71, 77, 139, 142
Man, Isle of: electoral system, data on 170
Mandela, Nelson 62, 63
manufactured majority: definition 179
Marshall Islands: 
 electoral system, data on 170
 remote voting 124
Mauritania: 
 electoral system, data on 170
 TRS 52
Mauritius: 
 ‘best loser’ system 123
 BV system 44
 commission on electoral systems 16




 candidate selection 99
 Chamber of Deputies 96, 97, 98
 coalitions 97
 Congress 96
 D’Hondt Formula 98
 elections:
  1979 97
  1982 97
  1985 97
  1988 96, 97
  1994 96
  1997 97, 98
  2000 97, 98
  2003 97, 98
 electoral districts 96, 97 
 electoral system, data on 170
 electoral system reform 20–21, 96–99
 federal electoral court 98
 Federal Electoral Institute (IFE) 96, 97
 FPTP system 96, 97
 Greens 97
 Hare Quota 97
 Institutional Revolutionary Party (PRI) 96, 
    97, 98, 99
 Largest Remainder Method 97, 98
 List PR system 96, 97, 98
 MMP system 33, 91, 91, 94
 National Action Party (PAN) 97
 over-representation 98
 Party of the Democratic Revolution 121
 political parties 99 
 presidential elections 130
 presidential system 96, 99
 re-election banned 96, 98–99
 Revolution 96, 99
 Senate 96, 97, 98
 separation of powers 96
 threshold 97
 women 121
Micronesia: electoral system, data on 170
Middle East: FPTP system 33
minorities: 
 electoral systems and 6, 122–23
 local level promotion of 8
 national discouragement of 8
 representation of 122–23





 see also under names of countries and electoral 
    systems
Mixed Member Proportional system (MMP): 
 advantages 95, 120
 ballot papers 101, 154
 compensation seats 91, 95
 countries using 91
 definition of 29, 179
 disadvantages 95, 120
 discussion 91, 95
 family of 3, 29
 frequency of use 30, 31, 32, 33
 geography and 95
 legislature size 95
 overhang mandates 95
 political parties 95
 strategic voting anomalies 95




 frequency of use 29
 hybrid 119
 local/national relationship 149–50
 sub-families 3
 tendency towards 23
 tiers 118
 types of 29
Moi, President Daniel Arap 138
Moldova: electoral system, data on 170
Monaco: electoral system, data on 170
Mongolia: 
 BV system 44
 electoral system, data on 170
 Mongolia People’s Revolutionary Party 27
 TRS 27
Montserrat: electoral system, data on 170
Morocco: electoral system, data on 170
Mozambique: 
 elections accepted 161
 electoral system, data on 170
 TRS 133





 electoral system, data on 170
 Herero 61
 Nama 61
 as one electoral district 71
 Ovambo 61
 political parties 7
 PR in 7
 TRS 133
 white people 61
 women 121
nations: centralization, degree of 7–8
Nauru: electoral system, data on 170
Nepal: 
 electoral system, data on 170
 FPTP system 35 
 regions over-represented 123
Netherlands: 
 colonies 163
 electoral system, data on 170
 List PR system 140
 MEPs 140
 as one electoral district 57
 out-of-country voting 125
 thresholds 84
Netherlands Antilles: electoral system, data 
 on 170 
new democracies: 
 building 126
 election staggering in 124
 electoral system choice 1, 159, 162
 FPTP system 163
 List PR system 61
 mixed systems and 29
 past systems and 163
 political parties 149
 politics in 162
 PR systems 57, 61
 priorities 1
 societal divisions 57
 voters, underestimating 160
215
 women and 37
New Zealand: 
 Asians in 103
 ballot paper 101
 coalitions 102
 elections:
  1978 11
  1981 11
  1996 102
  2002 102
 electoral system, data on 170
 electoral system reform 11, 13, 20, 21, 100, 
    103, 159, 161
 FPTP system 13, 100, 102
 Labour Party 100, 102
 Maori 103, 124
 minorities 103, 122
 MMP system 13, 33, 91, 91, 95, 100, 102–3, 
    159, 161
 National Party 11, 95, 100, 102
 Pacific Islanders 103
 proportional representation 100–3
 referendums 16, 21, 100, 161
 remote voting 125
 Royal Commission on the Electoral System 
    100, 102, 103
 seat allocation 102
 Social Credit 100
 thresholds 83, 102




 ballot paper 85
 electoral system, data on 170
 Sandinistas’ electoral defeat 161
Niger: electoral system, data on 170
Nigeria: 
 distribution requirement 137–38
 electoral system, data on 171
 presidential elections 133, 137
 TRS 133
Niue: electoral system, data on 171
Northern Ireland: 
 elections:
  1998 11
  2003 11
 Good Friday agreement election 11
 MEPs 141
 STV system 11, 71, 141, 159
Norway: electoral system, data on 171
O
Oceania: 
 AV system 49, 159
 FPTP system 31, 33
Oman: electoral system, data on 171
One Person One Vote Value (OPOVOV) 180
Ontario 18
open list systems 12, 60, 71, 84, 85, 90, 150, 180
Organization for Security and Co-operation in 
 Europe (OSCE) 14
Oslo Agreement, 1993 45
overhang mandate  (Überhangsmandat) 183
P
Pakistan: 
 communal roll system 124
 electoral system, data on 171
 minorities 122
 Parallel electoral system 104
Palau: electoral system, data on 171
Palestine: 
 ballot paper 131
 BV system 44
 British Mandate 46
 elections:
  1940s 45–46
  1970s 46
 electoral system, data on 171
 electoral systems 45–46
 Executive Authority 45
 Fatah 45, 46
 FPTP system 45
 Gaza City 46
 Hamas 45
 independents 46
 Interim Agreement 45
 Israel and 45





 minorities 46, 122
 Oslo Agreement 45
 Palestinian Council 45–46
 political parties 45
 presidential elections 130
 Samaritans 46
 vote counting 46
 West Bank 46
Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) 45
panachage 180
Panama: 
 electoral system, data on 171
 hybrid electoral system 119
 presidential elections 130
Papua New Guinea: 
 accountability 51
 Australia and 50
 AV system 33, 49, 50, 51, 159
 elections 51
 electoral system, data on 171
 electoral violence 51
 FPTP system 7, 43, 50, 51
 inter-ethnic accommodation 49, 50–51
 political parties 7, 149
 preferential voting 51
Paraguay: 
 electoral system, data on 171
 presidential elections 130
Parallel electoral system: 
 advantages 112, 120
 ballot papers 104, 108, 154
 countries using 29, 112
 definition 180
 disadvantages 112, 120
 discussion of 104, 112
 family of 3
 frequency of use 30, 31, 32, 33
 plurality/majority system 104
 PR component 104
 seats/votes 115
 votes to seats, impact on 189, 190
parliamentarism: presidentialism and 8
parliamentary system: 
 legislature/executive relationship 129
 Lower/Upper Houses, different electoral 
    systems for 138–39




 discussion of 47
 district magnitude 83
 electoral boundaries and 153
 ethnic representation 47
 family of 3, 28





 Chamber of Deputies 135





 BV system 44
 electoral system, data on 171
 mixed system 44, 47
 Parallel electoral system 104
 presidential elections 130, 133
Pinochet, General Augusto 21, 78, 79, 80
Pitcairn Islands: 
 electoral system, data on 171
 SNTV system 33, 113
plurality single-member district system 
 see First Past the Post System
plurality/majority systems: 
 definition 35, 180
 discussion of 35–53
 districts 28
 ethnical divisions and 9
 frequency of use 29, 31, 32
 legislative majority and 11
 manufactured majority 179
 political parties and 6, 7
 PR element added to 23
 proportionality and 27
 representatives’ accountability and 12
 single-member districts 28
217
 single-party government 11
 sub-families 3, 28
 types of 28
 unfair results 57
 women 61
 see also Alternative Vote; Block Vote; First Past
    the Post; Party Block Vote; Two-Round 
    System
Poland: 
 electoral system, data on 171




 alliances between 6
 breadth of appeal 10–11, 13, 149, 161
 candidates, relationship with 13, 149–50
 cohesion of 6
 conflict management and 10–11
 discipline of 6
 elected members, relationship with 25, 130
 elections, synchronizing 130
 electoral systems and 6, 149–50
 encouraging 9, 12–13, 161–62
 ethnicity and 126
 fragmentation 13, 130
 funding 149
 leaders and activists 7
 leaders’ control 7, 13
 management of 25
 personality and 126
 post-conflict 126
 regional concentration 27
 see also under names of countries and electoral 
    systems
Portugal: 
 electoral system, data on 171
 List PR system 142
 PR system 57
 TRS 133
post-conflict elections 15, 21, 126
preferences, second 28
preferential systems 130, 135, 160
preferential vote count 14
preferential voting 135–37, 136, 181
presidential systems: 
 electoral systems and 8, 129, 130–38, 159
 political parties and 8
 president/legislature relationship 8, 13, 
     129–30
 regional bases, appealing outside 137
Principe: TRS 133
proportional representation systems: 
 accountability and 59
 advantages of 57–58
 aim of 29
 ballot papers 60
 coalition governments 11, 12, 58–59, 129
 complexity 59
 definition 181
 disadvantages of 58–59
 discussion 57–77
 electoral district magnitude 77, 82–83, 122
 frequency of use 29, 30, 31, 32, 33
 geography and 82
 issues related to 77–90
 members and constituencies 82
 minorities and 60, 122
 minority parties 58, 83
 multi-member districts 57
 nations as single district 57, 71, 81
 party lists 29
 party magnitude 83
 political parties and 6, 7, 57, 59
 post-conflict transition 59
 preferential 29
 proportionality and 4, 77
 regional fiefdoms 58
 seat bonuses 57
 single-party majorities and 11, 12
 stability and 58
 sub-families 3, 29
 thresholds 83–84
 trends towards 23
 two-tier 118
 types of 57
 variations on 118
 ‘vote pooling’ 60
 wasted votes 58





 see also List Proportional Representation; 
    Single Transferable Vote
proportionality, index of 178
public opinion 20
Q
Qatar: electoral system, data on 171
quota:
 definition 181
  formulae: changing 21
  see also under names of countries and indiviual 





 provision for 7
 role of 25







 party-political situation and 9
representation, considerations on 121–23
representatives, accountability of 12
reserved seats 181
riding 181
Robinson, President Mary 135
Romania: 
 electoral system, data on 171
 TRS 133
Ruiz-Tagle, President Eduardo Frei 78, 80
Russia: TRS 133
Russian Federation: 
 electoral system, data on 171
 Parallel electoral system 31, 104




 electoral system, data on 171
 presidential elections 130
 women 121
S
Saint Helena: electoral system, data on 171
Saint Kitts and Nevis: electoral system, data on 
 171
Saint Lucia: electoral system, data on 171
Saint Vincent and the Grenadines: electoral 
 system, data on 171
Sainte-Laguë Method 96, 181
Samoa: 
 electoral system, data on 171
 minorities 122
San Marino: electoral system, data on 171
Santos, Jose dos 53
São Tomé and Principe: 
 electoral system, data on 171
 TRS 133




 D’Hondt Formula 86, 176
 Droop quota 62, 71, 176
 Hare quota 66, 67, 68, 97, 109, 177
 Highest Average 60
 Largest Remainder Method 60, 62, 66, 67, 
    97, 98, 109




 African Party for Democracy and Socialism 
    110
 Alliance of Forces of Progress 110
 Democratic Party of Senegal 110
 democratic transfer of power 109
 elections:
  1993 110
  1998 109
  2000 109
  2001 110
 electoral districts 109
 electoral system, data on 171
219
 Hare quota 109
 Largest Remainder Method 109
 List PR system 111
 local elections 110
 National Assembly 110
 opposition 109, 111
 Parallel system 47, 104, 109–11
 PBV system 104, 109, 110, 111
 presidential elections 109
 Socialist Party 109
 SOPI Coalition 110, 111
 TRS 109
 Union for Democratic Renewal 110
Serbia and Montenegro 126 see also Kosovo
Serbia and Montenegro: electoral system, 
 data on 171
Seychelles: 
 electoral system, data on 171




 election, 1996 154
 electoral system, data on 171
 List PR system 61
 TRS 133
Singapore: 
 best loser seats 47
 electoral system, data on 172
 PBV system 47
 presidential elections 130
Single Non-Transferable Vote (SNTV): 
 advantages 113
 ballot papers 154
 category of 3
 clientelistic politics 117
 definition 29, 182
 disadvantages 117
 discussion 113, 117
 district magnitude 82–83
 electoral boundaries and 153
 electoral districts 113, 117
 frequency of use 30, 31, 32, 33
 minority parties and 113, 117
 political parties and 113, 117
Single Transferable Vote (STV): 
 advantages 76
 ballot papers 75, 154
 candidates, choice of 76
 ‘clientelistic’ politics and 77
 definition 29, 182
 disadvantages 73, 77
 discussion 71–77
 Droop quota 71
 electoral boundaries and 153
 family of 3
 frequency of use 30, 32, 33, 57
 geography and 76
 incumbents currying favour 73
 independents 76
 party-list option 76
 political parties and 77
 quotas 71, 76
 short-termism 73
 sophistication of 76, 77
 surplus transfer values 77
 vote counting 76, 77
 voter education 155
single-party government 129
Slovakia: 
 electoral system, data on 172
 List PR system 142
 TRS 133
Slovenia: 
 electoral system, data on 172
 List PR system142
 minorities 122
 TRS 133
Soeharto, President 66, 67
Soekarno, President 66
Solomon Islands: electoral system, data on 172
Somalia: electoral system, data on 172
South Africa: 
 accountability 21, 64
 African Christian Democratic Party 60, 63
 African National Congress (ANC) 27, 62, 
    121, 162
 apartheid 62
 armed forces 92





 black people 64
 coloured people 64
 constitution 20, 63, 64
 democracy, change to 62
 Democratic Party (DP) 62, 63–64, 65
 district accountability 64
 Droop quota 62
 elections:
  1994 154
  2004 27
 elections accepted 161
 electoral system, data on 172
 electoral system reform 21
 electoral systems 20, 27, 62–65
 FPTP system 63, 64, 162
 Freedom Front (FF) 62, 63, 64
 geography 64
 Independent Electoral Commission (IEC) 65
 Indian people 64
 Inkatha Freedom Party (IFP) 62, 63
 KwaZulu-Natal 62, 63
 Largest Remainder method 62
 List PR system 61, 62–63, 64, 65, 84, 118, 
    144, 159, 162
 MMP system 65
 National Assembly 20, 61, 62, 63, 64
 National Council of Provinces 8
 National Party (NP) 62, 63
 Ndebeli 61, 64
 Pan-Africanist Congress of Azania (PAC) 
    62, 63
 Pedi 61, 64
 political parties 7
 PR in 7, 12, 21, 27, 61 see also List PR system
 presidential commission 21
 provincial parliament 63, 64
 regional lists 64
 Shangaan 61, 64
 Sotho 61, 64
 Swazi 61, 64
 Task Team 65
 Tswana 61, 64
 Upper House 138
 Venda 61, 64
 violence 63
 votes wasted 27
 white people 61, 64
 women 64, 121
 Xhosa 61, 64
 Zulu 61, 64
South Pacific 35
Southern African Development Community 
 12, 92
Soviet Union see Union of Soviet Socialist 
 Republics
Spain: 
 electoral system, data on 172
 List PR system 142
 LV system 117
Speight, George 23
Sri Lanka: 
 ballot paper 136
 electoral system, data on 172
 political parties 90





 democracy-building in 126
 electoral system, data on 172
 TRS 133
Supplementary Vote system 135, 137, 182
supranational bodies: 
 electing 139
 political parties and 139
supranational institution: definition 182
Suriname: electoral system, data on 172
Swaziland:electoral system, data on 12
Sweden: 
 electoral system, data on 172
 List PR system 84, 142
 MEPs 142
 remote voting 124–25
Switzerland: 
 electoral system, data on 172
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